In 1968, twenty-eight years after Walter Benjamin's death, Hannah Arendt published a literary portrait of Benjamin that questioned the Frankfurt School's editorial infringements on and interpretive ...appropriations of Benjamin's work. In recent discussions of her intervention in the debate that had escalated upon Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem's publication of Benjamin's letters in 1966, it has been neglected that Arendt published two versions of her portrait, American and German. This article shows that the American version differs significantly from the German as it amplifies a characteristic citation method through which Arendt performatively preserves and promotes Benjamin's work. Thus, the American version indicates how Arendt transformed her strong editorial commitment to rescuing European Jewish cultural heritage after the Holocaust into a critical method. The initial occasion for Arendt's portrait was her American Benjamin edition Illuminations (1968), toward which she had begun working since her arrival in New York in 1941. The edition's continuing global distribution demonstrates the lasting impact of Arendt's intervention.
After Felix Weil had endowed the Institut für Sozialforschung with the equivalent of 786 kilograms of refined gold in 1935, it seemed inconceivable that, in late 1938, its directors Friedrich Pollock ...and Max Horkheimer would declare a financial crisis and start cutting costs with little regard for the consequences. They tried to reduce the salaries of their staff, or even get rid of them, while at the same time securing additional funds for themselves. A month after transferring an extra $50,000 to an account at his exclusive disposal, Horkheimer let Walter Benjamin know that he was unable to provide him with the money for a steamliner ticket to New York, "aber meine Hände sind leider gebunden." These circumstances were not known to the participants in the so-called Merkur-debate of 1968, in which Theodor Adorno found himself accused of having willfully omitted documents showing Benjamin's Marxist inclinations when he published his friend's Briefe in 1966. While Hannah Arendt had criticized the Institut for not sufficiently supporting Benjamin, she had stopped short of ascribing them any role in Benjamin's suicide. However, the Frankfurter's financial incompetence matched their skill in controlling the narrative around this mismanagement, such that, to this day, Arendt continues to be criticized for wrongly accusing Horkheimer and Adorno. This article examines the circumstances that contributed to Benjamin's tragic death and the subsequent debates over potential wrongdoings.
Prosvjetiteljsko-romantičarski odnos prema antičkom naslijeđu u posljednjim desetljećima 18. i prvim desetljećima 19. stoljeća postavio je rimsku Salonu na mapu atraktivnih europskih nalazišta. ...Usporedno s osnivanjem institucija nadležnih za brigu i očuvanje salonitanskih spomenika, raste i zanimanje antikvara za novootkrivenim predmetima, kako domaćih tako i stranih. Za strance je građu često nabavljalo lokalno stanovništvo, a o kolekcijama koje su se pritom formirale sačuvano je veoma malo ili nimalo podataka. Uglavnom je zabilježeno tek postojanje kolekcija kod istaknutih pojedinaca, dok su zbirke u manjim sredinama nepoznatih sakupljača uglavnom u potpunosti nepoznate.
U ovom radu istražuje se do danas nepoznata zbirka brončanih skulpturica koja je pripadala Solinjaninu Ivanu Grubiću, zvanom Jablan, a danas je dio Antičke zbirke u Muzeju povijesti umjetnosti u Beču (Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien, Antikensammlung).
Gekkotan lizards are widely distributed in tropical regions and extend into more northern regions in Asia and Europe. Unfortunately, gekkotans lack significant fossil record and many aspects of their ...evolutionary biology are still poorly understood. Our study provides the first information about occurrence of this group in the Czech Republic. The fossil material comes from the Lower Miocene sediments (MN 3) of the locality Merkur-North. All the gekkonid bones can be assigned to the family Sphaerodactylidae and represent a single taxon, Euleptes gallica. This taxon was previously known only from the French locality Montaigu (zone MN 2), and thus our study extends its stratigraphic and geographic range.
Ethics of Evil Mills, Jon; Naso, Ronald C
2016, 20180329, 2018-03-29
eBook
In today’s world, where every form of transgression enjoys a psychological motive and rational justification, psychoanalysis stands alone in its ability to uncover the hidden motives that inform ...individual and social collective behaviour. Both in theory and in practice, it bears witness to the impact of anonymity on the potential for perpetration, especially when others are experienced as faceless, disposable objects whose otherness is, at bottom, but a projection, displacement, and denial of our own interiority – in short, the evil within.
In keeping with this perspective, Ethics of Evil rejects facile rationalisations of violence; it also rejects the idea that evil, as a concept, is inscrutable or animated by demonic forces. Instead, it evaluates the moral framework in which evil is situated, providing a descriptive understanding of it as a plurality and a depth psychological perspective on the threat it poses for our well-being and ways of life. In so doing, it also fashions and articulates an ethical stance that recognises the intrinsic link between human freedom and the potential for evil. The contributors to this book argue that moralising evil is one of the most important agendas of our time.
This paper discusses Jung's idea of myth as a projection of the collective unconscious, suggesting that the term ‘projection’ separates human beings from nature, withdrawing nature's life into ...humanity. Jung's discovery of a realm independent of consciousness – in conversations with his soul in The Red Book, and in synchronicity, began a dialogue which finally brought him, through the Alchemical Mercurius, closer to the idea of a world‐soul.
Cet article discute l’idée de Jung du mythe en tant que projection de l’inconscient collectif, suggérant que le terme de ‘projection’ sépare les êtres humains de la nature, en enlevant sa vie à la nature pour la mettre dans l’humanité. La découverte de Jung d’un royaume indépendant de la conscience – dans les conversations avec son âme dans le Livre Rouge, et en synchronicité, fut le point de départ d’un dialogue qui l’amena finalement plus près, à travers le Mercure alchimique, de l’idée d’une âme du monde.
Dieser Artikel behandelt Jungs Idee des Mythos als einer Projektion des Kollektiven Unbewußten, was andeutet, daß der Begriff ‘Projektion’ den Menschen von der Natur trennt und das Leben der Natur in die Menschheit zurückzieht. Mit Jungs Entdeckung eines vom Bewußtsein unabhängigen Reiches – in Gesprächen mit seiner Seele im Roten Buch und in Synchronizität – begann ein Dialog, der ihn schließlich, durch den alchemistischen Mercurius, der Idee einer Weltseele näherbrachte.
: Questo lavoro discute l’idea di Jung del mito come proiezione dell’inconscio collettivo, suggerendo che il termine “proiezione” separa gli esseri umani dalla natura, segregando la vita naturale dentro l’umanità. La scoperta di Jung di un dominio indipendente dalla coscienza – nelle conversazioni con la sua anima nel Libro Rosso, e nella sincronicità, iniziò un dialogo che alla fine lo portò, attraverso il Mercurio alchemico, più vicino all’idea dell’anima del mondo.
В статье обсуждается идея Юнга о мифе как о проекции коллективного бессознательного. Предполагается, что термин «проекция» разделяет людей и природу, убирает природную жизнь в человека. Открытие Юнгом независимой от сознания области, которое произошло в его беседах со своей душой в Красной Книге и в синхронии, в конечном итоге с помощью Алхимического Меркурия подвело его к идее о мировой душе.
El presente ensayo presenta la idea de Jung sobre el mito como una proyección del inconsciente colectivo, sugiriendo que el término ‘proyección ‘separa a los seres humanos de la naturaleza, retirando la vida natural de la humanidad. El descubrimiento de Jung de una dimensión independiente de la conciencia – en conversación con su alma en el Libro Rojo, y en sincronicidad, comenzó un diálogo que finalmente, lo condujo, a través del Mercurius Alquímico, más cerca de la idea del alma del mundo.
我的荣格是谁?尽管时常矛盾,却不断前进的对荣格关于集体无意识观点的扩展,从“无意识的人性”到(通过神话及各类名目)对世界的灵魂
这篇文章讨论了荣格关于神话是集体无意识投射的观点,提出“投射”的概念把人类从自然中分离了出来,并把自然的生命从人性中撤离。荣格所发现的这个领域独立于意识,在他《红书》中所记载的与自我灵魂的对话中,以及在共时性中,他开始了一个对话,通过炼金术的墨丘利,这一对话最终使他更贴近世界灵魂的观念。
The locality of Akníkov 1 (Czech Republic, MN 3) has yielded the largest diversity of Dimylidae known from a single locality. Four species are recognised in the few dozen recovered fossils:
Dimylus
...aff.
paradoxus
,
Plesiodimylus
sp.,
Chainodus intercedens
and
Lacrimodon vandermeuleni
nov. gen., nov. sp. The high diversity supports the assumption of a humid palaeoenvironment for Akníkov 1.
This paper represents an archetypal and deconstructive reading of the work of Wolfgang Giegerich. In an attempt to extend and philosophically develop Jung's late‐life view of the objective psyche, ...Giegerich, via Hegel, defines psychology proper as fundamentally separate from the everyday person and the ‘human, all‐too‐human’ aspects of the soul. It is argued that, in so doing, Giegerich removes the human person from being the primary focus of his psychology and creates instead a hierarchy of ideas and values privileging syntax over semantics, the logical over the empirical, and thinking over imagination. This bypasses the emotionality of the everyday person/patient and also renders psychology proper unable to address the day‐to‐day practice of the analyst. Giegerich attempts to rectify this problem by re‐incorporating what he had previously rejected, making his theory more complex than is apparent in his binary oppositions. In the end, however, it remains a question to what extent Giegerich is successful in avoiding a binary scission (Saban 2015) or a tendency to regularly de‐emphasize the human aspect of the soul (Hoedl 2015) in his need to continue to heroically push off from the ego seeking total freedom from neurosis and from our humanity.
Translation of
Cet article est une lecture archétypale et déconstructive du travail de Wolfgang Giegerich. Dans sa tentative d'étendre et de développer philosophiquement la vision élaborée tardivement par Jung d'une psyche objective, Giegerich, s'appuyant sur Hegel, définit la psychologie à proprement parler, qui serait fondamentalement séparée de la personne ordinaire et des aspects « humains, rien qu'humains » de l'âme. Il est montré qu'en faisant cela, Giegerich retire la personne humaine du centre de sa psychologie créant à la place une hiérarchie d'idées et de valeurs qui privilégie la syntaxe plutôt que la sémantique, le logique plutôt que l'empirique, la pensée plutôt que l'imagination. Ceci court‐circuite l'affectivité de la personne ordinaire/du patient et rend la psychologie à proprement parler incapable de rendre compte de la pratique au quotidien de l'analyste. Giegerich tente de rectifier ce problème en réincorporant ce qu'il avait rejeté, rendant sa théorie plus complexe qu'il y apparait si l'on s'en tient à ses oppositions binaires. En fin de compte, néanmoins, la question reste ouverte de savoir si Giegerich parvient ou non à éviter une division binaire (Saban 2015) ou une tendance à minimiser régulièrement l'aspect humain de l'âme (Hoedl 2015) de par son besoin de toujours s'éloigner héroïquement de l'égo en recherchant à se libérer totalement de la névrose et de ce qui fait notre humanité.
Dieses Papier stellt eine archetypische und dekonstruktivistische Lektüre des Werkes von Wolfgang Giegerich dar. In einem Versuch, Jungs späte Auffassung der objektiven Psyche zu erweitern und philosophisch zu entwickeln, definiert Giegerich, über Hegel kommend, die wirkliche Psychologie als grundsätzlich getrennt vom Alltagsmenschen und den ‘menschlichen, allzu menschlichen’ Aspekten der Seele. Es wird die Behauptung aufgestellt, daß Giegerich dadurch die menschliche Person aus ihrer Position als primärem Fokus seiner Psychologie entfernt und stattdessen eine Hierarchie der Ideen und Werte schafft, privilegierend Syntax gegenüber Semantik, das Logische gegenüber dem Empirischen und das Denken gegenüber der Phantasie. Dies umgeht die Emotionalität des Alltagsmenschen / Patienten und setzt die wirkliche Psychologie außer Stande, der tagtäglichen Praxis des Analytikers gerecht zu werden. Giegerich versucht, dieses Problem durch erneute Einbeziehung dessen, was er zuvor abgelehnt hatte, zu korrigieren, wodurch er seine Theorie komplexer gestaltet als diese in seinen binären Oppositionen erscheint. Am Ende jedoch bleibt die Frage, in welchem Umfang Giegerich erfolgreich ist bei der Vermeidung einer binären Spaltung (Saban 2015) oder einer Tendenz, regelmäßig den menschlichen Aspekt der Seele unterzubetonen (Hoedl 2015) in seinem Bestreben, sich weiterhin heldenhaft von der egosuchenden totalen Freiheit, von der Neurose und unserer Menschlichkeit abzustoßen.
Questo articolo è una lettura archetipica e decostruttiva dell'opera di Wolfgang Giegerich. Nel tentativo di estender sviluppare filosoficamente la visione della psiche oggettiva elaborata da Jung in tarda età, Giegerich, attraverso Hegel, definisce la psicologia in sé come fondamentalmente distinta dalla persona empirica e dagli aspetti “umani, troppo umani” dell'anima. Nell'articolo si evidenzia come, nel far ciò, Giegerich rimuova la persona umana dal suo essere il fuoco della sua stessa psicologia e crei, al suo posto, una gerarchia di idee e valori che privilegiano la sintassi rispetto alla semantica, il logico rispetto all'empirico e il pensiero rispetto all'immaginazione. Ciò aggirerebbe la persona ed il paziente empirico e renderebbe la psicologia in sé incapace di affrontare la pratica quotidiana dell'analista. Giegerich tenta di rettificare questo problema reincorporando ciò che aveva rigettato in precedenza e rendendo la sua teoria più complessa rispetto al suo evidente carattere oppositivo binario. Alla fine, tuttavia, restano aperte le questioni su fino a che punto Giegerich ‐ nel suo bisogno di allontanarsi eroicamente dall'Io alla ricerca di una libertà assoluta dalla nevrosi e dall'umanità – sia effettivamente in grado di evitare una scissione binaria (Saban 2015), o una tendenza a de‐enfatizzare le caratteristiche dell'anima umana (Hoedl 2015).
Эта статья представляет на рассмотрение архетипическое и деконструктивное прочтение работ Вольфганга Гигериха. В попытке расширить и философски углубить поздние взгляды Юнга на объективную психику Гигерих, посредством Гегеля, определяет собственно психологию как фундаментально отличную от повседневной личности и «человеческих, слишком человеческих» аспектов души. Доказывается, что, делая это, Гигерих убирает человеческую личность из фокуса своей психологии и вместо этого создает иерархию идей и ценностей, отдающих предпочтение синтаксису в противовес семантике и логическому в противовес эмпирическому, а также мышлению над воображением. Такая установка обходит стороной эмоциональность повседневной личности человека/пациента, равно как и делает собственно психологию неспособной обратиться к каждодневной практике аналитика. Гигерих пытается выправить эту проблему, вновь включая в психологию то, что он ранее отвергал, делая тем самым свою теорию еще более сложной, чем это видно в его бинарных оппозициях. В конце концов, однако, остается вопросом, до какой степени Гигерих преуспел в избегании бинарного разделения (Сабан 2015) или тенденции к регулярному де‐сопереживанию человеческим аспектам души (Хёдль 2015) в своей потребности продолжать героически отталкиваться от эго в поисках тотальной свободы от невроза и от нашей человечности.
Este ensayo presenta una lectura arquetipal y deconstructiva del trabajo de Wofgang Giegerich. Con la intención de expandir y desarrollar filosóficamente la perspectiva sobre la psique objetiva, que Jung tuvo sobre el final de su obra, Giegerich, vía Hegel, define correctamente a la psicología como fundamentalmente separada de la persona cotidiana y de los aspectos “humanos, demasiado‐humanos” del alma. Se argumenta que al hacer esto, Giegerich quita a la persona humana como foco principal de su psicología y crea una jerarquía de ideas y valores que privilegian la sintaxis por sobre la semántica, la lógica por sobre lo empírico, y el pensamiento por sobre la imaginación. Esto ignora los afectos de la persona/paciente en su cotidianeidad y también deja a la psicología como incapaz de ocuparse de la práctica cotidiana del analista. La intención de Giegerich de rectificar este problema, reincorporando lo que previamente él había rechazado, vuelve su teoría más compleja de lo que aparenta en sus oposiciones binarias. Sin embargo, la pregunta permanece respecto de hasta cuánto Giegerich ha tenido éxito en, evitar una escisión binaria (Saban 2015) o una tendencia hacia des‐enfatizar regularmente el aspecto humano del alma (Hoedl 2015) en su necesidad de continuar desprendiéndose heroicamente del ego, buscando liberarse totalmente de la neurosis y de nuestra humanidad.
本文叙述了对沃福冈‐吉格里希作品的原型和解构性的解读。为了扩展以及在哲学层面上发展荣格晚期关于心理客观性的观点,吉格里希(通过黑格尔),为心理学之恰当作出了定义,把它从根本上与那些日常层面的,以及在“人之太过于人性”层面的个体灵魂层面区别开来。有人主张,通过这样的定义,吉格里希不再把人作为其心理学的首要关注,取而代之的是他所创造的具有层级解构的观点和一种价值取向,它把语法的价值凌驾于语义之上,逻辑凌驾于经验,思考凌驾于想象。这回避了个体/病人日常的情感,并致使心理学恰当性无法适用于心理分析师的日常实践。吉格里希尝试把他之前所排斥的内容重新进行整合,以修复这个问题,这让他二元对立的理论变得更加复杂。最后,不管怎样,仍需要质疑的是,在吉格里希持续英雄式的推离自我,寻求远离神经症以及获取人性的彻底自由的过程中,他在多大程度上成功地避免了二元分裂(Saban 2015),以及避免习惯性地对灵魂方面的忽视的倾向(Hoedl 2015)。
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