ABSTRACT
This paper aims to perform a large‐scale meta‐analysis of the relationship between post‐privatization ownership and firm performance in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet ...Union. Baseline estimation of a meta‐regression model that employs a total of 2,894 estimates drawn from 121 previous studies indicated the superior impact of foreign ownership on firm performance in comparison with state and domestic private entities. Furthermore, the estimation of an extended meta‐regression model that explicitly controls for the idiosyncrasies of transition economies and privatization policies strongly suggested that differences between countries in location, privatization method, and speed of policy implementation strongly influence the link between post‐privatization ownership structure and firm performance. We also found that these factors not only cause a remarkable gap between countries in terms of ex post improvement in firm performance but also significantly affect the interrelationship between foreign investors, domestic outsider owners, and firm managers, and the relative superiority of various domestic outsiders. Conclusive evidence of the harm caused to ex post firm performance by voucher privatization is one of the most noteworthy empirical findings in this paper.
Re-municipalization is part of a broader set of reverse privatization reforms. We argue the term re-municipalization lacks conceptual clarity, confusing municipal level reversals from national ones, ...new service delivery from reversals, and mixed market positions from full public control. This conceptual confusion makes measurement of re-municipalization difficult. While more case studies are being discovered, quantitative time series studies do not show remunicipalization is increasing. Much case study based research argues remunicipalization is politically transformative, but quantitative research generally finds re-municipalization to be part of a pragmatic market management process, a position confirmed by the papers in this special issue.
International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing ...countries in its ability to mandate far‐ranging policy reforms – so‐called “conditionalities” – in exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti‐corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, other IMF policy measures, such as the privatization of state‐owned enterprises, can create rent‐extraction opportunities and limit the capacity of state institutions to limit corrupt behavior. To test these mechanisms, we conduct instrumental‐variable regression analysis using an original dataset on IMF conditionality for up to 141 developing countries from 1982 to 2014. We find that conditions to privatize state‐owned enterprises exert significant detrimental effects on corruption control. Conversely, other areas of IMF intervention are not consistently related to corruption abatement. These findings offer policy lessons regarding the design of conditionality, which should avoid large‐scale privatization, especially under conditions of weak accountability.
•We explore the potential role of state-invested enterprises (SIEs) in the telecommunication sector as investors in innovation.•Public ownership is positively correlated to patenting activity.•For ...both state-invested and private companies improvements in institutional quality are positively associated with firm-level patenting.•The relation is stronger under public ownership.•We highlight the role of SIEs as patient investors.
Despite the wave of privatisation in recent decades, enterprises under government control still account for a large part of assets and employment in several countries and particularly continue to play a key role in certain network industries. We explore the potential role of State-Invested Enterprises (SIEs) as investors in innovation, with particular interest in that played by the institutional environment. We focus on the telecommunication industry, which has been affected by fundamental technological and organisational change, including liberalisation and privatisation, over the last decades but where public ownership still retains a major role. We draw on a longitudinal data set of 706 telecom companies from 91 countries over the 2007–2015 period and show that public ownership is positively correlated to patenting activity. We also find that - for both state-invested and private companies - improvements in institutional quality are positively associated with firm-level patenting, and that such a relation is stronger under public ownership. We offer an interpretation of these findings which shed new light on the role of SIEs as patient investors.
Monopoly is regulated in the regulation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as the right to regulate (bestuur) all state resources as mandated by the constitution of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution ...and also the BUMN Law Number 19 of 2003 where one of them is a company that is an entity a government-owned business in the form of a limited liability company. The capital is divided into wholly or at least 51 percent of the shares owned by the Republic of Indonesia with the main objective of pursuing profit. In the case of SOEs, corporate actions are determined by the direction of state policies in their economy. Problem formulation based on the above background, is monopolistic and de-monopoly practices against SOEs, inconsistency of the government? This research used normative juridical with a quantitative analytical approach and examines literature studies that conclude. The study results showed that corporate action was not doubt or inconsistency in implementing a state monopoly. However, this holding was to increase the capacity and existence of SOEs as agents of development and the state in managing resources related to many people’s lives.
We examine the real effect of partial privatization on corporate innovation. To establish causality, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in the expectation of further partial privatization ...generated by China's split share structure reform, which mandatorily converts non-tradable shares into freely tradable shares and opens up the gate to the further privatization of state-owned enterprises. We find that partial privatization prospects have a positive effect on corporate innovation. A better alignment of the interests of government agents with those of private shareholders and improved stock price informativeness appear to be two plausible underlying mechanisms. Our paper sheds new light on the real effects of partial privatization.
•Partial privatization prospects have a positive effect on corporate innovation.•A better alignment of the interests of government agents with those of private shareholders is a plausible underlying mechanism.•Improved stock price informativeness is another plausible underlying mechanism.•Our paper sheds new light on the real effects of partial privatization and has important policy implications for policy makers who aim to promote technological innovation.
This paper investigates privatization policy in mixed oligopoly when partial privatization changes a technological difference between semi‐public and private firms. It shows that when the degree of ...privatization is partial, privatization is insufficient. Furthermore, privatization is more likely to be insufficient as the market becomes more competitive. If the cost efficiency gain is captured by decreasing the degree of privatization, privatization is insufficient regardless of whether entry by private firms is restricted or free.
We examine the relation between state residual ownership and bank risk-taking for privatized banks from 45 countries. Applying propensity score matching, we find that privatized banks tend to exhibit ...higher levels of risk-taking post-privatization than their publicly listed non-privatized counterparts. Moreover, partially privatized banks exhibit higher levels of risk-taking than fully privatized banks. We also observe a positive and significant relation between the level of residual state ownership and risk-taking. These findings are consistent with the distorted objectives associated with government control, as suggested by the political benefits of control, and with the soft budget constraint views of state ownership. The distortion can be mitigated by the quality of a country's institutional and regulatory environments. Finally, our results show that the effect of state ownership on risk-taking is more pronounced in countries with a higher dominance of state-owned enterprises, and it was more prevalent during the global financial crisis.
•We study the relation between state ownership and risk-taking in privatized banks.•PSM analysis suggests privatized banks exhibit higher risk-taking after privatization•Partially privatized banks show greater risk-taking than fully privatized banks.•State ownership and risk-taking in privatized banks are positively related.•This relation is shaped by the country's institutional and regulatory environments.
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