The Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) is not currently equipped to empower Indigenous Australians to set up their for-profit businesses under its regime due to its ...rigidity and interventionist approach. This article argues the need for a change. A proposal is put forward to allow for the creation of a new type of corporation under the existing legislative framework for Indigenous entrepreneurs to run their for-profit businesses in a culturally appropriate way.
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui pengaruh pendapatan bagi hasil pembiayaan musyarakah terhadap laba perusahaan yang terdapat pada PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia, kemudian untuk ...mengetahui pengaruh margin pembiayaan murabahah terhadap laba perusahaan pada PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia, dan untuk mengetahui seberapa besar pengaruh dari pendapatan bagi hasil pembiayaan musyarakah juga pendapatan dari margin pembiayaan murabahah terhadap laba perusahaan pada PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode analisis deskriptif verifikatif dengan menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif yang dianalisis secara parsial dan simultan. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa uji statistik pendapatan bagi hasil pembiayaan musyarakah terhadap laba perusahaan menunjukan hasil koefisien determinasi sebesar 0,6%, uji statistik margin pembiayaan murabahah terhadap laba perusahaan menunjukkan hasil koefisien determinasi sebesar 1,4%, uji statistik antara pendapatan bagi hasil pembiayaan musyarakah dan margin pembiayaan murabahah terhadap laba perusahaan menunjukkan hasil koefisien determinasi yaitu sebesar 5,4% sisanya sebesar 94,6% yang kemungkinan dapat dipengaruhi oleh faktor lain yang tidak dibahas dan diteliti dalam penelitian ini.
•A novel energy cooperation framework for energy storage and prosumers is proposed.•A bi-level energy trading model considering the network constraints is presented.•A profit-sharing mechanism is ...designed with the asymmetric Nash bargaining model.•The adaptive alternating direction method of multipliers is applied efficiently.
Energy trading between community energy storage systems (CESSs) and prosumers has received much attention recently. But few studies have considered the impact of network constraints on energy trading and how to share profits equitably. To address these issues, this paper proposes an efficient energy cooperation framework for CESSs and prosumers. Firstly, an energy cooperation platform is introduced as a manager to interact with all players and the distribution system operator (DSO), improving the interaction efficiency and having better scalability. Secondly, we present a bi-level energy trading model: at the lower level, each prosumer and CESS interact with the platform to determine their shared power profiles; at the upper level, the platform and DSO calibrate the shared scheme from the lower level with network constraints and generate trading adjustments to guide the lower level energy trading. Furthermore, a profit-sharing mechanism based on the asymmetric Nash bargaining model is designed, where the contribution rates are determined by the shared energy of players. More importantly, to avoid players' cheating behavior, the player's revenue before allocation is calculated by the platform. Additionally, the adaptive alternating directional multiplier method (ADMM) is employed for solving energy trading problems, where the penalty parameters can be adaptively adjusted to accelerate the convergence rate. Finally, the case studies verify the feasibility and fairness of the energy cooperation framework.
This study aims to determine the implementation of profit sharing based musyarakah contracts, financing products and financing mechanisms at the Baitul Maal wa Tamwil (BMT) Dana Barokah. This study ...uses a qualitative method with a case study approach. The data used in the study used primary data and viewed from the data collection sources, the data used came from direct interviews with tellers and managers at BMT. The results of this study explain that BMT provides several savings products and financing products. To apply for financing, customers must first fill out a form and then complete the required files. In the implementation of musyarakah financing at BMT Dana Barokah Muntilan it is in accordance with Islamic sharia principles and the division of business with profit sharing, but the bank only as a provider of capital does not participate in conducting business activities. The profit-sharing determined by BMT Dana Barokah Muntilan is 2.5%, but negotiations are still possible.
This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from ...coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member's risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.
Due to the rising share of variable renewable energy, balancing market integration (BMI) has been advocated as a promising solution to achieve flexible resource sharing among different regions and ...enhance the flexibility of the overall power system. However, BMI can result in welfare transfers among regions, which may correspondingly give rise to resistance to integration. Therefore, an incentive mechanism to facilitate flexible resource sharing under BMI is designed in this paper. We first analyse the sources of the benefits of BMI and compare the influence of different market regulation approaches on the welfare transfer effect via a graphical method. Then, based on the Coase theorem, we design an incentive profit-sharing mechanism that is able to optimize the allocation of flexible resources and eliminate welfare transfers among regions to some extent to reduce possible resistance to integration. Case studies based on the three-region system and a realistic northwest power grid in China show that the balancing cost of multi-region systems can be respectively reduced up to 31% and 25%, and the utilization of flexible units can be increased by over 30% by BMI. Finally, corresponding policy implications for BMI are put forward; the proposed mechanism also provides a useful reference and insight for dealing with welfare transfers in interregional trading.
•Balancing market integration results in welfare transfers among regions.•An incentive profit-sharing mechanism based on the Coase theorem is designed.•Balancing market integration benefits from imbalance netting and resource sharing.•Inappropriate market adjustment approaches may lead to efficiency loss.•The contribution rates of each region and transmission lines are considered.
This research constructs a simple model to illustrate the global supply‐chain (GSC) profit sharing and industrial upgrading mechanism, finding that the average profitability distribution in the ...different supply‐chain stages is determined by three main conditions: (1) the average product of the labor in the firms at each production stage; (2) the production complexity level of each production stage in the chain; and (3) the ratio of the output elasticity of capital to the output elasticity of labor in each stage. This study also proposes a new industrial upgrading mechanism, the “smile‐curve‐driven supply‐chain upgrading,” for supply‐chain firms. Increases in production complexity and level of factor intensity in each production stage are found to be the two essential conditions for the smile‐curve‐driven supply‐chain upgrading. Our static and dynamic panel empirical models, including robustness checks, are both broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions of this paper.
Conflicts regarding tariff transitions and wages often occur in Indonesia. On the other hand, SMEs have an important role in efforts to improve the welfare of the community. This study aims to ...discuss self-regulating the results (mudharabah) of regional minimum wage increases at the MSME Puti Minang Group (PtM) successfully overcoming wage conflicts with Mudharabah. This research is a skin research carried out at PtM MSMEs in 6 Regencies in Lampung Province. The processed data is primarily based on the data for the result in PtM. In general, profit sharing (Mudharabah) at PTM in 2016 exceeded regional minimum wages. Based on the output value, it can be seen that the P-Value = 0,000, means smaller than the value α = 0.05, so Ho is rejected and accept Ha. For users (Mudharabah) of PTM in 2016 is greater than the UMR in 2016. PtM wage system using profit sharing (Mudharabah), can provide regional minimum wage standard (UMR) in Lampung in 2016, with an increase of 2016 UMR of 13% from UMR 2015. These results are evidence that a UMR increase of 13%, the profit-sharing system (Mudharabah) at PTM still has the ability to adapt (self-regulate) to the increase in UMR.
•Develop a game model between an e-commerce platform and multiple retailers.•Explore the effects of platform network on e-commerce supply chain management.•Investigate how platform digital ...empowerment affects decisions of platform company and offline retailers.•Achieve a win-win situation by using revenue-sharing or profit sharing contract.
We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform and multiple retailers. The platform with operational data of each retail store can effectively help retailers select marketable products and then improve their operational efficiency. We first investigate the motivation of retailers in accepting the platform digital empowerment (PDE) and joining the platform. We find that the retailer should join the platform and choose PDE only when the sales effort cost coefficient is high and the effect of sales effort on demand is weak. Second, we investigate the influence of the number of retailers on the platform network effect and find that the more retailers on the platform, the more profits the retailers and the e-commerce platform will make. Besides, the retailers’ sales efforts and the PDE level will increase. Third, we study the PDE decisions under the unconstrained and decentralized control system (DC), the decentralized control system with revenue sharing contract (RS) and the decentralized control system with profit sharing contract (PS), respectively. We find that the platform’s profit in PS is the highest among these systems if the sales effort cost coefficient is high. Furthermore, for these systems, the PDE level under DC is always the highest if the effort cost is low; otherwise, the PDE level under PS is the highest. In addition, the sales effort under DC is always the highest if PDE is employed, that is, nether RS nor PS can effectively promote the retailer’s sales effort.
ABSTRACT
We examine how compensation policies of audit firms are associated with audit quality. Specifically, we investigate the effects of the ratio of variable to fixed compensation and the size of ...the basis for profit sharing (i.e., whether partners share profits in a small or in a large profit pool). For our analyses, we use detailed mandatory disclosure of the compensation policies in German audit firms. We document that compensation policies vary considerably across audit firms. We find that profit sharing in a small profit pool and high variable compensation are two characteristics of auditor compensation associated with lower audit quality. We also find some evidence suggesting that audit quality may be most at risk in cases in which partners rely more heavily on variable compensation to divide a relatively small profit pool. In additional analyses, we find that these associations are more pronounced in medium‐sized audit firms. We argue that this finding may result from these firms being too large for audit partners to directly monitor each other effectively, yet simultaneously too small to have sophisticated centralized monitoring systems in place. Finally, we find that integrating partner‐specific, nonprofit‐related performance metrics into the compensation structure mitigates the adverse effects of small profit pools and high variable compensation.
RÉSUMÉ
Les politiques de rémunération des cabinets d’audit sont‐elles liées à la qualité de l’audit?
Les auteurs s'interrogent sur la nature du lien entre les politiques de rémunération des cabinets d'audit et la qualité de l'audit. Ils s'intéressent plus précisément à l'incidence de la proportion de la rémunération variable par rapport à la rémunération fixe et de la taille de la masse bénéficiaire (modeste ou importante) servant de base à la participation aux bénéfices. Ils utilisent dans leurs analyses l'information détaillée que les cabinets d'audit allemands sont tenus de fournir quant à leurs politiques de rémunération. Les données recueillies confirment que les politiques de rémunération varient considérablement selon les cabinets d'audit. Les auteurs constatent que la participation à une masse bénéficiaire modeste et une proportion élevée de rémunération variable sont deux caractéristiques de la rémunération des auditeurs qui sont associées à une qualité inférieure de l'audit. Ils relèvent également des données qui tendent à démontrer que la qualité de l'audit peut être exposée à un maximum de risque dans les cas où les associés s'appuient davantage sur la rémunération variable pour le partage d'une masse bénéficiaire relativement modeste. Des analyses supplémentaires révèlent que ces liens sont plus marqués dans les cabinets d'audit de taille moyenne. Selon les auteurs, cette observation pourrait être attribuable au fait que la taille de ces cabinets est trop importante pour que les associés d'audit puissent se livrer directement à une surveillance réciproque efficace, mais néanmoins trop modeste pour qu'ils se dotent de systèmes de surveillance centralisés perfectionnés. Enfin, les auteurs constatent que l'intégration de paramètres de rendement non liés aux bénéfices propres aux associés dans la structure de rémunération atténue les répercussions négatives des masses bénéficiaires modestes et de la proportion élevée de rémunération variable.
PDF
