There was not, except in the very broadest sense, a unified 'Allied' grand strategy regarding any aspect of World War II. British-American strategy and Soviet strategy were formed in isolation. This ...was certainly true of the strategy of anti-German insurgency. Aside from geographical and ideological factors a major source of difference was that Britain was at war with Germany from September 1939, while the USSR and the USA became involved two years later. There were major asymmetries: Moscow's insurgency strategy for most of the war was in practice applied to its own national territory, while British (and later American) insurgency strategy was applied to foreign countries occupied by Germany. It will be argued, however, that in different parts of the Grand Alliance the path of insurgency strategy followed a similar trajectory, even if this strategy was not synchronised in time or space. In London, Moscow, and Washington, high hopes were initially placed on popular rebellion in German-occupied territory. It was only months after the entry of their countries into the war that the high commands, both west and east of the Reich, came to the conclusion that insurgent forces could only be used as an auxiliary to huge conventional armies.
Commando Country assesses the nature of more than 30 special training centres that operated in the Scottish highlands between 1940 and 1945, in order to explore the origins, evolution and culture of ...British special service training during the Second World War. These locations were chosen by virtue of the utility of the physical environment of the highland estate, strongly influenced by associated ideas about the challenge of that environment, individual character and the nature of irregular warfare. By virtue of its Scottish geographical perspective, Commando Country diverges from the existing literature by looking across the training establishments used by different organisations, principally Military Intelligence, the Commandos, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), whose histories tend to be considered in isolation. The book investigates the development and function of each category of training centre, the relationships between them, and their place in the broader framework of British and Allied special operations. Based on research in official documentary sources, unpublished and published memoirs and on fieldwork and interviews with surviving participants conducted by the author, Commando Country also presents rare unpublished photographs from public and private sources and artefacts assembled for the exhibition of the same name held at the National War Museum, Edinburgh in 2007. The resulting thesis is that the philosophy and practice improvised at the original school of irregular warfare at Inverailort House in the summer of 1940 permeated the culture of the training centres that developed thereafter. Close attention is accordingly given to the circumstances, organisation and instructing personnel that created the Inverailort syllabus, and the backgrounds and skills brought to bear, some drawn from civilian professions. The application of similar methods to the newly formed Commando forces is then traced. In this context the original operational purposes of individual aspects of the training became standardised into a general test of fitness and character designed to control admission of volunteers into the Commandos, the raiding and assault units that regarded themselves as a new military elite. Simultaneously, the approach pioneered at Inverailort was adapted to form the paramilitary training element of SOE, the organisation that coordinated and supported Resistance organisations in enemy-occupied countries. Particular attention is paid to the dedicated training establishments for Polish and Norwegian SOE units based in Scotland. The book concludes by considering how techniques and philosophy were applied more widely as conventional military training itself evolved, extending influence even into postwar civilian outdoor recreation.
Plans for British and American political warfare operations in 1943 diverged considerably. SOE conceptions always involved a sabotage component, while OSS naturally put more emphasis on intelligence ...requirements. Detaching Hungary from the Axis became a strategic goal almost only by chance. Operational plans were not as fully responsive to shifts in Allied strategy as one might have expected. Assumptions about Allied military presence in the Balkans remained part of the plans far beyond the decisions reached at Quadrant.
This article will survey the activities of Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Sweden during the course of the Second World War. Under the constraints of a foreign policy that sought to gradually ...encourage the government of Sweden to become more pro-allied rather than pro-axis and 'non-belligerent', SOE nonetheless entered Sweden with hopes of developing a series of contacts with groups and individuals that could be turned into active resistance if Sweden joined the axis, or if Nazi Germany either invaded or occupied Sweden and the whole of Scandinavia. Once the possibility of an axis invasion of Sweden was decisively dismissed, SOE had to find a different role. In Sweden, the successful development of SOE's intelligence gathering capabilities in the economic sphere, especially in the allied campaign against German iron-ore traffic and ball-bearings, provided the organization with a purpose that definitely took another course when compared to intelligence activities in other regions and countries. With these constraints in view, this article focuses on three major aspects of SOE involvement in Sweden. First, the article will examine SOE's role, and war aims in Sweden, linking these to the very different requirements of the Foreign Office. Second, the article will explore British and Swedish intelligence relations. Third, it will consider the Swedish security police response to British intelligence.
Introduces this issue of "Intelligence and National Security". There has been something of a renaissance in the use of covert operations in international politics in recent years, not least those ...undertaken as part of the present war on terror. An appreciation of the Special Operations Executive's fortunes over the course of the Second World War has never been more relevant than today. It is now over ten years since the first Special Operations Executive files were deposited at the National Archives at Kew, London, and with the arrival of its personnel files this process is now substantially complete. Nevertheless, it is only relatively recently that historians have been able to subject the archive to sustained academic research and complete long-term research projects on aspects of the organisation's activities.
A detailed account of SOE in the Middle East is a prominent omission from the collection of studies on SOE during the Second World War. This is surprising given the importance of the region to ...Britain and the fact that some records were released, with a helpful guide, in 1994. Using these records, and the SOE War Diary (released in 1999), this article intends to show that SOE operations in the Middle East were characterized by a succession of crises. These fall into three periods: the early activities in 1940-41; the post-occupational planning phase of 1941-43, and the post-October 1943 period which saw reorganization, the recession of the German threat, the disbandment of the post-occupational schemes and the desire to re-tool SOE in the Middle East for peacetime/post-war problems.
James Klugmann spent two and a half years working on the staff of the Yugoslav Section of SOE. One of the most active and overt British communists of his generation, he has long been accused of ...having exploited that post to manipulate operations and policy in the interests of the communist cause. With reference to SOE and MI5 records, this study reveals how he was able to join and remain in SOE in spite of his pre-war profile as a leading student activist of the left.
The Cruise of U-188 Kohnen, David
Decision in the Atlantic,
04/2019
Book Chapter
This chapter by David Kohnen examines the Allied response to the initial German submarine operations in the Indian Ocean during the Second World War. Roughly forty German submarines sailed for East ...Asian waters after 1942; U-188 was among the few to navigate the Allied gauntlet in the Atlantic to reach the Indian Ocean. Only three German submarines, including U-188, returned to Europe from operations in the Indian Ocean before the Allied victory in May of 1945. The discussions between key British and American commanders regarding the presence of German submarines in the Indian Ocean provide unique insight into the operations and intelligence organizations of the Admiralty and Navy Department and are examined in detail. The chapter also looks at the Allied submarine tracking rooms, which assisted the Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services in the capture of the skipper of U-188 – thereby securing information on the Imperial Japanese during a critical period in the closing months of the Second World War.
This article surveys the activities of Special Operations Executive in Spain during the course of the Second World War. Under the constraints of a foreign policy that sought to gradually encourage ...the regime of General Francisco Franco to become more resolutely neutral rather than pro-Axis and 'non-belligerent', SOE nonetheless entered Spain with the hopes of developing a series of contacts with groups and individuals that could be turned into an active Resistance if Spain joined the Axis, or if Nazi Germany either invaded or occupied the Iberian Peninsula. Once the possibility of an Axis landing in Spain was decisively dismissed, SOE had to break away from its mandate to 'set Europe ablaze' and find a new role. In Spain, the successful development of SOE's intelligence gathering capabilities in the economic sphere, especially in the Allied campaign against German wolfram smuggling, provided the organization with a purpose that definitely went 'against the grain' when compared to activities in other regions and countries.
