Nastanak Republike Hrvatske kao subjekta međunarodnog prava nije vezan uz njezino međunarodno priznanje, nego uz proglašenje neovisnosti, može se reći uz stjecanje onih prava i dužnosti na njezinu ...teritoriju koje imaju sve suverene države. Pitanje kada je Republika Hrvatska postala subjektom međunarodnoga prava se tako svodi na pitanje datuma proglašenja i stjecanja pune suverenosti, ili - što je važnije - na pitanje o efektivnosti ostvarivanja neovisne vlasti.
Prema našemu mišljenju je Republika Hrvatska kao subjekt međunarodnoga prava nastala 25. lipnja 1991. donošenjem državnopravnih akata o suverenosti i samostalnosti, implicitno i neovisnosti, uz faktičnu efektivnost vlasti.
Brijunskom deklaracijom, 7. srpnja 1991., je Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske preuzeo međunarodnu obvezu o odgodi primjene tih akata na rok od 3 mjeseca. Sabor, koji je isključivo nadležan o tome donijeti odluku, odgodu nije nikada usvojio.
Ovdje se radi o sudaru međunarodne pravne obveze i internoga prava. Skloni smo prednost dati međunarodnom pravu i usvojiti gledište da je primjena odluka zaista bila i odgođena.
Brijunskom deklaracijom nisu stavljeni izvan snage državotvorni akti doneseni 25. lipnja 1991. Učinak te deklaracije se može promatrati dvojako: nastao je povratak na ranije stanje i gubitak međunarodne pravne osobnosti Republike Hrvatske. Poništio se učinak akata o neovisnosti države, Hrvatska se vratila u status federalne jedinice SFRJ.
Prema drugome gledištu su i nadalje ostvarivane puna suverenost i neovisnost, proklamirane 25. lipnja - neovisnost je u kontinuitetu, bez prekida.
Rad se usredotočuje na Krležinu dugotrajnu opsjednutost hrvatskim
nacionalnim pitanjem koja je bila podjednako prešućivana i u jugoslavenskoj i u hrvatskoj recepciji njegova djela. U prvom slučaju ...Krleži
kao priznatome jugoslavenskom autoru jednostavno nije pristajala nacionalna strast; u drugome Krleža kao autor “proleterski” obilježenoga
nacionalnog osjećaja nikako nije odgovarao (malo)građanskome hrvatstvu
novouspostavljenoga hrvatskoga književnog kanona. Rad pokušava
ispraviti tu nepravdu smještajući Krležinu opsesiju u tipično postimperijalni
srednjoistočnoeuropski politički, intelektualni i kulturni prostor.
Autor u vrlo sažetom obliku nastoji prikazati rezultate gospodarskog razvoja Hrvatske u proteklom stoljeću. Genezu nedovoljne razvijenosti povezuje sa turbulentnim političkim prilikama i ratnim ...zbivanjima tog razdoblja. Smatra da su hegemonističke politike Austro-Ugarske Monarhije i Kraljevine Jugoslavije bitno umanjile potencijalne mogućnosti razvoja u to doba. U razdoblju nakon II. svjetskog rata unatoč visokih ulaganja ostvareni su ispodprosječni rezultati zbog voluntarističkog karaktera djelujućeg društveno-ekonomskog sustava. U razdoblju nakon stjecanja potpune suverenosti znatan dio proizvodnog potencijala Hrvatske destruiran je loše provedenom privatizacijom i neoliberalnom ekonomskom politikom koju je vlada provodila po preporuci Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda i Svjetske banke. Zato su ukupni dosezi razvoja Hrvatske u proteklom stoljeću znatno manji od mogućih. Hrvatska nije uspjela smanjiti svoje zaostajanje za razvijenim državama regije i svijeta.
Any analysis of visible evidences of the doctrine of autonomy of EU law faces from the outset the problem of how to define the founding assumption of that doctrine; namely, in reference to what is EU ...law autonomous, according to the case law of the European Court of Justice? European Union constitutional developments over the last two decades have helped legal writers to develop the doctrine of "constitutional pluralism"; a new form of constitutionality, which bridges the traditional dichotomy between states and international organizations. The differences between evolutionary and revolutionary constitutions may deepen the understanding of the European Union, since only evolutionary constitutions are characterized by a pluralism of constitutive wills. Democratic governance and a responsible government should not be concretely identified with representative democracy, since these values can equally obtain in situations where part of the national sovereignty does not belong to the state. The direct effect and primacy of EEC law are the oldest expressions of the autonomy of EEC law. Most importantly, direct effect permitted the adoption of the rule of competence only allowing EEC courts to decide whether EEC law applied to any given case. Thereby, the ECJ affirmed its own Kompetenz-Kompetenz - the competence to rule over its own jurisdiction. Formally, direct effect remains to this day the cornerstone of the EU law's claim to autonomy from the laws of its Member States; substantially, the primacy of EU law over the laws of the Member States plays a similar role. The Court has been expanding EC competences for the last forty years through the doctrine of implied powers, which were then progressively entrenched in the founding treaties over time. Politically, the European Union has encountered difficulties in expressing solidarity with endangered and over-indebted Member States of the European Monetary Union, as well as in conceptualizing common interests of the European Union in general. The Commission, the Parliament, and the Council are entrusted with new tasks and the Court is granted new competences by virtue of the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact; further strengthening the EU and its institutional architecture, while circumventing procedural provisions for amending the founding treaties. In a couple of years the European Central Bank has evolved from the guarantor of the stability of prices to a mechanism permitting to "print" money in order to support the budgets and banks of over-indebted states. EMU members have agreed to centralize the monitoring of the banking sector. The answers given so far have created an irreversible gap between EMU and other EU Member States. In the Rottmann case (2010), the ECJ reviewed a Member State's actions concerning nationality; an area previously exclusively within the competence of Member States. It ruled that EU citizenship is not an accessory to the nationality of a EU Member State. The judgment ratifies a direct political relationship between the European Union and its citizens. The decisions of the German Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the laws on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009) illustrate the reluctance of that court to recognize the autonomy of EU law and most authors regard these decisions as limitations imposed upon further integration of the European Union. From the perspective of policy analysis, these decisions constitute clear-cut recommendations the necessary qualities for that process in the future; transferring democratic legitimization from the level of the Member States to that of the EU institutions. Fundamental rights have served as a tool and justification for the continuous expansion of the competences of the Court to new subject-matter areas of EU law. The doctrine of equivalent protection developed by the European Court for Human Rights and fully articulated in the Bosphorus judgment (2005) reaffirm the autonomy of EU law at the global level. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is the first element of the founding treaties directly aimed at EU citizens rather than Member States. It is thus in the area of human rights that the first legally binding act has been enacted, by virtue of which citizens of the EU belong to a single political community determined by its own laws and values. Accession of the EU to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the subjection of the EU to the competence of the court in Strasbourg have raised many questions concerning the primacy of competences and harmonization of the standards of interpretation for human and fundamental rights. The subjection of the ECJ to the European Court of Human Rights appears unnecessary since the latter neither bears greater legitimacy nor possesses better expertise with respect to the protection of fundamental rights within the European Union framework. The ECJ judgment in the MOX case (2006) is of great importance for the autonomy of EU law. The subsuming of mixed agreements under EU law, affirmation of exclusive competence of the EU Court for EU law disputes, and interpretation of the duty of cooperation as a limitation on the competences of Member States has led to a practical decoupling of the legal systems of the EU Member States beside the rights and obligations that those States hold under international law; affirming the role of EU institutions as a powerful intermediary between the two legal realms. The meeting point between targeted sanctions, imposed by the UN Security Council, and the legal system of the European Union has led to particularly tumultuous interactions. The case of Jassin Abdulah Kadi, whom the UN Security Council listed as a target for such sanctions, served as an ideal background for the ECJ to explore possibilities of an authentic value-based stance on targeted sanctions. The ECJ effectively opposed EU values to international norms. In the Kadi and Jusuf and al Barakaat Cases (2008), the Court upheld the legal position of fundamental rights, guaranteed by the European Union, as "constitutional principles" of the European Union, above that of UN Security Council resolutions enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This defense of due process standards has led to several reforms of the UN Security Council proceedings for the listing of targeted individuals. The external competences of the European Union were not expressly provided for in the founding treaties. They arose in practice following mixed agreements, concluded in parallel by Member States and the EEC, and later the EC and the EU. The Court's doctrine depriving WTO agreements of direct effect was expanded in the Intertanko case (2008) to other mixed agreements; giving the impression that the Court's ultimate goal is to make participation of the Member States in mixed agreements completely redundant. Over the span of the last fifty years the Court understood the autonomy of EU law in reference to the laws of the Member States. In its recent case-law, however, the autonomy of EU law from the laws of the Members States has helped the Court to claim the supremacy of the Member States' obligations under EU law over their other international duties. This may be regarded as a natural consequence of the level of constitutionalization achieved by EU law. The analysis of the concrete manifestations of the autonomy of EU law in the ECJ case-law, aimed at determining the substance and effects of that doctrine, leads to the conclusion that the Court has consciously, purposefully and over a longer period of time, used the concept of EU law autonomy to forward the sovereignty of the European Union. From a theoretical perspective, the most important aspect of the autonomy of EU law from the laws of its Members States is the power of EU institutions to decide upon their own competences. The recognition of such a power to the ECJ by the Member States is both voluntary and continuous. Subsequently, it may be regarded as evidence of the will of a constitution-making authority (pouvoir constituant) on the part of Member States, aimed at grounding the sovereignty of the European Union as a whole. At the institutional level, the most conspicuous phenomenon within the process of gradual establishment of a direct political relationship between citizens and the EU institutions is the expansion of the competences of the European Parliament, including the changes in the procedure for the election of its members. From a formal legal and symbolic perspective, the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU has been of great importance for the establishment of a common identity based on shared values. The Court's judgment in the Rottmann case shows that the Court's case-law is an irreplacable factor in the development of the Union. The European Union is ruled by an evolutionary form of constitutionalism, which presently finds itself in the transitory phase of constitutional pluralism. This phase is characterized by efforts to reach a state in which sovereignty would be divided between the European Union and the Member States. A precondition for this stated goal is the appearance of a common political will among the relevant constitutional factors, primarily the Member States, but also indirectly and gradually among EU citizens. If such will eventually appears, it will happen primarily due to a gradual, continuous and determined strengthening of the autonomy of EU law with respect to the laws of Member States.
Analiza konkretnog ispoljavanja učenja o autonomnosti prava EU suočena je na samom polazištu sa pitanjem određenja osnovne postavke tog učenja: u odnosu na šta je pravo EU, sudeći po praksi Suda EU, autonomno? Primer Evropske unije u poslednje dve decenije poslužio je mnogim pravnim piscima da razviju učenje o „ustavnom pluralizmu" kao novom obliku ustavnosti, koji prevazilazi klasičnu dihotomiju između države i međunarodne o
U ovom radu autor raspravlja o pitanju je li moguć, odnosno u kojoj mjeri je moguć utjecaj kaznenog prava Europske unije na nacionalna kaznena prava kada je u pitanju opći dio. Naime, ...tradicionalni instituti općeg dijela do sada su rijetko bili predmetom intervencija EU-a jer je osnovni cilj kaznenog prava EU-a postići ujednačeno inkriminiranje određenih kaznenih djela, što je materija posebnog dijela. Ipak, u dosadašnjim instrumentima i praksi europskih institucija zamijetni su fragmenti općeg dijela. Autor analizira dosadašnju europsku pravnu stečevinu u ovom području i prepoznaje te fragmente te ih nastoji uobličiti u jedinstvenu cjelinu. Na kraju iznosi svoje mišljenje o tome je li harmonizacija općega dijela realna mogućnost te u kojem će smjeru teći daljnje formiranje supranacionalnog općeg dijela kaznenog prava.
Rad pokazuje kako je Vicova filozofija razrađena u Novoj znanosti pozicija onoga što će se kasnije odrediti političkom teologijom. Time rad polazi od određenja pojma političke teologije i prikazuje ...načela koja će Vica svrstati u tu specifičnu tradiciju filozofijskoga mišljenja. U tom smislu Vicova je filozofija utemeljena na metafizičkoj tradiciji i time postaje jasno kako može biti određena kao politička teologija. Vicova analiza je utemeljena na klasičnoj tipologiji oblika vladavine koju su razmatrali Platon i Aristotel, ali uključuje i filozofiju povijesti kako bi pokazala, suprotno uobičajenim razmatranjima, da se politički oblici vladavine kreću od metafizičkoga načela jednoga (monarhija), nekolicine (aristokracija) i svih (demokracija) i konačno
završavaju u metafizičkome postulatu jednoga koji je ponovno najbolje izražen u monarhiji. Za tu metodu Vico koristi klasični obrazac političke teologije s principom božanske providnosti u formiranju političkih zajednica, jer je to središnji koncept političke teologije. Razlog je to zbog kojeg Vico pokazuje kako su prve zajednice bile utemeljene na religijskim postulatima, a tek kasnije na filozofskima. Autor zaključuje kako Vicova Nova znanost može biti određena kao važno djelo filozofije politike utemeljeno na političkoj teologiji koje danas, u uvjetima materijalizirane globalizacije ponovno postaje važna pozicija u prevladavanju krize modernoga materijalizma svijeta.
It is indeed rare to find the social notion that demands to be explained and
interpreted so often and almost from its very beginning, as it is the case
with the legal notion. Reasons for this are ...numerous, but the fact is that
the law is the phenomenon that, unlike any other social phenomenon, impacts
so directly and intensively to the social reality which is, on its end,
susceptible to on-going changes. Such dynamics and versatility of social
relationships determines the dynamics and versatility of the law itself. In
fact, the law can have its true meaning and achieve the purpose being
assigned to it, only if it stands in agreement with the social reality being
effectuated in. Otherwise, the law exists as the system of norms having its
own purpose, non-effectible in time and space, and therefore completely
detached from the society, having no influence onto the society, because the
values of such law are denied, or, on the contrary, this influence is
negative. Not following any social changes with its norms, the law conserves
the social relationships being dynamic in their nature, holding them in the
bonds of legal rules, principles and concepts, not reflecting the social
reality, and furthermore represents the disharmony with the law itself. It is
since the true meaning and the content of the legal rule or principle can be
learned only if it is interpreted in its interplay with those rules that can
provide the full meaning to it, because they relate to the same social
reality. This is particularly important when we want to discover the meaning
of the basic legal principles as it is the principle of the state
sovereignty. In that sense, in this work we want to emphasize the
inconsistency being still present in the large part of the legal theory,
which, as it seems, does not intend to retreat from the method where it
explains, for centuries already, the concept of the state sovereignty. All of
this, besides of the fact that the evolution and development of the law, and
consequent changes brought along, had to mean the evolution and new
understanding of the principle of the state sovereignty itself. Notably since
the development of the international law had influenced not only to the
principle of the state sovereignty, but also to the role and the importance
of the state itself, being perceived in a completely new and different
manner, nowadays. The state is no longer the aim to itself. The state is
comprehended to be the legal framework where the human being, as a member of
a group, but also as the supreme value safeguarded by the law, irrespective
of the state borders, shall be able to achieve its interests in the best
possible way. In that sense, the principle of the state sovereignty is not
just the principle aiming to protect the state from outside and inside, just
because it is a state, emphasizing in this way legal and factual
limitlessness of the state. On the contrary, today this is the principle i.e.
the right possessed by the state as the entity being deserved, not by mere
fact that it is a state but primarily because it is the state that esteems
universal value fabricated into the very foundations of the international
law. Hence, in this work we drew the clear differentiation between the
meaning of the state sovereignty in the past, which we defined as the classic
concept of the state sovereignty, and the meaning the state sovereignty has
today. This contemporary meaning shapes in largely the rules of the
international law, which, not just in the sense of its peremptory norms, but
also in the sense of the way how these rules are established, constantly
bringdown the thesis on the legal limitlessness of the contemporary state.
Also, our intent was to draw attention to the fact that the concept of the
state sovereignty in terms of legal limitlessness of the state, has often
appeared, and still appears as an instrument of the misuse by states,
especially in the situation when, under the umbrella of the state
sovereignty, they want to justify brutal violation of the human rights on
their territories. In that sense, we drew attention to the significance of
the development of human rights and their influence onto the new
understanding of the role of an individual, but also of the state, in the
contemporary world. As it is our intention to explain the meaning of the
state sovereignty in the light of the rules of contemporary international
law, by applying those methods being immanent to the social science,
primarily legal methods such as dogmaticlegal method, we made efforts in this
work to provide the legal analysis of the problem that we are dealing with.
Yet, we also wanted to emphasize the problem of influence of extralegal
elements being present in the discussions about the law, as this is indeed
one of the reasons of the confusion existing in legal-theoretic discussions
about the state in general. We believe the results of this research shall
contribute to enriching the legal science, if not with new and final answers
to the questions being posed before it, then for the new view when it comes
to relationship of so important legal principles, such as the principle of
the state sovereignty and principles of the contemporary international law.
Retko koja društvena misao zahteva da bude tako često i iznova objašnjavana i
tumačena kao što je to slučaj sa pravnom mišlju. Razlozi za tako što su
brojni, ali je činjenica, da je pravo pojava koja, kao ni jedna druga
društvena pojava tako direktno i intenzivno utiče na društvenu realnost koja
je međutim podložna stalnim promenama. Ta dinamika i promenljivost društvenih
odnosa uslovljava i dinamiku i promenljivost samog prava. Pravo zapravo može
imati svoj smisao i ostvariti funkciju koja mu se dodeljuje, jedino ukoliko
je u saglasju sa društvenom realnošću u kojoj se ostvaruje. U protivnom,
pravo figurira kao normativni sistem koji postoji za sebe, neostvariv u
vremenu i prostoru i na taj način potpuno otrgnut od društva, na koje ili ne
može imati nikakvog uticaja jer mu se na taj način poriče bilo kakva
vrednost, ili je naprotiv, taj uticaj krajnje negativan. Ne prateći društvene
promene svojim normiranjem, pravo konzervira dinamične društvene odnose,
držeći ih u stegama pravnih pravila, principa i koncepata, koji, ne samo što
ne odslikavaju društvenu realnost, već predstavljaju i nesklad sa samim
pravom. To je zbog toga što se pravo značenje i sadržina nekog pravnog
pravila ili principa može saznati jedino ukoliko ga tumačimo u njegovom
sadejstvu sa onim pravilima koja mu, usled toga što se odnose na istu
društvenu realnost, mogu jedino dati potpuni smisao. To je naročito važno
kada želimo da otkrijemo značenje osnovnih pravnih principa kakav jeste
princip državnog suvereniteta. U tom smislu u ovom radu želimo da ukažemo na
nedoslednost koja je još uvek prisutna u velikom delu pravne teorije, koja,
čini se, nema nameru da odstupi od, sada već viševekovnog načina na koji se
objašnjava koncept državnog suvereniteta. I pored toga, što su evolucija i
razvoj prava, pa u skladu sa tim i promene koje su sa sobom donele, morale
značiti i evoluciju i novo razumevanje i samog principa državnog
suvereniteta. Ovo naročito i zbog toga, što je upravo razvoj međunarodnog
prava uticao na to, da se, ne samo princip državnog suvereniteta, nego u
uloga i značaj same države danas shvata na jedan potpuno nov način. Država
više nije sama sebi cilj. Ona se sve više shvata kao pravni okvir unutar kojeg
će čovek, najpre kao pripadnik grupe, ali i kao vrhunska vrednost koju pravo
štiti, nezavisno od državnih granica, moći da na najbolji način ostvari svoj
interes. U tom smislu, ni princip državnog suvereniteta nije samo princip
koji ima za cilj da štiti državu spolja i iznutra samo zbog toga što je država,
apostrofirajući time njenu pravu i faktičku neograničenost. Naprotiv, danas je
to princip odnosno pravo koje država poseduje kao entitet koji ga zaslužuje,
ne samo činjenicom da se radi o državi, već, i pre svega činjenicom da se radi
o državi koja poštuje univerzalne vrednosti koje su utkane u same osnove
međunarodnog prava. Tako smo u ovom radu podvukli jasnu razliku između
značenja državnog suvereniteta nekada, koje značenje smo označili klasičnim
konceptom državne suverenosti, i značenja koje suverenost države ima danas. To
savremeno značenje umnogome oblikuju pravila međunarodnog prava, koja, ne samo
u smislu njegovih kogentnih normi, već i u smislu načina samog nastajanja,
uporno obaraju tezu u pravnoj neograničenosti savremene države. Takođe,
namera nam je bila i da skrenemo pažnju na to, da se koncept državne
suverenosti u smislu pravne neograničenosti države, često javljao a javlja se i
danas, kao instrument zloupotrebe od strane država, naročito u situaciji,
kada pod plaštom suverenosti žele opravdati brutalna kršenja ljudskih prava na
svojoj teritoriji. U tom smislu smo skrenuli pažnju i na značaj razvoja
ljudskih prava i njihov uticaj na novo razumevanje uloge pojedinca ali i države
u savremenom svetu. Kako nam je namera da primenom onih metoda koji su
imanentni društvenoj nauci, ali pre svega pravnih metoda kakav je
dogmatsko-normativni metod, objasnimo značenje državnog suvereniteta u svetlu
pravila savremenog međunarodnog prava, to smo se potrudili da u ovom radu
damo jednu pravnu analizu problema kojim se bavimo. Ipak, želeli smo da
ukažemo i na problem upliva vanpravnih elemenata u raspravi o pravu, što je
jedan od razloga konfuzije koja postoji u pravno-teorijskim raspravama o
državi uopšte. Verujemo da će rezultati ovog istraživanja doprineti da pravna
nauka bude bogatija, ako ne za nove i konačne odgovore na pitanja koja se pred
nju javljaju, a ono za jedan novi pogled kada je u pitanju odnos tako važnih
pravnih principa kao što su princip državnog suvereniteta i principi
savremenog međunarodnog prava.
Autor u članku nastoji obrazložiti temeljnu postavku o Europi na ishodu ideje
moderne suverenosti naroda kao prijelazu iz paradigme konstitutivne u destitutivnu
moć. To istodobno pretpostavlja ...filozofijsko-političko razumijevanje
razloga zašto se Europska unija nalazi nužno u trajnoj krizi vlastita djelovanja.
Budući da nemogućnost konstrukcije "političkoga naroda" (demos) proizlazi iz
slabosti "civilne religije slobode", susrećemo se s diobom na dvije Europe unutar
formalnoga okvira demokracije: zapadna ili liberalno-demokratska Europa
nastoji spasiti duh univerzalnosti, a istočna ili autoritarno-demokratska uspostavlja
svoju novu moć na pretpostavkama povratka suverenosti nacije-države,
rastakanja sekularnosti i odbacivanja multikulturalizma. U kritičkoj analizi
Agambenove teorije o stasisu ili građanskome ratu kao "novoj političkoj paradigmi"
pokazuje se da ono što se zbiva "danas" u ideji političkoga nije više pitanje
o slobodi događaja "nadolazeće zajednice". Umjesto toga na djelu je moć bez
vladavine "naroda", država bez suverenosti i nastanak izgleda "globalnoga građanskoga
rata" u situaciji kada se život razdvaja na političko upravljanje "krizom"
i preživljavanje u globalnome poretku entropije.
Autorica u tekstu polazi od premise da je politički subjekt neoliberalizma, vladajuće političke racionalnosti, individua koja se može okarakterizirati kao isključivi i nepodijeljeni posjednik samog ...sebe. Preispitivanjem tropa ne/ovisnosti razlažu se pretpostavke koje su uključene u pojam individue, a potom se, analizom konteksta njegove upotrebe u 19. stoljeću, pokazuje da je on bremenit genealogijama koje ograničavaju njegovu političku upotrebljivost u 21. stoljeću. Misliti protiv neoliberalizma zahtijeva napuštanje ideje individue kao suverenog vlasnika koji vlada sobom. Promišljanje alternativnog političkog horizonta, traganje za homo politicus-om koji se uistinu razlikuje od homo oeconomicus-a, iziskuje napuštanje političkog mišljenja koje polazi od pojedinca.
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