After the establishment of communist rule in Yugoslavia and the elimination of all political opponents, the Catholic Church remained the only strong and well-organised institution in which the ...communists saw a possible opponent. This is why the communist authorities carried out a series of repressive and political measures in order to prevent its public activities and weaken its influence in society. Bishops and priests were assassinated or imprisoned, Church property was confiscated, religious publications and seminaries were banned, religious schools were closed and ordinands pressured to give up on studying for priestly vocations, a propaganda campaign was launched against the Church and its priests, priests were scrutinized (especially through clerical associations) and recruited as informants for the secret services, and a series of other measures was carried out with the goal of weakening the influence of the Church in society. The main operational role in the implementation of these measures was played by law enforcement services, primarily the State Security Administration and the other services of the Secretariat of the Interior as well as the Counterintelligence Service, which concerned itself mostly with ecclesiastical persons performing compulsory military service in the Yugoslav People’s Army. These services’ annual reports for Croatia from 1951 to 1965 and their analyses and studies, which only became available to the public in the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb in 2017, offer us insights into law enforcement’s views on the conditions in the Catholic Church, their assessments of its ‘hostile’ activities, and the ways in which they planned their activities and carried out certain anti-Church measures. In addition, this paper is the first to present the actual numerical indicators of priests and other Church officials or persons closely connected to the work of the Church who were in various ways employed as a part of the collaborator networks of communist secret services in their activities regarding the Catholic Church in the stated period. It is important to highlight that the vast majority of these persons agreed to collaborate due to pressure or blackmail, for the most part failed to produce the results that the State Security Administration had expected of them, and were therefore often removed from the collaborator network. The State Security Administration benefited little from this network, and the fact that it failed to achieve its goals in its struggle against the Catholic Church confirms this.
U početku svibnja 1941. skupina mladih ustaša pri Ustaškom stanu u
Karlovcu uhitila je i ubila trojicu Srba. Afera, poznata i kao slučaj Vujičić
(prema Milanu Vujičiću, najpoznatijoj žrtvi, ...odvjetniku i političaru)
svojedobno je zataškana, no u historiografiji i publicistici ostavila je
dubljega traga od nekih većih zlodjela. U proljeće 1947. Jugoslaviji je izručen
Vladimir Židovec, diplomat Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH), koji je u doba
zločina bio tajnik karlovačkoga Ustaškog stana. On je podvrgnut intenzivnoj
istrazi u kojoj je ponudio i svoju suradnju. U poduljem i višestruko upitnom
svjedočenju on je kao inicijatora zločina teretio svojega lokalnog suparnika,
predsjednika Stana Antu Nikšića, koji je i sâm završio u diplomatskoj službi
NDH, ali je neko vrijeme bio i ministar unutarnjih poslova. Unatoč raznim
dvojbenim pojedinostima istrage, na tezi prema kojoj je Nikšić potaknuo
ubojstvo svojega osobnog prijatelja Vujičića ustraje se već desetljećima. Kao
navodno neprijeporna činjenica našla je put u leksikografsku literaturu, a i
poslužila u poopćenim kontekstualizacijama. U članku se stoga na osnovu nekih
novih saznanja nastoji ponovno razmotriti cijeli slučaj, ne radi konačnoga
odgovora, već kako bi se upozorilo na nužnost suzdržanijih interpretacija, kad
se one odnose na materijale koji su imali zadovoljiti potrebe tajnih službi.
In early May 1941, three Serbs were killed by a group of young Ustasha
militiamen assigned to the local headquarters of the Ustasha movement in the
Croatian city of Karlovac. The affair, known as »the Vujičić case« after its
best known victim, attorney and politician Milan Vujičić, was hushed up at that
time, but the case left a deeper imprint on historical studies than some of the
larger atrocities committed during the period. The case was reopened in early
1947, upon the extradition of Vladimir Židovec to Yugoslavia. Židovec was the
secretary of the local Ustaša HQ at the time of the crime, and afterwards a
diplomat in the Independent State of Croatia (ISC). Subjected to harsh
interrogation by the Yugoslav Udba secret police, Židovec offered to
collaborate and authored a lengthy but tainted testimony. He claimed that his
antagonist and formal local superior Ante Nikšić, afterwards an ISC diplomat
and minister of the interior, initiated the crime. In spite of various
important deficiencies of the inquiry, the thesis that Nikšić had instigated
the murder of his personal friend Vujičić has been reiterated over the years.
It has been incorporated into reference manuals as a proven fact, and has even
been contextualized on a larger scale. This article therefore strives to
reconsider the case on the basis of some new elements. While offering no final
answers, it points to various incongruences of the present interpretation.
Analizom narativa o arhivu i arhivskoj graði koji se pojavljuju u javnom prostoru, u ovom se radu otkriva politička i ideološka razina povezana s politikom identiteta nasuprot naizgled neutralne ...pozicije arhiva kao institucije. Fokus je na proizvodnji emocija putem tih narativa koje sudjeluju u kolektivnom identifikacijskom procesu i antagoniziranju društvenog polja. U radu se razmatra na koji način proizvodnjom emocija (boli, patnje, ljubavi i mržnje) dosjei UDBE kao objekt narativa unutar javnog i političkog prostora sudjeluju u (re)konstruiranju hrvatskog nacionalnog identiteta (kolektivnog tijela), odnosno uspostavljanju konstitutivne norme sjećanja i povijesti. Putem emocija vrijednosno se označavaju identifikacijske oznake "jugoslavenstva" i "hrvatstva" uspostavljajući ih kao binarnu opoziciju te (^artikulirajući Drugog ("neprijatelja") kao Jugoslavena ili komunjaru. Analiza pokazuje kako se u tom procesu konstruiraju i različite ideološke fantazme koje strukturiraju realnost.
U historiografiji dosad nije poklonjena veća pažnja Milanu Žugelju, poznaniku i suborcu Andrije Hebranga u komunističkom pokretu, a po gestapovskim i udbinim dokumentima sudeći i čovjeku čija je smrt ...uzrokovana bliskom povezanošću s Hebrangom. Milan Žugelj je dva puta uhićen zbog Andrije Hebranga: prvi put 1942., kada je Hebrang u ustaškom zatvoru njega označio kao svog obavještajnog informatora u Beču i drugi put 1948., kada je Žugelj uhićen zbog sumnje da su Hebrang i on zajedno pristali na rad za gestapovske i ustaške organe. Baš zbog toga smo se odlučili za objavljivanje 19 dokumenata: 16 gestapovskih i 3 udbina, koji su primarna građa za rasvjetljavanje djelovanja Andrije Hebanga i Milana Žugelja; od tih 19 dokumenata su dosad samo dva bila objavljena (u knjizi M. Milatovića o Hebrangu, 1952), ali i ta dva u obliku faksimila, bez navođenja arhivskog izvora.
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