Adolescence is a period of life in which peer relationships become increasingly important. Adolescents have a greater likelihood of taking risks when they are with peers rather than alone. In this ...study, we investigated the development of social influence on risk perception from late childhood through adulthood. Five hundred and sixty-three participants rated the riskiness of everyday situations and were then informed about the ratings of a social-influence group (teenagers or adults) before rating each situation again. All age groups showed a significant social-influence effect, changing their risk ratings in the direction of the provided ratings; this social-influence effect decreased with age. Most age groups adjusted their ratings more to conform to the ratings of the adult social-influence group than to the ratings of the teenager social-influence group. Only young adolescents were more strongly influenced by the teenager social-influence group than they were by the adult social-influence group, which suggests that to early adolescents, the opinions of other teenagers about risk matter more than the opinions of adults.
Social norms in networks Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves
Journal of economic theory,
January 2020, 2020-01-00, Letnik:
185
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this study, we develop a social-norm model that provides a ...microfoundation of the linear-in-means model and investigate its properties. We show that individual outcomes may increase, decrease, or vary non-monotonically with the taste for conformity. Equilibria are usually inefficient and, to restore the first best, the planner needs to subsidize (tax) agents whose neighbors make efforts above (below) the social norms. Thus, giving more subsidies to more central agents is not necessarily efficient. We also discuss the policy implications of our model in terms of education and crime.
Alone in a Crowd of Sheep Pronin, Emily; Berger, Jonah; Molouki, Sarah
Journal of personality and social psychology,
04/2007, Letnik:
92, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The results of 5 studies showed that people see others as more conforming than
themselves. This asymmetry was found to occur in domains ranging from consumer
purchases to political views. ...Participants claimed to be less susceptible than
their average peers to broad descriptions of social influences, and they also
claimed to be less susceptible than specific peers to specific instances of
conformity. These studies further demonstrated that this asymmetry is not simply
the result of social desirability, but it is also rooted in people's attention
to introspective versus behavioral information when making conformity
assessments. The participants displayed an
introspection
illusion
, placing more weight on introspective evidence of conformity
(relative to behavioral evidence) when judging their own susceptibility to
social influence as opposed to someone else's. Implications for
self-other asymmetries, implicit social influence, and interpersonal
conflict are discussed.
In this study, we examined the relative effectiveness of prestige-based incentives (vaccination of an expert scientist/president/politician/celebrity/religious leader), conformist incentives ...(vaccination of friends and family) and risk-based incentives (witnessing death or illness of a person from the disease) for increasing participants' chances of getting vaccinated with respect to their coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine intention. We conducted a cross-cultural survey using demographically representative samples from the UK (
= 1533), USA (
= 1550) and Turkey (
= 1567). The most effective incentives in all three countries were vaccination of an expert scientist, followed by vaccination of friends and family members and knowing someone dying from the disease. Vaccination of an expert scientist was significantly more effective at increasing vaccine intention than any other incentive. Vaccine incentives, regardless of the incentive type, were much less effective for those who originally refused the COVID-19 vaccine than for those who were hesitant to receive the vaccine. Although the percentage of vaccine-hesitant participants was highest in Turkey, the mean effectiveness scores of incentives were also the highest in Turkey, suggesting that an informed vaccine promotion strategy can be successful in this country. Our findings have policy applicability and suggest that positive vaccination messages delivered by expert scientists, vaccination of friends and family and risk-based incentives can be effective at increasing vaccine uptake.
This study employs a neoclassical growth model to investigate the impact of consumption externalities on the distribution of wealth. It also jointly accounts for heterogeneity in the degree of ...consumption externalities, heterogeneity in the initial wealth endowments, and endogenous labor supply. First, we demonstrate that catching-up occurs when an initially poorer household works more than an initially wealthier one, after which the additional income acquired through hard work offsets the initial wealth difference. Second, a reduction in wealth inequality is only consistent and systematic if an initially wealthier household works relatively less than the social average. When this condition is not met, a reduction in wealth inequality only occurs if the initial wealth is highly and unevenly distributed.
•A neoclassical growth model with elastic labor supply is applied.•Heterogeneity stems from consumption externality and initial wealth endowment.•Divergent growth rates for consumption and leisure are observed among individuals.•Work is positively correlated with the strength of consumption externality.•Through hard work, catching-up and reduction in wealth inequality are possible.
Recently there has been a surge of interest in the intersection between epistemology and action theory, especially in principles linking rationality in thought and rationality in action. Recently ...there has also been a surge of interest in the epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement: what, epistemically speaking, is the rational response in light of disagreement with someone whom one regards as an epistemic peer? The objective of this paper is to explore these two issues—separately, but also in connection with one another. I turn first to the idea that the normative standing of our actions depends on the normative standing of our beliefs. I endorse this idea. More precisely, I endorse a principle according to which sufficiently high credence in success conditions for a given goal-directed action is a necessary condition on rational execution of that action. I then turn to the debate concerning the epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement. The basic issue is whether such disagreement is always epistemically significant in the sense of serving as a defeater of the initial credences of the disagreeing parties. Conformists argue that this is so while non-conformists deny it. I present a new argument against a brand of non-conformism that I call "strong non-conformism". The key premise is the principle that sufficiently high credence in success conditions for a given goal-directed action is a necessary condition on rational execution of that action. I argue that, given this principle, strong non-conformism fails to yield the verdict that the epistemic requirement on rational action is violated in a case where, intuitively, it is violated. This is because strong non-conformism has it that disagreement with a perceived peer does not act as a defeater in the relevant case. Conformism fares better.
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