Dutch employers’ liability for workplace accidents is a very interesting topic, not only from a legal perspective, but also from a law and economics one. It is one of the few systems in Europe where ...liability is still based on the fault of the employer, whereas most countries apply a form of strict/no-fault liability or a system of no-fault insurance. It is interesting because the Dutch Civil Code explicitly refers to prevention of work-related losses. Law and economics focuses exactly on the behavioural incentives that are provided by tort liability, instead of on the compensation aspect. In this article, I provide an answer to the question of how Dutch employers’ liability compares to the law and economics desiderata. At first glance, the design of this type of liability (fault liability) is contrary to what law and economics would advocate (strict liability). In addition, the level of care that courts require from the employer seems to be excessively high. Interestingly, both characteristics together result in a situation which, from a law and economics perspective, is almost indistinguishable from the desired strict liability. So, two wrongs may make a right: the ‘wrong’ choice for fault liability combined with the ‘wrong’ level of due care results in the ‘right’ application of (quasi) strict liability. Therefore, at least in theory, employers receive the correct behavioural incentives, which induce them to take the optimal level of care and activity. However, when we subsequently turn our attention to employees, things look less perfect. Law and economics scholars argue that in situations where not only the tortfeasor but also the victim can influence accident probability, both parties should receive behavioural incentives. This implies that a rule of strict liability should be accompanied by a defence of contributory or comparative negligence. The Dutch employer liability regime contains a defence of intent or wilful recklessness on the part of the employee. From a law and economics perspective, this defence provides inadequate incentives to the employee, which is a third wrong. An often-heard response to this line of reasoning is that tort victims will receive behavioural incentives for fear of being involved in an accident in the first place, so the lack of a full defence of contributory or comparative negligence is not problematic. If this is true, then the damages the victims receive do not make them ‘whole’, which introduces a fourth wrong: uncompensated losses. This second set of two wrongs does not make a right, because if victims receive incomplete compensation, tortfeasors do not fully pay for the losses they have caused. This may reduce the behavioural incentives the tortfeasors receive, who may hence not choose optimal levels of care and activity after all.
I contend that virtue ethics provides the best ethical justification for vaccination programmes, and associated payment schemes for vaccine damaged individuals (which have been adopted in twenty-four ...countries and one province). Virtue ethics justifies vaccination programmes, as they contribute to the common good, and associated payment schemes, as they demonstrate compassion, justice and prudence in response to virtuous vaccination decisions by citizens. I also argue that the virtues of maturity and prudence justify voluntary vaccinations. I utilise several virtues to analyse, and suggest reforms to, the United Kingdom's (UK) Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme (VDPS). I also compare the UK VDPS with the schemes that have been adopted in other states, in particular the Vaccine Injury Compensation Programme (VICP) which has been adopted within the United States (US).
On the strict liability view, excusably ignorant agents must cover all the wrongful costs they have inadvertently brought onto others, although it is undisputed that they are not at fault. On the ...fault liability view, victims need not be compensated by excusably ignorant harmers. To some, both views appear harsh. Under fault liability, those who cause harm are seen as getting off scot-free while victims suffer. Under strict liability, agents are viewed as being burdened without any fault of their own. In response to a seemingly intractable conflict between competing theories, some have called for compromise. Caney (Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 13(1):210, 2010) has proposed a “modified strict liability principle” which was further developed by Bell (Monist 94(3):391–411, 2011). The principle’s revision is promising because it gives substantive reason for why and how middle ground should be achieved. In this paper, I assess this proposal and the prospects for mediating between strict and fault liability more generally. Specifically, I (1) introduce concepts, (2) present Bell’s principle of limited liability, (3) critique it, and (4) explore general avenues for finding middle ground between strict and fault liability.
We seek to examine the manner in which either the EU member states of France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden or parts of them, such as the country of England in the UK or the Flemish Region in ...Belgium, deal with the distributional effects of the flood risk management strategies prevention, defense, and mitigation. Measures carried out in each of these strategies can cause preflood harm, as in the devaluation of property or loss of income. However, different member states and authorities address this harm in different ways. A descriptive overview of the different compensation regimes in the field of flood risk management is followed by an analysis of these differences and an explanation of what may cause them, such as the geographical differences that lead to differences in the way that they interfere with private rights and the dominant legal principles that underlie compensation regimes. An elaborated compensation regime could lead to more equitable and legitimate flood risk management because the burdens are fairly spread and all interests—including those of injured parties—are considered in the decision-making process. Our aim is to stimulate the hardly existent discussion on the financial harm that is caused by measures to prevent floods (preflood), in addition to the already existing discussion on the ex post flood distributional effects.
The third-party governance of environmental pollution and the pollution rights trading system are two typical examples of modern environmental governance systems. In China, the quasi-co-owned ...relationship of pollution rights between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises is the link through which to achieve synergy between the two factors. To explore how to achieve such synergy, first, the “principle of no-fault liability” is introduced, and the responsibilities of pollution-discharging enterprises and pollution-control enterprises are defined. Second, based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights, a revenue-sharing mechanism for pollution rights trading is designed. Finally, a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of pollution-discharging enterprises, pollution-control enterprises and local governments is constructed, and numerical simulation is performed. The results are as follows. 1) By setting a reasonable market trading price for pollution rights, a reward and punishment distribution coefficient, an improvement in reputation gains, and a saving in pollution rights indicators become conducive to the formation of cooperative relationships between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises, for which the reasonable range of the reward and punishment distribution coefficient is (0.3, 0.4. 2) Regardless of whether a government subsidy is provided, the optimal range of the revenue-sharing coefficient from pollution rights trading is 0.5, 0.6. 3) When a government subsidy is withdrawn, increasing the market trading price and surplus indicators of pollution rights can promote the stable operation of the third-party governance model. 4) An increase in policy support and administrative accountability of higher levels of government and a reduction in supervision costs for local governments can help these parties effectively avoid addressing the absence of local government supervision. It is recommended that third-party governance enterprises participate in pollution rights trading to implement the main responsibilities of pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises and to set a reasonable revenue-sharing coefficient and reward and punishment distribution coefficient of pollution rights.
Food applications of the PL law are widely known. Food application is divided into manufactured products (natural products and artificial products) and processing (cooking), and is subdivided into ...fresh food and processed food, food and drink, and seasonings. The food defect definition is said to be a health hazard. A food sanitation management qualification license is required for food manufacturing, and the production facility is required to be certified by a public health center, and purified drinking water is required to be heat sterilized. The food safety system is based on the qualification of the handler and the approval of the manufacturer, but the applicable system differs from the international standards in some places. Claims for damages against the assailant of a victim of health damage caused by defective food are subject to the Product Liability Act, and the judgment of the assailant's professional negligence is stipulated in the Food Handling Standards, Processing Standards, Applicable Ingredients Standards and Standards. . In addition, food poisoning and other health hazards must be prevented by sterilization and disinfection, which are mandatory in food processing. Responsibility for the provision of food products contrary to these norms, standards and obligations is imposed. This study reports the results of research into evaluation criteria that are exempt from food application.
Food applications of the PL law are widely known. Food application is divided into manufactured products (natural products and artificial products) and processing (cooking), and is subdivided into ...fresh food and processed food, food and drink, and seasonings. The food defect definition is said to be a health hazard. A food sanitation management qualification license is required for food manufacturing, and the production facility is required to be certified by a public health center, and purified drinking water is required to be heat sterilized. The food safety system is based on the qualification of the handler and the approval of the manufacturer, but the applicable system differs from the international standards in some places. Claims for damages against the assailant of a victim of health damage caused by defective food are subject to the Product Liability Act, and the judgment of the assailant's professional negligence is stipulated in the Food Handling Standards, Processing Standards, Applicable Ingredients Standards and Standards. . In addition, food poisoning and other health hazards must be prevented by sterilization and disinfection, which are mandatory in food processing. Responsibility for the provision of food products contrary to these norms, standards and obligations is imposed. This study reports the results of research into evaluation criteria that are exempt from food application.
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