An insightful overview of health insurers and a guide to sustainability for provider organizations.Physicians experience ongoing frustrations in their relationships with health plans. Even as they ...struggle to keep up with accelerating clinical advances, they face daunting challenges from payers that are transitioning from traditional fee-for-service contracts to complex alternative payment models. In Health Plans Unmasked, Martin Lustick, MD, offers insights and guidance for those who face the herculean task of transforming their business practices to achieve financial stability while improving outcomes for their patients.By explaining both how and why insurance companies behave the way they do, Dr. Lustick helps providers avoid mistakes and take advantage of opportunities for success. He provides information on:• The evolution of health care financing in the United States• The nuts and bolts of health plan capabilities and the real motives of health plan administrators• Tips for successful contracting strategies • Alternative payment models and the promises of value-based careWith a career spanning five decades as a practicing pediatrician, chief operating officer of a medical group, chief medical officer of a hospital, and chief medical officer of a health plan, Dr. Lustick provides a straightforward guide to sustainability for provider organizations. Physicians, office managers, and anyone in a health-related field will benefit from his breaking down the role of health plans in our health care ecosystem.
Insurance in a Climate of Change Mills, Evan
Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science),
08/2005, Letnik:
309, Številka:
5737
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Catastrophe insurance provides peace of mind and financial security. Climate change can have adverse impacts on insurance affordability and availability, potentially slowing the growth of the ...industry and shifting more of the burden to governments and individuals. Most forms of insurance are vulnerable, including property, liability, health, and life. It is incumbent on insurers, their regulators, and the policy community to develop a better grasp of the physical and business risks. Insurers are well positioned to participate in public-private initiatives to monitor loss trends, improve catastrophe modeling, address the causes of climate change, and prepare for and adapt to the impacts.
•We examine which policies increased coverage under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).•We assessed premium subsidies, the individual mandate, and Medicaid expansion.•Premium subsidies created 40% of the ...ACA coverage increase, and Medicaid 60%.•Medicaid was 30% woodwork effect, 10% early expansion, 20% newly-eligible adults.•The mandate penalty amount had negligible effects on coverage gains.
Using premium subsidies for private coverage, an individual mandate, and Medicaid expansion, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has increased insurance coverage. We provide the first comprehensive assessment of these provisions’ effects, using the 2012–2015 American Community Survey and a triple-difference estimation strategy that exploits variation by income, geography, and time. Overall, our model explains 60% of the coverage gains in 2014–2015. We find that coverage was moderately responsive to price subsidies, with larger gains in state-based insurance exchanges than the federal exchange. The individual mandate's exemptions and penalties had little impact on coverage rates. The law increased Medicaid among individuals gaining eligibility under the ACA and among previously-eligible populations (“woodwork effect”) even in non-expansion states, with no resulting reductions in private insurance. Overall, exchange premium subsidies produced 40% of the coverage gains explained by our ACA policy measures, and Medicaid the other 60%, of which 1/2 occurred among previously-eligible individuals.
Across a wide set of nongroup insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues that private information, held by the potential ...applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk. I first derive a new no-trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections. I then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no-trade condition can explain rejections. The methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents' beliefs. I apply this approach to three nongroup markets: long-term care, disability, and life insurance. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, in all three settings I find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected; I find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance, and I show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected. The results suggest that private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets.
The share of working-age Americans receiving disability benefits from the federal Disability Insurance (DI) program has increased significantly in recent decades, from 2.2 percent in the late 1970s ...to 3.6 percent in the years immediately preceding the 2007–2009 recession and 4.6 percent in 2013. With the federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund currently projected to be depleted in 2016, Congressional action of some sort is likely to occur within the next several years. It is therefore a good time to sort out the competing explanations for the increase in disability benefit receipt and to review some of the ideas that economists have put forth for reforming US disability programs.
Selection (adverse or advantageous) is the central problem that inhibits the smooth, efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets. Even—and perhaps especially—when consumers are ...well-informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice, such markets may function inefficiently due to risk selection. Selection can cause markets to unravel with skyrocketing premiums and can cause consumers to be under- or overinsured. In its simplest form, adverse selection arises due to the tendency of those who expect to incur high health care costs in the future to be the most motivated purchasers. The costlier enrollees are more likely to become insured rather than to remain uninsured, and conditional on having health insurance, the costlier enrollees sort themselves to the more generous plans in the choice set. These dual problems represent the primary concerns for policymakers designing regulations for health insurance markets. In this essay, we review the theory and evidence concerning selection in competitive health insurance markets and discuss the common policy tools used to address the problems it creates. We emphasize the two markets that seem especially likely to be targets of reform in the short and medium term: Medicare Advantage (the private plan option available under Medicare) and the state-level individual insurance markets.
We examine whether and to what extent consolidation in the US health insurance industry has contributed to higher employer-sponsored insurance premiums. We exploit the differential impact across ...local markets of a national merger of two insurers to identify the causal effect of concentration on premiums. Using data for large groups, we estimate premiums in average markets were approximately seven percentage points higher by 2007 due to increases in local concentration from 1998–2006. We also find evidence consolidation facilitates the exercise of monopsonistic power vis-à-vis physicians, leading to reductions in their absolute employment and earnings relative to other healthcare workers. JEL: G22, I13
This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage—risk prediction of adverse ...selection theory—that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage—risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage—risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or adverse selection, and we discuss methods for distinguishing between them. Finally, we review the evidence on learning by policyholders and insurers.
PDF
