This study examines young Simmel’s reflections on social-historical knowledge and philosophy of history. I compare these reflections to three models of post-Hegelian thought: Moritz Lazarus and ...Heymann Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie, Wilhelm Dilthey’s Historismus, and Wilhelm Windelband’s Neo-Kantianism. From different perspectives, these three authors tried to justify a scientific approach to cultural and social phenomena, considering the speculative philosophy of history obsolete because it was overtaken by the development of particular sciences since the early 19th century. Even if the old speculative philosophy of history had collapsed, the rejection of metaphysics’ legacy proved to be a challenging task. This legacy reappears in the post-Hegelian models of thought, showing how the philosophy of history (which seemed to be dead) still expresses the human need for meaning. A human need that urges to find expression. Simmel’s work, “The Problems of Philosophy of History” (1892), examines the persistence of the philosophy of history and its changing function. Philosophy of history no longer represents the story of a guaranteed salvation but expresses philosophically the problems that are constantly renewed by the people who live history.
The term "emotional practices" is gaining currency in the historical study of emotions. This essay discusses the theoretical and methodological implications of this concept. A definition of emotion ...informed by practice theory promises to bridge persistent dichotomies with which historians of emotion grapple, such as body and mind, structure and agency, as well as expression and experience. Practice theory emphasizes the importance of habituation and social context and is thus consistent with, and could enrich, psychological models of situated, distributed, and embodied cognition and their approaches to the study of emotion. It is suggested here that practices not only generate emotions, but that emotions themselves can be viewed as a practical engagement with the world. Conceiving of emotions as practices means understanding them as emerging from bodily dispositions conditioned by a social context, which always has cultural and historical specificity. Emotion-as-practice is bound up with and dependent on "emotional practices," defined here as practices involving the self (as body and mind), language, material artifacts, the environment, and other people. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, the essay emphasizes that the body is not a static, timeless, universal foundation that produces ahistorical emotional arousal, but is itself socially situated, adaptive, trained, plastic, and thus historical. Four kinds of emotional practices that make use of the capacities of a body trained by specific social settings and power relations are sketched out—mobilizing, naming, communicating, and regulating emotion—as are consequences for method in historical research.
This work is about the spirit of Western civilization and its temptations. Drawing on Hegel's philosophy of history, the text explains why, until recently, this civilization was dominant over the ...rest of the world. The thing is that she understood the importance of rationality, subordinated all manifestations of life to her and especially, during capitalism (modernism), developed science and technology, and produced powerful weapons. Along the way, she incorporated all the significant achievements of other civilizations and peoples into her system of rationality. In this regard, Hegel says in the introduction to the Philosophy of History: „The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process.“ In other words, history is exclusively occupied with showing how Reason (Mind) comes to a recognition and adoption of the Truth. Of course, rationality is something that belongs to all civilizations and peoples, but other societies, for various reasons (geographical, climatic, religious, etc.) subordinated rationality to some other imperatives.
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AFTER 1945: A BIBLIOMETRIC STUDY BEVERNAGE, BERBER; IECKER DE ALMEIDA, GISELE; DELANOTE, BROOS ...
History and theory :Studies in the philosophy of history,
September 2019, 2019-09-00, 20190901, Letnik:
58, Številka:
3
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ABSTRACT
Much has been said about what philosophy of history should be. This bibliometric assessment of research in the philosophy of history examines what scholars in this field have actually ...produced. The study covers a dataset—a subsection of the bibliography of the International Network for Theory of History—of 13,953 books, articles, book chapters, dissertations, and other scholarly publications, encompassing materials written in seven different languages published between 1945 and 2014. This material was classified according to a multilayered system of taxonomy consisting of keywords representative of themes discussed in the field. Separate quantitative analyses were made to elucidate characteristics about the publication outputs in the field in the different language groups. Changes in paradigm, often referred to as “turns” or “trends,” have been mapped in this study, according to a quantitative analysis of the most recurrent keywords within a five‐year interval, which give an indication of the most debated themes in each period. ∗Religion/theology/secularization∗ is the most frequent keyword during the period 1945 to 1969, followed by ∗Marxism/historical‐materialism∗1 from 1970 to 1984, in what can be considered a second period of the field. Although many of the key publications of the linguistic turn were written within this second period, our dataset shows that it is not until the third period (1985–2014) that their writing goes on to influence other authors in the field.
This essay traces the development of Isaiah Berlin's conception of history from the 1930s to the 1960s, extrapolating the ways in which he responded to and dismantled the monist and determinist ...claims by logical positivists and scientific rationalists, which were alleged to repudiate unrealised possibilities and men's voluntary power in history. Berlin's elaboration of such notions as 'concepts and categories' as governing principles dictating the intellectual features of a given society not only lays a conceptual foundation for intellectual history, but also underscores historicity as a dimension of paramount importance to the study of mankind.
Making use of Berlin's correspondence with the American philosopher Morton White, this essay examines their abortive project on the philosophy of history. Apathetic about any analytic anatomy of historical knowledge, Berlin was much more interested in exploring the emergence of historical understanding as a distinctive type of knowledge demarcated from other-in particular scientific-forms of knowledge in European history of ideas. Berlin's ideas of history thus make a case for the history of ideas as an intellectual practice, whereas his history of ideas delineates the development of a particular idea of history.
In my article I present the characterization of the state of "singularity" as an upcoming moment in history, which is being foretold by Raymond Kurzweil – futurologist, computer scientist and ...transhumanist. I also present the concept of dividing history into six epochs proposed by Kurzweil, who captures the history of the whole universe as a process of increasing the amount of information. In describing Kurzweil's thought, I do it from the philosophical point of view, showing its historiosophical moments.
Historians of all kinds are beginning to return to temporally expansive studies after decades of aversion and neglect. There are even signs that intellectual historians are returning to the longue ...durée. What are the reasons for this revival of long-range intellectual history? And how might it be rendered methodologically robust as well as historically compelling? This article proposes a model of transtemporal history, proceeding via serial contextualism to create a history in ideas spanning centuries, even millennia: key examples come from work in progress on ideas of civil war from ancient Rome to the present. The article concludes with brief reflections on the potential impact of the digital humanities on the practice of long-range intellectual history.
Doing time in the sociology of education Lingard, Bob; Thompson, Greg
British journal of sociology of education,
01/2017, Letnik:
38, Številka:
1
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This article is both an editorial introduction for this special issue and a distinctive contribution in its own right. The article seeks to extend a dynamic and multiple conception of time to the ...sociology of education to think beyond the clock time associated with modernity and industrialisation. This need is illustrated through an account and critique of E.P. Thompson's canonical account of clock time. The article argues that this construction of clock time implicitly frames most work in the sociology of education. The concept of 'timespace' offers a way to go beyond both clock time and the current 'spatial turn' in the sociology of education that prioritises space over time. It is shown how computerisation also ushers in a new temporality, which works simultaneously with clock time and perhaps presages the move from a disciplinary to control society. The article accepts that there are multiple and dynamic temporalities and correlatively supports a working together of historical and sociological imaginations towards a sociology of education that acknowledges and works with multiple temporalities, empirically, methodologically, theoretically and in research writing.
In this essay I intend to flesh out and discuss what I consider to be the groundbreaking contribution by the German historian and theorist of history Reinhart Koselleck to postwar historiography: his ...theory of historical times. I begin by discussing the view, so prominent in the Anglophone context, that Koselleck's idea of the plurality of historical times can be grasped only in terms of a plurality of historical periods in chronological succession, and hence, that Koselleck's theory of historical times is in reality a theory of periodization. Against this interpretation, to be found in works by Kathleen Davis, Peter Osborne, and Lynn Hunt, among others, I will argue that not only is Koselleck's theory of historical times, or, with a more phenomenlogical turn of phrase, his theory of multiple temporalities, not a theory of periodization, it is, furthermore, a theory developed to defy periodization. Hence, at the core of Koselleck's work is the attempt to replace the idea of linear, homogeneous time with a more complex, heterogeneous, and multilayered notion of temporality. In this essay I will demonstrate how this shift is achieved by means of three dichotomies: between natural and historical, extralinguistic and intralinguistic, and diachronic and synchronic time.
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