Love and Reasons Juan Pablo Hernández
Eidos (Barranquilla, Colombia),
07/2020
33
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Love and rationality are often considered as capacities which easily come into conflict, or are even opposed to one another. In the paper I elaborate on some points suggested by Harry Frankfurt in ...order to propose that the relation between love and rationality is not one of opposition. After offering a characterization of love as a hybrid multi-track disposition, I will argue that love is rational in the following sense: although love is not justifiable, it is nevertheless a source of basic and sometimes irresistible reasons which to a large extent shape the field of our rationality. This does not mean that love is an irrational or arrational foundation, or that it is impervious to reason; it only means that in certain circumstances it makes sense to subject love to rational scrutiny.
The purpose of this work is to show how Chaïm Perelman’s new rhetoric proposal fundamentally constitutes a theory of practical rationality in an argumentative perspective. To develop this thesis, we ...proceed as follows: first, we describe the pragmatic turn that leads Perelman to point out the limits of formal deductivist logic in the field of values, in some of his youth texts; then, Perelman’s bet on new rhetoric is presented as a kind of application of rationality, developed in his Treaty of Argumentation and in some texts written after 1958; finally, the Perelmanian notion of reason is developed in the framework of legal argumentation, to show how, from this perspective, Perelman is linked to the debate of the second half of the twentieth century known as the “doctrine of difficult cases in law”.
Why does belief in the paranormal, conspiracy theories, and various other phenomena that are not backed up by evidence remain widespread in modern society? In the present research we adopt an ...individual difference approach, as we seek to identify psychological precursors of skepticism toward unfounded beliefs. We propose that part of the reason why unfounded beliefs are so widespread is because skepticism requires both sufficient analytic skills, and the motivation to form beliefs on rational grounds. In Study 1 we show that analytic thinking is associated with a lower inclination to believe various conspiracy theories, and paranormal phenomena, but only among individuals who strongly value epistemic rationality. We replicate this effect on paranormal belief, but not conspiracy beliefs, in Study 2. We also provide evidence suggesting that general cognitive ability, rather than analytic cognitive style, is the underlying facet of analytic thinking that is responsible for these effects.
•Analytic thinking is not sufficient to promote skepticism toward various unfounded beliefs.•Analytic thinking and valuing epistemic rationality interactively predict skepticism.•Cognitive ability, rather than analytic cognitive style, seems to account for these findings.
Axiomatic rationality is defined in terms of conformity to abstract axioms. Savage (The foundations of statistics, Wiley, New York,
1954
) limited axiomatic rationality to
small worlds
(
S
,
C
), ...that is, situations in which the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of future states
S
and their consequences
C
are known. Others have interpreted axiomatic rationality as a categorical norm for how human beings should reason, arguing in addition that violations would lead to real costs such as money pumps. Yet a review of the literature shows little evidence that violations are actually associated with any measurable costs. Limiting axiomatic rationality to small worlds, I propose a naturalized version of rationality for situations of intractability and uncertainty (as opposed to risk), all of which are not in (
S
,
C
). In these situations, humans can achieve their goals by relying on heuristics that may violate axiomatic rationality. The study of ecological rationality requires formal models of heuristics and an analysis of the structures of environments these can exploit. It lays the foundation of a moderate naturalism in epistemology, providing statements about heuristics we
should
use in a given situation. Unlike axiomatic rationality, ecological rationality can explain less-is-more effects (when using less information can be expected to generate more accurate predictions), formalize when one should move from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ and be evaluated by goals beyond coherence, such as predictive accuracy, frugality, and efficiency. Ecological rationality can be seen as a formalization of means–end instrumentalist rationality, based on Herbert Simon’s insight that rational behavior is a function of the mind and its environment.
This paper focuses on a set of issues when choosing between methods for environmental appraisal. Approaches like cost benefit analysis/contingent valuation, multicriteria analysis and deliberative ...methods are based on very different assumptions concerning the characteristics of environmental resources, the capacities of the individuals involved and the role the methods play in framing the process. The present paper views environmental appraisal methods as institutional structures. They are seen as rules concerning a) who should participate and in which capacity, b) what is considered data and which form data should take, and c) rules about how a conclusion is reached. Specifically, the choice of method defines the logic of the appraisal process and next influences the output. While cost benefit analysis is based on the assumption of individual rationality, deliberative methods assume that individuals can act according to social rationality. The first part of the paper is devoted to clarifying what institutions are and their role in the valuation process. Second, the main features of environmental or ecosystem services and the demands they raise for decision-making are described. A general framework for evaluating appraisal methods is then developed. Finally, this structure is elaborated in more detail as a basis for deciding over the choices of methods in the case of evaluating ecosystem services. A set of unresolved issues are identified — especially related to how the choice of appraisal methods themselves should be instituted.
Analytic thinking has been put forth as one of the processes through which people may become atheists. According to this view, people who are more (vs. less) analytically inclined should be more ...likely to reject the existence of deities because they rely less on the various intuitive cognitive processes that support supernatural beliefs. Consistent with this “analytic atheism” hypothesis, studies have found a negative association between analytic thinking and religious belief. In the present article we expand on this literature and argue that analytic thinking should be more strongly associated with religious disbelief when coupled with motivation to be epistemically rational. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show that the association between analytic thinking and weaker religious faith (Study 1), as well as between analytic thinking and disbelief (vs. belief) in God, and related supernatural phenomena (Study 2–3) is stronger among people who ascribe more (vs. less) value to epistemic rationality.
•Analytic thinking predicts disbelief in God in large U.S. and Swedish samples.•This association is moderated by ascribed value to epistemic rationality.•Individuals who strongly value epistemic rationality show a stronger association.
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