This work aims to approach the completeness and functionality of Thomas Kuhn’s conception about the Scientific Revolution inside the Normal Science and the concept of Paradigm in agreement with the ...construction of legal science. The analysis is presented through bibliographical research that considers not only the production of theorists dedicated to understanding the ordering of the History of Science, as well as Kuhn, but also of jurists who discuss the definition of Law and its changeability. In this perspective, the authors also study the influence of the aforementioned Revolution throughout the process of scientific evolution and how it can interfere in the organization of Law within society, from the explanation of the concepts shown by Kuhn in his work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and from their analogy with the development of the social legal body. In conclusion, the deliberation regarding the Scientific Revolution is configured as a model to be followed to overcome the crises faced by Law, through the change of Paradigm, so that there is the guarantee and effectiveness of legal prerogatives bequest to the collectivity.
Aided by personal documents and institutional archives that were closed for decades, this book recounts the development of physics—or, more aptly, science under stress—in Soviet Russia up to World ...War II. Focusing on Leningrad, center of Soviet physics until the late 1930s, Josephson discusses the impact of scientific, cultural, and political revolution on physicists' research and professional aspirations.
Political and social revolution in Russia threatened to confound the scientific revolution. Physicists eager to investigate new concepts of space, energy, light, and motion were forced to accommodate dialectical materialism and subordinate their interests to those of the state. They ultimately faced Stalinist purges and the shift of physics leadership to Moscow. This account of scientists cut off from their Western colleagues reveals a little-known part of the history of modern physics.
Galileo (1564-1642), in his well-known Discorsi (Galileo, 1638), briefly turning his attention to the fracture of a beam, starts an interesting discussion on the beam’s breakage as well as its ...location. Could the section and breaking point of a beam have been determined beforehand? Furthermore, is it specific to the material? What Galileo did was not merely challenge a physics problem, but the prevailing knowledge of his time: namely, Aristotelianism on one hand, and Nominalism on the other. As a matter of fact, must the breakage of an element be treated as a universal or is it particular to a given material? The present essay aims to prove how Galileo, confronting the structural problem and bringing it into the realm of science, was not just raising a problem but, using Salviati’s words, he also established what actually takes place. Many years later, with the progress of physics, strength of materials and theory of structures, figures such as Claude Navier (1785-1836) and Benoît Clapeyron (1799-1864) confirmed once again that the Pisan turned out to be right. This article intends to combine technical fields such as strength of materials and theory of structures with others like the history of science and philosophy proper. A cooperative approach to these disciplines can be doubtlessly helpful to improve the knowledge, learning and teaching of their different curricula, giving the reader a global, holistic perspective.
Evolving Evolutionary Psychology Narvaez, Darcia; Moore, David S.; Witherington, David C. ...
The American psychologist,
04/2022, Letnik:
77, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Which evolutionary theory can best benefit psychological theory, research, and application? The most well-known school of evolutionary psychology has a narrow conceptual perspective (a.k.a., "Narrow ...Evolutionary Psychology" or NEP). Proponents of NEP have long argued that their brand of evolutionary psychology represents a full-fledged scientific revolution, with Buss (2020) recently likening NEP's scientific impact to that of a Copernican or Darwinian paradigm shift. However, NEP stands on two traditions that are now the subjects of serious debate and revision: the neo-Darwinian adaptationist framework within evolutionary biology, and the computationalist "mind-as-computer" framework within cognitive science. Although NEP calls itself revolutionary, the significant revolutions taking place today in both evolutionary biology and cognitive science reveal NEP to be rooted in the orthodoxies of the past. We propose a more inclusive, developmental evolutionary psychology theory (DEPTH) better suited for our field in multiple ways, from acknowledging epigenesis to incorporating developmental science. To discern appropriate baselines for human nature and for human becoming, one must integrate developmental neuroscience, anthropology, and cognitive archeology. To be of value in addressing and remedying the challenges facing humanity, psychological theories must recognize the central importance of our plasticity, evolved developmental niche, and deep history.
Public Significance Statement
Understanding humans and our behavior requires unpacking our evolutionary heritages and developmental pathways. We inherit much more than genes. Biology, environment, and culture are seamlessly intertwined, in both individual development and evolution. Every individual constructs their personhood through real-time engagement with the world, so it matters what kind of relational experiences the individual has. In contrast to the most prominent evolutionary psychology theory that emphasizes the stranglehold of humanity's evolutionary past, a developmental evolutionary psychology theory orients to dynamic development in the present, taking epigenetics and plasticity seriously. This approach is better able to guide research and practice, and free people from the disempowering belief in biological determinism.
This article begins by examining a recent claim by Brad Wray that the discovery of atomic number and isotopy constitutes a scientific revolution in the sense of the later writings of Thomas Kuhn. I ...argue that although Kuhn’s criteria may apply to the change from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican model of the universe, they do not apply in the above chemical or atomic case. I also examine the wider issue of Kuhn’s turning away from internal scientific issues to a consideration of lexical issues. I conclude, as others have done before me, that this may have been a wrong turn in view of the emphasis being placed on questions of sense rather than reference.
The author examines an essay by Maurizio Torrini on the scientific revolution and libertinism. Studying the reception of Galileo’s discoveries in European philosophical culture, Torrini highlights ...the misunderstandings and instrumental uses that libertines made of Galilean astronomy. The scientific revolution and libertinism had independent paths and even when their paths crossed, no fusion emerged between the two components. Only at the end of the seventeenth century did apologetics unify libertinism and Galilean science into one doctrine to facilitate their condemnation. The essay shows the consequences that this interpretation produces on the historiographic categories with which modern philosophy is interpreted.
When the meaning of key terms is incompatible in competing taxonomies, a revolution might occur in the field by which the established taxonomy is replaced with another. Since the key term “impact” in ...scientometrics seems to undergo a taxonomic change, a revolution might be taking place at present: Impact is no longer defined as impact on science alone (measured by citations), but on all sectors of society (e.g. economics, culture, or politics). In this Short Communication, we outline that the current revolution in scientometrics does not only imply a broadening of the impact perspective, but also the devaluation of quality considerations in evaluative contexts. Impact might no longer be seen as a proxy for quality, but in its original sense: the simple resonance in some sectors of society.
Critical historical analysis of the 19th-century cholera and 21st-century coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemics suggests that in conflicts over pandemic-mitigation policies, the professional ...backgrounds of principal opponents reveal dominant and minority scientific paradigms, presaging possible epistemological shifts. Epistemic conflict over cholera helped spur biomedical expertise as the dominant paradigm for U.S. public health science and policy beginning in the 20th century. This paradigm was reflected in federal government reliance on infectious disease physicians as the primary scientific decision makers in the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, epistemic conflict over challenges to behavioral and social well-being in 2020 may highlight discordance between the dominant biomedical paradigm used in making federal policy and the inherently holistic impact of that policy on population health, suggesting need for a new paradigm of multidisciplinary scientific engagement. Because population-wide public health initiatives affect many aspects of health—physiological, psychological, behavioral, and social—that are best measured and interpreted by experts in these respective fields, multidisciplinary scientific engagement would facilitate optimal, holistic evaluation of policy benefits and harms. This multidisciplinary approach, analogous to that currently recommended in medical management of chronic disease, would advance epidemiological research to inform evidence-based policy for public health crises in which U.S. population-wide interventions are contemplated.
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