Psychology endeavors to develop theories of human capacities and behaviors on the basis of a variety of methodologies and dependent measures. We argue that one of the most divisive factors in ...psychological science is whether researchers choose to use computational modeling of theories (over and above data) during the scientific-inference process. Modeling is undervalued yet holds promise for advancing psychological science. The inherent demands of computational modeling guide us toward better science by forcing us to conceptually analyze, specify, and formalize intuitions that otherwise remain unexamined—what we dub open theory. Constraining our inference process through modeling enables us to build explanatory and predictive theories. Here, we present scientific inference in psychology as a path function in which each step shapes the next. Computational modeling can constrain these steps, thus advancing scientific inference over and above the stewardship of experimental practice (e.g., preregistration). If psychology continues to eschew computational modeling, we predict more replicability crises and persistent failure at coherent theory building. This is because without formal modeling we lack open and transparent theorizing. We also explain how to formalize, specify, and implement a computational model, emphasizing that the advantages of modeling can be achieved by anyone with benefit to all.
In the first part of the article, the central role of theory in emotion psychology is underscored and reasons are given why more theoretical psychology of emotion is needed. In the second part, nine ...tasks for the theoretical psychology of emotion are defined, by refining and extending three of the general tasks of theoretical psychology proposed 70 years ago by Sigmund Koch Theoretical psychology, 1950: An overview. Psychological Review, 58(4), 295.
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0055768
. The nine tasks are: (1) Analysis, rational reconstruction and critique of existing emotion theories. (2) Comparison of different theories. (3) Systematization and integration of theories. (4) Reconstruction of the development of theories over time. (5) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of theory-data and data-theory inferences. (6) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of the complete set of arguments for and against specific emotion-theoretic assumption and whole theories. (7) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of measurement theories for emotions. (8) Development of new emotion theories and theories of emotion measurement. (9) Information about theoretical and methodological developments of interest to emotion psychology in other subdisciplines of psychology and in neighbouring sciences, and export of theories and methods to other disciplines.
In this paper, we analyse Hayek's views on endogenous preferences. Perhaps surprisingly in the light of his remarks that economists ought to take people's preferences as given, there are several ...places in Hayek's economics and political economy where preference endogeneity plays a significant role. We begin by documenting those cases, providing an historical overview of Hayek's views on preference endogeneity. We then go on to argue that in his work on theoretical psychology Hayek provides an account of the causal mechanisms through which people's preferences can change in response to their social context. Finally, we assess Hayek's views on preference endogeneity in the light of more recent work on the topic in behavioural economics, before going on to consider what Hayek's analysis can add to contemporary debates in political economy.
The replication crisis has preoccupied psychology for over a decade and has led to many reform proposals. In this Special Issue, we argue that a reflexive discussion of both the replication crisis ...and possible reforms is crucial. With the plural ‘replication of crises’ in the title, we want to make clear that the current crisis is more than one. What is perceived as a crisis varies depending on the scientific field, theoretical background, and epistemological perspective. As a consequence, this Special Issue aims to promote both an intra-disciplinary dialogue between scientific and theoretical psychology, and an inter-disciplinary dialogue between psychology, the humanities and the social sciences. The individual contributions focus on three central questions: (1) What is specific about the replication crisis in psychology? (2) What are the connections between the replication crisis in psychology and that in other scientific fields? (3) What are possible underlying causes of the replication crisis in psychology, and what are the opportunities for improvement? Although each of the articles offers a unique and sometimes challenging perspective to understanding the replication crisis, they all share the assumption that we need to reflect in order to learn and improve.
The replication crisis led to the rise of metascience as a possible solution. In this article, we examine central metascientific premises and argue that attempts to solve the replication crisis in ...psychology will benefit from a tighter integration of approaches from the psychological humanities. The first part of our article identifies central epistemic merits that metascientific endeavors can contribute to psychology. However, we argue secondly against the widespread claim that metascience is the only way to deal with the replication crisis in psychology and point to major epistemic problems: the one-sided notion of a singular scientific method, the homogenizing view of psychology, and the exclusion of practices of theorizing. As a possible compensation for such shortcomings, we introduce, third, the reflective and pluralistic approach of psychological humanities. In so doing, we show how psychological humanities can serve as an important complement to the objective of improving psychological research. Psychological humanities contribute to a more precise determination of validity, to ethical considerations, and a better understanding of psychology’s objects in regard to replication. Accordingly, we argue for the integration of psychological humanities into both metascience and psychology to provide a better basis for addressing epistemic and ethical questions.
Psychology: a Giant with Feet of Clay Zagaria, Andrea; Ando’, Agata; Zennaro, Alessandro
Integrative psychological & behavioral science,
09/2020, Letnik:
54, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The aim of the current study has been to highlight the theoretical precariousness of Psychology. The theoretical precariousness has been evidenced through a review of psychological “core-constructs” ...whose definitions were thoroughly searched in 11 popular introductory textbooks of psychology edited between 2012 and 2019 and in an APA dictionary of Psychology (VandeBos
2015
). This analysis has shown unsatisfactory or discordant definitions of psychological “core-constructs”. A further epistemological comparison between psychology and three “harder” sciences (i.e., physics, chemistry and biology) seemed to support the “soft” nature of psychology: a minor consensus in its “core” and a minor capacity to accumulate knowledge when compared to the former “harder” sciences (Fanelli in
PLoS One, 5
, e10068,
2010
; Fanelli and Glänzel in
PLoS One, 8
, e66938,
2013
). This comparison also seemed to support the “pre-paradigmatic” condition of psychology, in which conflicts between rival schools of thought hamper the development of a real unified paradigm (Kuhn
1970
). To enter a paradigmatic stage, we propose here evolutionary psychology as the most compelling approach, thanks to its empirical support and theoretical consistency
.
However, since the skepticism about “grand unifying theories” is well disposed (Badcock in
Review of General Psychology, 16
, 10–23,
2012
), we suggest that evolutionary psychology must be intended as a pluralistic approach rather than a monolithic one, and that its main strength is its capacity to resolve the nature-nurture dialectics.
This paper introduces Radix Intelligence, a new definition and integrative model of intelligence developed within the overarching system of Psychobionomy (Petrides, 2019). Following a discussion of ...misconceptions and pitfalls plaguing existing models of intelligence, with emphasis on the IQ literature, I point at Radix Intelligence as the primal energy underpinning mind activity in its entirety. All existence unfolds according to the laws of Radix Intelligence, whose nature is collective, impersonal, and non-local. Within the confines of the personalized human mind, the self-construct, a latent structure within the Thinking stage of the Psychobionomic system, refracts the unitary flow of Radix Intelligence into a manifold of major traits, including trait cognitive, trait emotional, and trait social intelligence, among others. In the context of elucidating Radix Intelligence, I offer a radical reinterpretation of the so-called “crud factor” and also touch on the issue of common method variance. Theoretical implications of Radix Intelligence are discussed with reference to the need for dynamic integration across the whole field of differential psychology, and practical implications with dual reference to the potential for establishing a new field of subconscious psychometrics and the pressing urgency for the individual to transition from a psychology of becoming to a psychology of being.
Research on cognition and emotion during the past 30 years has made reasonable progress in theory, methods and empirical research. New theories of the cognition-emotion relation have been proposed, ...emotion research has become more interdisciplinary, and improved methods of emotion measurement have been developed. On the empirical side, the main achievement of the past 30 years is seen to consist in the reduction of the set of serious contenders for a theory of emotions. Still, several important issues are not fully resolved, including the computational implementation of appraisal processes, the nature of emotions, and the link between emotions and actions. Also, quantitative theories of the cognition-emotion relation need to be refined and tested, and improved theories of the link between emotions and bodily and facial expressions need to be developed. To counter the dangers of theoretical fragmentation and knowledge loss, more efforts should be devoted to the analysis, reconstruction, comparison and integration of important theories and hypotheses in the field of emotion, as well as to the systematization of arguments in favor and against these theories and hypotheses.
Mills discusses the notion of myth and links it to a discussion of theory. While he does not consider myth and theory to be synonymous, I attempt to close the gap between these two notions even ...further. This argument is accomplished by discussing theorists that have theorized about theory and aligning their claims with Mills’ claims about myth. I propose that Mills cannot rely on coherence to substantiate good myth/theory and, instead, suggest the consideration of what constitutes good quality theorizing. Good theorizing involves deep understanding of different theories/myths and comparing them to generate innovation.