With limited authority over state lawmaking, but ultimate responsibility for the performance of government, how effective are governors in moving their programs through the legislature? This book ...advances a new theory about what makes chief executives most successful and explores this theory through original data. Thad Kousser and Justin H. Phillips argue that negotiations over the budget, on the one hand, and policy bills on the other are driven by fundamentally different dynamics. They capture these dynamics in models informed by interviews with gubernatorial advisors, cabinet members, press secretaries and governors themselves. Through a series of novel empirical analyses and rich case studies, the authors demonstrate that governors can be powerful actors in the lawmaking process, but that what they're bargaining over – the budget or policy – shapes both how they play the game and how often they can win it.
Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto— or veto threat— has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, ...the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade ...Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.
Conflict analysis, which plays an important role in our society, has attracted more and more attentions. However, the existing conflict analysis models are not effective enough to evaluate the ...inconsistency degree of cliques that have more than two individuals. Besides, for each clique, its allied, conflict and neutral attributes have not been explicitly defined and thoroughly explored. Therefore, due to the lack of enough explicit clues, we cannot further formulate some strategies manipulating the conflict degrees of related cliques to realize the specific objectives. Last but not least, one-vote veto is seldom considered, although it plays a vital role in many fields, such as venture capital and United Nations Security Council resolutions. In order to solve these problems, we resort to three-way concept analysis and describe a clique by using the intent of a specific concept. On the basis of the obtained specific concepts, we derive the allied, conflict and neutral attributes of cliques, and further make decisions and explore the maximal coalitions and minimum conflict sets. Finally, in order to cater dynamic environment, we also describe an incremental algorithm for conflict analysis.
We investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by ...structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copeland
α
, maximin,
k
-veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting.
Haciendo parte de la estructura de un Estado, siempre existen actores individuales o colectivos que tienen el poder de realizar cambios en las decisiones programáticas impuestas. Estos actores ...denominados veto players o jugadores con veto, pueden estar determinados en la constitución o surgir fuera de ella. En la actualidad, la extrapolación de funciones de algunos poderes dificulta la identificación de los mismos. La controversia aumenta con la inclusión dentro del esquema del poder judicial (PJ) de un órgano jurisdiccional superior, un Tribunal Constitucional (TC) encargado de realizar el control que garantice la vigencia y primacía de la Constitución. Teniendo en consideración la función y la importancia del Tribunal Constitucional en el Estado peruano, así como algunas "controvertidas" sentencias de este organismo, corresponde preguntarse si las potestades que se le han atribuido otorgan a este nuevo elemento la capacidad suficiente para implementar o alterar la estabilidad decisoria del sistema político, es decir, si con estos poderes, el TC peruano se ha convertido en un verdadero actor con poder de veto.
Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For ...example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties?Veto Playersadvances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo.
Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics,Veto Playerswill be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline.
From the preface to the Italian edition:
"Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna
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