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  • A realistic theory of Universals
    Borstner, Bojan
    The author begins with the assumtion that the distinction between sciences and ontology is necessary for the interpretation of the world-hypothesis. The world contains concrete and abstract objects ... (Frege's heritage). There are two possible different positions in the long history of philosophy - realism and nominalism - that try to explain this hypothesis. I defend Immanent realism against Transcendental realism (Tooley) and different kinds of nominalism (Devitt, Lewis). The Immanent realist says that there are individuals which have properties and relations. These properties and relations are universals which are real but could not be uninstantiated - for each property P there exists a particual x such that Px. The author accepts Immanent realism because it is ferile background theory for an explanation of laws of nature - a generalisation is accidentally true by virtue of facts about particulars but it is nomologically true by virtue of a relation among universals (nomic necessity is a second order universal - a relation between first order universals or second order particulars).
    Vrsta gradiva - članek, sestavni del
    Leto - 1989
    Jezik - angleški
    COBISS.SI-ID - 14985472