UNI-MB - logo
UMNIK - logo
 
(UM)
  • Znanje i referencija
    Jutronić, Dunja
    The paper deals with a much debated question within the historical causal theory of reference about what the grounder has to know (or is any kind of knowledge or substantial set of beliefs ... necessary?) at the act of grounding the term. Namely, descriptive theories of reference assume that identifying knowledge of referent is necessary for reference, while the causalist claims that no knowledge about the referent is necessary. However the qua-problem, as defined in Devitt and Sterelny (1987), shows that the grounder has to have something in mind at the act of grounding. The author(ess) tries to show that something like Putnam's stereotypes seems to be present in the mind of the grounder. Devitt's (1981) criticism of Putnam's stereotypes is nonconclusive since it does not seem possible to communicate or to teach a term without any use of a stereotype. Devitt's doubt that the speaker has to associate some kind of description that classifies the term as the term of a natural kind actually admits the existence of stereotype since the speaker has to "know" at least the general category to which the referent belongs. The qua-problem is still with us as a stumbling block for the naturalization of reference within the historical causal theory of reference
    Vir: Filozofska istraživanja. - ISSN 0351-4706 (God. 19, sv. 3, 1999, str. 407-416)
    Vrsta gradiva - članek, sestavni del
    Leto - 1999
    Jezik - hrvaški
    COBISS.SI-ID - 9215752

vir: Filozofska istraživanja. - ISSN 0351-4706 (God. 19, sv. 3, 1999, str. 407-416)

loading ...
loading ...
loading ...