The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is composed of one judge per country that has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). When a case is brought against a country, that country has the privilege to have ‘its’ judge take seat ex officio. When the elected judge is unable to sit ex officio, the country may propose an ad hoc judge. Ad hoc judges do not need to pass the normal test of scrutiny as to their competence and impartiality, allowing governments to propose pro-government candidates in politically sensitive cases. Consequently, academic literature, legal practice and even judges of the Court have voiced concerns over the neutrality and quality of ad hoc judges. Changes have been made to the Convention mechanism and further changes are called for to ensure the neutrality of ad hoc judges. By doing statistical analysis, this article suggests that the actual voting behaviour of ad hoc judges may not be so problematic as sometimes suggested. This may be relevant for a decision to introduce further changes to the Convention mechanism and the extent of those potential revisions.