The Dynamic Heterogeneous Redundancy (DHR) architecture presents a novel approach to system design and organization, aiming to enhance system security by integrating dynamicity and heterogeneity into its structure. Despite its practical efficacy, the theoretical underpinnings elucidating the mechanisms through which DHR enhances security remain unestablished. This study endeavors to bridge this gap by conducting a theoretical analysis and modeling of the DHR architecture, focusing on its intrinsic characteristics and their implications for system security. Employing static game theory, our research uncovers the unique Nash equilibrium within DHR architecture. Expanding upon this mathematical framework, we delve into how factors such as dynamicity, heterogeneity, and failure rates influence these equilibria, subsequently shaping system security. To validate our findings, we conduct a case study involving a triply redundant DHR system and simulate the offense-defense interplay using the Adam optimization algorithm within boundedly rational static games. Our results affirm the variations in system security under diverse initial conditions and model states, thereby establishing a robust theoretical foundation for DHR architectures and laying the groundwork for their broader comprehension and application across various domains.