E-viri
Recenzirano
-
Cole, Shawn; Healy, Andrew; Werker, Eric
Journal of development economics, 03/2012, Letnik: 97, Številka: 2Journal Article
Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis, indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters. We also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years. These results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.
Vnos na polico
Trajna povezava
- URL:
Faktor vpliva
Dostop do baze podatkov JCR je dovoljen samo uporabnikom iz Slovenije. Vaš trenutni IP-naslov ni na seznamu dovoljenih za dostop, zato je potrebna avtentikacija z ustreznim računom AAI.
Leto | Faktor vpliva | Izdaja | Kategorija | Razvrstitev | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP |
Baze podatkov, v katerih je revija indeksirana
Ime baze podatkov | Področje | Leto |
---|
Povezave do osebnih bibliografij avtorjev | Povezave do podatkov o raziskovalcih v sistemu SICRIS |
---|
Vir: Osebne bibliografije
in: SICRIS
To gradivo vam je dostopno v celotnem besedilu. Če kljub temu želite naročiti gradivo, kliknite gumb Nadaljuj.