This chapter explains on Azerbaijan's commitment to a pro-Western foreign policy which is based not on whims but on rational calculations deriving from the long-standing perceptions of threats and interests. Azerbaijan's political reform agenda had ground to a halt, further slowing the pace of integration with the West. When Azerbaijan became independent, relations with the West have developed and broadened greatly in all fields. These relations can be grouped into three baskets of issues: governance and democratization, energy and trade, and security cooperation. Over time, these three areas have been accorded varying degrees of importance. Azerbaijan is in the process of building its distinct national identity, and does not have the Kemalist heritage. As such, Azerbaijan's identity could survive without the West much better than Turkey's could. But that prospect should be of no comfort to Azerbaijan or to the West. Less than twenty years ago, Azerbaijan faced war, the fragmentation of the newborn country, a collapsed economy and political chaos. In the intervening years, much has happened in Azerbaijan's neighborhood. One of the greatest challenges for Azerbaijan and a prerequisite for its political development is whether the strength of informal power structures can be tamed and subjugated to formal and accountable institutions. The future of the Karabakh issue will have a decisive effect: should Azerbaijan get the chance to begin redeveloping the large Western areas of the country currently under occupation that may generate a substantial push for rural and regional development. In Azerbaijani society, the rise of the Azerbaijani language and the cultural affirmation of Azerbaijani identity is one of the most noteworthy developments of the period since independence. There is a growing tendency for Azerbaijan's leaders to lean toward a balanced or "multi-vectoral" foreign policy akin to the model that Kazakhstan pioneered a decade ago.