India's recent military responses to terrorist attacks, indicate a new phase in the "ugly stability" of nuclear South Asia. In the past, both India and Pakistan have often used tacit cooperation ...through the use of "gray zone" approaches - in which states use coercive methods short of warfare to secure their goals - to reduce the dangers of escalation. In recent years it appears that India will no longer only rely on gray zone approaches in response to Pakistan's provocations.
With particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region, this book examines the rise and fall of sea powers.
In the Asia-Pacific region there has been significant expansion of sea-based economies together ...with burgeoning naval power. Many claim that these processes will transform the world's future economic and security relationships. The book addresses the question of to what extent the notion of 'Asia rising' is reflected by and dependent on its developing sea power. A central theme is the Chinese challenge to long-term Western maritime ascendency and what might be the consequences of this.
In order to situate current and future developments this book includes chapters which analyse what sea power means and has meant, as well as its role, both historic and contemporary, in the rise and fall of great powers.
This book will be of much interest to students of naval power, Asian politics, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, IR and security studies.
India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why ...did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context? The article will firstly discuss the concept of joint operational commands and then theories of organisational military change. Secondly, it will look at the debate in India about jointness and these commands, and how this led to the creation of the ANC. Lastly, it will conclude with observations about the ANC and the future of similar commands in the Indian context. Unless disaster or political events incentivise Indian politicians to force change on the defence establishment, it is unlikely that there will be any further joint operational theatre commands (like the ANC) in the future, but joint operational functional commands (like the strategic forces command, SFC) are more likely.
WHEN IS COERCION SUCCESSFUL? Bratton, Patrick C.
Naval War College review,
07/2005, Volume:
58, Issue:
3
Journal Article
Coercion is the use of threats to influence another's behavior. Although there is a substantial and growing literature on coercion, there is little consensus within that literature as to what ...qualifies as a successful example of coercion. Bratton explains why there is so little agreements as to when coercion is successful. Furthermore, coercion needs to be placed within the larger field of foreign policies of the relevant actors in order to see how it meets the needs, concerns, and options of policymakers.
How effective was the Indian government in sending clear, coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages during 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02? This study finds that compellence was ...hampered by three factors: (1) the government kept changing its demands; (2) the lack of adequate civil-military coordination; and (3) the government engaged in a dual-track policy of direct coercion of Pakistan, while simultaneously engaging the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. Ultimately, these two policy strands worked at cross-purposes to each other.
When do coercive tools, like air power and economic sanctions, work? Robert Pape argues that coercive strategies that depend upon the punishment of civilians-whether they are executed by strategic ...bombing or economic sanctions-do not work and will never work. He argues that only denial/interdiction strategies-those that disrupt the enemy's military strategy-will be able to coerce states. This review essay examines the majority of Pape's writings to see if he successfully defends his dismissal of punishment strategies, and provides policymakers with a theory of coercion. Upon close examination, there are two flaws with Pape's work: (1) he holds punishment strategies to a higher standard of success than denial strategies; and (2) he confuses effectiveness with utility.
When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait Thies, Wallace J.; Bratton, Patrick C.
Journal of strategic studies,
12/1/2004, 2004-12-00, 20041201, Volume:
27, Issue:
4
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Are authoritarian states better at coercion than democracies? The latter frequently find it difficult to make credible and persuasive threats; orchestrate words and deeds; and signal by deed as well ...as by word. Authoritarian states are often believed to be less bound by constraints such as divided government and organizational rivalries, but this belief has rarely been tested. This paper examines the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, in which the People's Republic of China was the coercer and the United States the target. A close examination of what China said and did reveals policy reversals and conflicting signals often associated with the US in the coercion literature.
With particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region, this book examines the rise and fall of sea powers. In the Asia-Pacific region there has been significant expansion of seabased economies together ...with burgeoning naval power. Many claim that these processes will transform the world’s future economic and security relationships. The book addresses the question of the extent to which the notion of ‘Asia rising’ is reflected by and dependent on its developing sea power. A central theme is the Chinese challenge to long-term Western maritime ascendency and what might be the consequences of this. In order to situate current and future developments this book includes chapters which analyse what sea power means and has meant, as well as its role, both historic and contemporary, in the rise and fall of great powers. This book will be of much interest to students of naval power, Asian politics, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, IR and security studies.
How effective are parliamentary democracies at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages? Are parliamentary democracies any better at doing this than presidential ...democracies? In order to answer these questions, the research project uses an in-depth analysis of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War as a case study. This article seeks to determine how effective the United Kingdom was at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages. In general we observe that the United Kingdom suffered from many of the same problems in executing a coercive strategy as presidential governments do.
