Motivated by empirical evidence I uncover on the dynamics of French firms' exports, I offer a novel theory of trade frictions. Firms export only into markets where they have a contact. They search ...directly for new trading partners, but also use their existing network of contacts to search remotely for new partners. I characterize the dynamic formation of an international network of exporters in this model. Structurally, I estimate this model on French data and confirm its predictions regarding the distribution of the number of foreign markets accessed by exporters and the geographic distribution of exports.
The gravity equation in international trade states that bilateral exports are proportional to economic size and inversely proportional to geographic distance. While the role of size is well ...understood, that of distance remains mysterious. I offer an explanation for the role of distance: If (i) the distribution of firm sizes is Pareto, (ii) the average squared distance of a firm’s exports is an increasing power function of its size, and (iii) a parameter restriction holds, then the distance elasticity of trade is constant for long distances. When the firm size distribution follows Zipf’s law, trade is inversely proportional to distance.
By considering a model with identical firms, Krugman (1980) predicts that a higher elasticity of substitution between goods magnifies the impact of trade barriers on trade flows. In this paper, I ...introduce firm heterogeneity in a simple model of international trade. I prove that the extensive margin and the intensive margin are affected by the elasticity of substitution in exact opposite directions. When the distribution of productivity across firms is Pareto, the predictions of the Krugman model with representative firms are overturned: the impact of trade barriers on trade flows is dampened by the elasticity of substitution, and not magnified. (JEL F12, F13)
What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In the presence of financing frictions, firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects. Through this collateral ...channel, shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment. To compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral value, we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate. Over the 1993-2007 period, the representative US corporation invests $0.06 out of each $1 of collateral.
I propose a model of international trade with liquidity constraints. If firms must pay a fixed entry cost in order to access foreign markets, and if they face liquidity constraints to finance these ...costs, only those firms that have sufficient liquidity are able to export. A set of firms could profitably export, but are prevented from doing so because they lack sufficient liquidity. More productive firms that generate large liquidity from their domestic sales, and wealthier firms that inherit a large amount of liquidity, are more likely to export. This model offers a potential explanation for the apparent lack of sensitivity of exports to exchange rate fluctuations. When the exchange rate appreciates, existing exporters lose competitiveness abroad, and are forced to reduce their exports. At the same time, the value of domestic assets owned by potential exporters increases. Some liquidity constrained exporters start exporting. This dampens the anti-competitiveness impact of a currency appreciation. Under some conditions, it may reverse it altogether and increase aggregate exports. In this sense, the model is able to rationalize the co-existence of competitive devaluations and competitive revaluations.
We generalize Krugman's (1979) ‘new trade’ model by allowing for an explicit production chain in which a range of tasks is performed sequentially by a number of specialized teams. We demonstrate that ...an increase in market size induces a deeper division of labor among these teams which leads to an increase in firm productivity. The paper can be thought of as a formalization of Smith's (1776) famous theorem that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. It also sheds light on how market size differences can limit the scope for international technology transfers.
► We generalize the Krugman (1979) model by introducing specialized production teams. ► We demonstrate that an increase in market size induces a deeper division of labor. ► This shows that the division of labor can be limited by the extent of the market. ► It also implies that market size differences can limit global technology transfers.
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