I shall explore in this article the hypothesis that structures are relations between the components of complex entities. After having introduced hylomorphism, its major advantages and the major views ...of the nature of structures, I shall introduce the distinctions between external and internal relations and the one between symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations. I shall also describe the theory of non-symmetrical relations that I accept, i.e., the O-Roles theory, as most structures seem to be external and non-symmetrical relations. Later on, I shall develop my hypothesis and I shall deal with one objection, i.e., that relations necessarily come together with Bradley’s vicious regress. Finally, I shall also hypothesize that complex entities are different from structures and from their structured components. In this respect, I shall defend a “simple view” of complex entities. Dwelling on this view, I shall also reply to some recent objections against hylomorphism.
Relationism and the Problem of Order Paolini Paoletti, Michele
Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology,
06/2023, Volume:
38, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism ...cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. I also examine four main existing strategies to solve it. In Section 3, I develop my argument. The first step consists in arguing that—among those strategies—relationism can only accept directionalism. The second step consists in arguing that directionalism is affected by a serious problem: the Problem of Converses. I also show that relationists who embrace directionalism cannot solve this problem. In Section 4, I introduce and rebut several strategies on behalf of relationists to cope with my argument. In Section 5, I briefly draw some conclusions.
I shall introduce at the beginning of the paper a characterization of strong ontological emergence. According to it, roughly, something strongly emerges from some other thing(s) iff the former ...depends in some respect on the latter and it some independent of it in some other respect. Afterwards, I shall present my own formulation of strong emergence, which is based on the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a causal power. Causal powers are the entities to be primarily taken as emergent. Emergent causal powers depend for their possession on their emergence bases, but they are also independent of the latter (and on further relevantly similar entities) for their activation. This claim will be defended within some more general assumptions about the metaphysics of powers. Finally, I shall compare the power-based formulation of emergence with other formulations. I shall try to demonstrate that the power-based formulation is (all other things being equal) metaphysically less controversial than the other formulations. For the power-based formulation (unlike the other formulations) does not need to defend the additional thesis that the emergents can depend in some relevant respect on their bases and be independent of the latter in some other relevant respect. Indeed, the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a power (and the possibility of having the former without the latter) is inscribed in the nature of powers themselves.
Mechanisms are organized collections of objects and activities that underlie certain phenomena/behaviours. In this article, I shall argue that the organizations of mechanisms should be thought of as ...external relations, namely, as relations that do not entirely depend on their
relata
’s existence, nor on their natures, nor on their intrinsic properties. After having introduced in the first two sections mechanisms and the ontology of relations, I shall analyse the organizations of mechanisms along four different dimensions: spatial, temporal, causal and hierarchical. I shall demonstrate that each dimension requires that organizations be taken as external relations. Finally, in the last section, I shall anticipate and reply to two objections.
V prispevku obravnavamo definicije leksemov rdeče (rouge) in infrardeče (infrarouge), ki sta si navidezno blizu na ravni označenca in označevalca. Kar razlikuje pomen obeh besed, ni le raba in ...sprejemanje (splošno védenje proti ekspertnemu znanju), pač pa tudi drugačen način razumevanja, saj se pomen leksema infrardeče (infrarouge) nanaša na realnost, ki je z vidom ne moremo zaznati. V primeru infrarouge se znanstvena definicija zdi nujna, pomen leksema rdeče pa pripada splošnemu besedišču. Definicija besede rdeče (rouge) pravzaprav predmetom pripisuje kromatične lastnosti, ki jih z znanstvenega vidika nimajo; v fiziki namreč barva ni lastnost predmeta, pač pa dolžina valov.
I reconsider in this article the problem of the Holy Trinity from the standpoint of some recent theories of the ontology of relations. After having presented the problem and after having introduced ...some basic ontological concepts (i.e., substance, modes, person), I shall briefly dwell on the ontology of non-symmetrical relations and on the O-Roles theory suggested by Francesco Orilia. Afterwards, I shall develop my own solution to the problem of the Holy Trinity by exploring the status of Intratrinitarian relations and of divine Persons. Among other things, I shall defend the thesis that divine Persons are not substances, but peculiar modes of God. I shall also ground the distinction between the properties attributed to God himself and the ones attributed to specific divine Persons. Finally, I shall anticipate and face some objections against my account (e.g., the one of modalism) and argue that it is legitimate to maintain that there is no kind of persons in general—which is a consequence of my view.
We summarize in this introduction the contents of all the contributions included in Synthese special issue on form, structure and hylomorphism. Moreover, we provide an exhaustive bibliography of ...recent research on these topics.
Against Conjunctive Properties Paolini Paoletti, Michele
Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology,
09/2020, Volume:
35, Issue:
3
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
I put in question in this article the existence of conjunctive properties. In the second section, after having provided a characterization of conjunctive properties, I develop an argument based on ...the principle of ontological parsimony: if we accept that there are conjunctive properties in the universe then,
ceteris paribus
, our ontology turns out to be less ontologically parsimonious than if we reject them.
Afterwards, in the third section, I distinguish between maximalist and non-maximalist and reductionist and non-reductionist theories of conjunctive properties, as well as between reductionist and non-reductionist theories that reject conjunctive properties. Such distinctions help to clarify the options at hand when accepting or rejecting conjunctive properties. In light of these distinctions, I then tackle two objections against the argument from ontological parsimony.
Finally, in the remaining sections, I deal with two arguments defended by D. M. Armstrong for the existence of conjunctive properties: the argument from infinite complexity and the argument from causal powers. I show that there are several ways to resist these arguments and their conclusion.
Formulating Emergence Paolini Paoletti, Michele
Ratio (Oxford),
April 2018, 2018-04-00, 20180401, Volume:
31, Issue:
S1
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Emergence is intuitively characterized as dependent novelty. Yet, besides this intuition, several formulations of it were elaborated in the last decades. In this article, after having distinguished ...between two different varieties of emergence (a weak and a strong one), I aim at providing two formulation schemes for emergence. This could help to explain what emergence is and to clarify and unify the suggested formulations. The general idea behind my schemes is that emergence is partial and qualified dependence of the emergent entities on their emergence bases. After having examined several formulations of emergences and presented my schemes, I shall analyse two interesting consequences of the acceptance of the latter: the in principle compatibility between weak and strong emergence and the idea that micro‐physicalism, i.e., the main competitor of emergentism, may actually come in different degrees of strength, more or less in contrast with emergentism. Eventually, I shall briefly compare my formulation schemes with some other relevantly similar proposals.
There is an ongoing debate on the ontology of relations, which features four main competing approaches:
directionalism
,
positionalism
,
anti-positionalism
, and
primitivism
. This paper focuses on a ...particular version of positionalism, namely
role positionalism
, and proposes the results of an experimental philosophy research concerning aspects of it. We tested the intuitions of ordinary subjects regarding the inter-relational generality of the roles typically assumed for spatial and kinematic relations, namely
source
,
destination
,
theme
,
location
. According to a 2014 paper by Orilia, this generality is rather wide, as it encompasses relations of temporal order, causation, quantitative order, transaction, possession, and parthood. Our findings do not support this proposal, except for parthood, and, in a limited way, for temporal order. We also tested the intuitions of ordinary subjects regarding the contrast between
the pro-converses option
, according to which non-symmetric relations split into distinct converse relations, and
the anti-converses option
, according to which non-symmetric relations have no distinct converses. Although traditionally positionalism is associated to the latter option, in recent works by Orilia role positionalism is associated to the former option for at least some relations, while remaining anchored to the latter option for other relations. Our findings support this mixed line to some extent, but not quite in the way suggested by Orilia in such works.
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