The crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the weaknesses of the EU as an international actor. Although the EU is an economic, commercial and regulatory giant, it has not succeeded in emerging as a ...significant military or security actor—despite having announced a ‘common foreign and security policy’ 30 years ago. In particular, it is deeply divided over policy towards Russia. Moreover, attempts to devise an overall policy for its neighbourhood, and in particular an ‘Eastern Partnership’ focused on the borderline states between the Union and Russia, have been widely judged as failures. In the showdown between Russia and the West over Ukraine, the EU per se has been marginalised by both Moscow and Washington. Various EU member states have embraced different preferences with respect to the potential resolution of the Ukraine crisis. In the context of potential discussions, demanded by Vladimir Putin, on a ‘new security order’ for Eurasia, the EU’s absence is tragic.
The European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is run using special procedures. The Member States have not delegated powers to the supranational institutions. Yet a number of ...studies challenge the assumption that policy‐making lies exclusively with Member States’ governments. The Commission's putative influence within the CFSP, however, remains to be studied systematically from an analytical perspective. Aiming to fill this gap in the literature, this article asks how the Commission de facto influences EU foreign and security policies beyond its delegated powers. Two least likely cases are analysed: the launch of EU naval mission Atalanta and the adoption of an EU Maritime Security Strategy. By adressing this question, the article contributes to a better understanding of the level of EU foreign policy integration. It also adds knowledge on the possible causes of this development, and thus to the EU integration literature more generally.
(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1679-1695 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. – II. The normative positioning of the Union: a new ...space for the collective exercise of sovereignty. – II.1. Human rights and criminal law, a source of inspiration and legitimacy. – II.2. Normative interpretation and hybridization within the Council practice. – III. “Supplementing” criminal repression? A new space to overcome the limits of jurisdiction. – III.1. Foreign policy v. criminal repression: the nature and purpose of the measures involved. – III.2. Overcoming the limits of jurisdiction and extending the reach of the measures. | (Abstract) The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime was adopted by the European Union in December 2020, following in the footsteps of its allies and some of its own Member States. Initiated across the Atlantic in response to the murder of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, these thematic international sanctions can now target anyone associated with the most serious human rights violations. Presented as key levers in the international fight against impunity, these instruments lie at the confluence of foreign policy and criminal justice. The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime is therefore a privileged observation point for studying the evolution of practice in areas that are traditionally closely associated with State sovereignty. More specifically, the analysis, carried out within the framework of both EU external action law and public international law, shows how the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime enables the Union and its Member States to grasp some international situations which would fall outside their single competences and jurisdictions. This in turn illustrates a form of enhanced, collective and long-armed sovereignty, exercised on the international stage by the EU and its members in the service of their values and strategic interests.
(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1513-1522 | European Forum Insight of 16 February 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Who are the ...oligarchs in third countries? - II.1. Targeting leading businesspersons: the precedent of Syria. - II.2. Targeting Russian businesspersons: emerging trends. - III. Losing the status of Russian oligarch: any possibility to be de-listed? - IV. Conclusions. | (Abstract) This Insight examines the developments in the EU restrictive measures against Russia in the aftermath of the full-scale aggression in Ukraine, focusing on the novel "(g) criterion" designed to target Russian businesspersons (often referred to as Russian oligarchs). The analysis illustrates the recent litigation before the General Court, in which targeted individuals seek to annul their designations. It highlights that, compared to previous sanctions practice, the new criterion adopts an innovative sector-based approach, establishing a new link between businesspersons operating in certain economic sectors and vital source of revenue for the Russian government. The Insight further explores the Court's cautious stance on de-listing Russian businesspersons, emphasizing the prudent assessment of evidence and circumvention attempts. Finally, the Insight points to the broad implications of the "(g) criterion" and suggests that the Council holds considerable political discretion in exerting maximum pressure on Rus-sia's business elite, with the ultimate objective of reducing the Kremlin's ability to finance its war.
Scholarship has increasingly acknowledged the importance of public attitudes for shaping the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Economic sanctions emerged as one of CFSP's central ...tools. Yet despite the emergence of sanctions as a popular instrument in the EU foreign policy toolbox, public attitudes towards sanctions are yet to be studied in depth. This article explains public support for EU sanctions, using the empirical example of sanctions against Russia. It looks at geopolitical attitudes, economic motivations and ideational factors to explain the variation in public support for sanctions. The conclusion suggests that geopolitical factors are the most important, and that economic factors matter very little. Euroscepticism and anti‐Americanism play an important role in explaining the support for sanctions at the individual level.
Abstract
Malicious cyber activities are on the rise. States and other relevant actors need to constantly adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, including by setting up effective deterrence ...mechanisms. This is what the European Union (EU) has done through the adoption of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Decision 2019/797, which allows it to impose targeted sanctions to deter and respond to cyberattacks that constitute an external threat to the EU or its member states. However, in contrast to other horizontal regimes of restrictive measures in force within the EU, foreign governments are not included as potential targets of cyber sanctions. Moreover, the recital of the Decision specifies that the adoption of restrictive measures does not involve attribution of international responsibility for cyber-attacks to a third State. This article aims at identifying the rationale behind the inclusion of these distinctive features. It starts by considering the legal uncertainty that surrounds attribution of international responsibility for cyber operations. Next, it explains why the EU is not well placed to invoke third-State responsibility, and the reasons behind its reluctance to do so. It will then illustrate the risks inherent in the lack of a clear legal framework to attribute the responsibility of cyber-attacks to third countries. This may have serious consequences in terms of legal certainty when a cyber-attack amounts to a breach of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. Then, we explore recent developments in EU legislation in the area of cyber security and the possibility to strenghten the powers of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). We draw two conclusions: first, the Union might develop the capacity to attribute cyber attacks to specific actors and there is an interest to do so. However, Member States are probably still reticent to take this step. Two, despite the advantages of establishing a reliable attribution mechanisms, it is submitted that the majority of States prefers to take advantage of a regulative gap that allows them to react to cyber incidents as they see fit.
(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(2), 487-501 | European Forum Insight of 27 July 2023 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Space as enabler of ...EU strategic autonomy. - III. Institutional complexities of EU space governance: the role of ESA and of the Member States. - IV. The material complexities of EU space governance: the civil/military nexus and the different legal basis applicable to civil and security aspects of space. - V. Tackling material complexities: improving the security/defence requirements and uses of EU space infrastructure. - VI. Addressing institutional complexities: the single EU Space Programme and the EU Space Programme Agency (EUSPA). - VII. Final remarks. | (Abstract) EU space policy is an important field in the pursuit of EU strategic autonomy, both as regards the need to protect EU space infrastructures (and industry) from external threats and as regards the need to strengthen EU capacity to act in the space domain for security and defence purposes. However, some complexities exist in the governance of EU space policy, which may affect its ability to deliver in the above-mentioned terms. Reference is made, in particular, to: (i) the role of other international organisations, such as the European Space Agency (ESA), and of the member States, in shaping and carrying out EU space policy (ii) the nature of EU space competence as designed in the Treaties and the different procedures applicable respectively to civil and security/defence aspects of space. Recent practice shows that EU is striving to overcome such limits, with a view to equip its own space policy with the necessary tools to address security and defence challenges of the Union and of the Member States. The Insight gives account of such recent practice and singles out the main developments which allowed the EU legal system to cope with the above-mentioned difficulties, in order to realize a shift from a purely scientific/commercial approach to space policy to a more strategic one, where security and defence interests of the EU and of the Member States are taken into account and possibly addressed.
The ‘High Representative’ speaks on behalf of the European Union in international organizations since 2010. The motivation for this reform has been to strengthen the European Union's foreign policy ...representation. It can be expected that this empowerment of the High Representative has affected the content of official European Union speeches held at the United Nations. Did the reform lead to a more coherent and cohesive representation of European Union foreign policy at the United Nations? To answer this question, I analyze the content of all speeches held on behalf of the European Union in the United Nations General Assembly between 1993 and 2021. I find that European Union foreign policy priorities are more coherently and cohesively represented since the Lisbon reforms took effect. I argue that the empowerment of the ‘High Representatives’ and their diplomats caused this effect. Today, European Union representatives are less likely to follow global trends but set their own thematic priorities by focusing on the areas of disarmament, sustainable development, and international law.
Die erneute Fokussierung auf Europas Verteidigung infolge des Ukraine-Kriegs eröffnet der Europäischen Union die Möglichkeit, ihren fragmentierten Verteidigungsindustriesektor umzustrukturieren, um ...so die Sicherheit all ihrer Mitglieder zu stärken. Die EU muss das empfindliche Gleichgewicht zwischen nationalen Interessen und dem Wohl der Union schützen. Diese sensible Balance hat häufig Spannungen verursacht. Seit Gründung der EU haben die Mitgliedstaaten ihre nationalen Sicherheitsangelegenheiten hintangestellt. Das hat nationale Verteidigungsindustrien hervorgebracht, die hauptsächlich Material für den inländischen Bedarf oder für Exporte in Nicht-EU-Länder produzieren, und zur Entwicklung verschiedener Waffensysteme geführt. Diese Fragmentierung hat die Effizienz und die Skaleneffekte der europäischen Verteidigungsindustrie verringert. Während die EU sich durch Initiativen wie
um Zusammenarbeit bemüht, müssen nun die verschiedenen nationalen Sektoren stärker kooperieren, um die Herausforderungen des derzeitigen strategischen Umfelds bewältigen zu können. Die groß angelegte russische Invasion in der Ukraine hat erhebliche Schwachstellen im derzeitigen europäischen Verteidigungsindustriesystem aufgezeigt. Dazu gehören die Erschöpfung der Lagerbestände, die Vielzahl von Plattformen, die übermäßige Abhängigkeit von Importen bei kritischen Rohstoffen und Halbleitern sowie die zögerlichen Erhöhungen des Verteidigungshaushalts. Die EU muss sich auf eine gemeinsame Vision bei Bedrohungen und langfristigen Zielen einer geschlossenen Verteidigungspolitik einigen. Erst dann kann sie einen kollektiven Planungs- und Beschaffungsprozesses erarbeiten und so die Vielzahl doppelter und redundanter Systeme reduzieren.
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