This study identifies common perceptions between Thomas Hobbes’ approach to religion with that of Critias the sophist. Despite the distance that separates the social environments within which each of ...these authors lived and wrote, in their political philosophy we can spot a shared set of concerns, whose importance transcend the historical and political contexts in which the authors lived and wrote: in the state of nature, where no organized commonwealth (or civil society) exists, capable of repressing the innate greed of men and women, savagery and conflict reign supreme; life is threatened by violence and extreme aggression. It is only the state of society that guarantees stability and good life. For both thinkers, belief in immaterial spirits protects the state of society; belief in God promotes obedience to civil law and guarantees human co-existence. In Critias’ mind, religion is a necessary means to avert aggression, even when the State’s executive powers are unable to punish offenders, using all necessary tools to prevent hostility and conflict. While civil law is the hallmark of peace and stability, belief in a transcendent entity that influences collective and individual modes of living, is an important addition to the pursuit of social peace. A few centuries later, Hobbes (influenced by the misery of the English Civil War) developed viewpoints that also highlight the role of religion in defending social peace. Nonetheless, in Hobbes’ mind religion could safeguard stability only (A) when ecclesiastical authorities submit to the judgment of an omnipotent Sovereign and (B) when the coercive mechanisms of the State supress religious pluralism, prohibiting different interpretations of the Bible, which Hobbes himself considered one of the main causes of conflict.
Dada la cantidad de referencias a koinonia en los dialogos de Platon, llama la atencion que la frase "bien comun" sea usada solo una vez--en el Carmides 166d. Socrates pregunta a su interlocutor ...Critias: "¿No crees que es por el bien comun, para casi (schedon) todos los hombres, el que deba descubrirse como son todos los seres (ton onton)?". La pregunta surge despues de que Critias ha afirmado que sophrosýne es autoconocimiento, lo cual luego especifica como un "conocimiento de todos los demas conocimientos y de si mismo". En este articulo, sostengo que no es casualidad que Socrates mencione el "bien comun" precisamente en este momento en su discusion con Critias. La nocion de sophrosýne que Critias defiende es incoherente debido a lo que este afirma que es su caracteristica distintiva--su reflexividad. Debido a su total reflexividad, no apunta a ningun fin mas alla de si mismo y, por lo tanto, es incapaz de revelar "los seres" ni de estar conectado a ningun bien fuera de si mismo. El bien comun que Socrates menciona aqui esta, por ende, esencialmente relacionado al reconocimiento de la ignorancia que motiva a asombrarse (thaûma) de un bien mas alla del amor de nuestras propias cosas. Por lo tanto, sugiero una explicacion para la curiosa adicion de "casi" (schedon) en el comentario de Socrates aqui: Critias mismo muestra que, a menos que el (o su joven primo Carmides) pueda admitir la ignorancia y experimentar tal asombro, entonces el no esta constitucionalmente incluido en este bien comun.
Given the number of references to koinōnia in Plato’s dialogues, it is striking that the phrase “common good” (koinon agathon) is used only once – at Charmides 166d. Socrates asks his interlocutor ...Critias a question, “Do you not think it is for the common good, almost (schedon), of all men, that how all the beings (tōn ontōn) are should be discovered?” The question emerges after Critias has claimed that sōphrosynē is self-knowledge, which he then specifies as a “knowledge of all other knowledges and of itself”. In this paper, I argue that it is no accident that Socrates mentions the “common good” at precisely this moment in his discussion with Critias. The notion of sōphrosynē that Critias defends is incoherent owing to what Critias claims to be its distinguishing feature – its reflexivity. Because of its total reflexivity, it points to no end beyond itself and thereby it is neither capable of disclosing “the beings” nor of being connected to any good outside of itself. The common good Socrates mentions here is therefore essentially related to an acknowledgment of ignorance that motivates one to wonder (thauma) at a good beyond one’s love of one’s own things. I thus suggest an explanation for the curious addition of “almost” (schedon) in Socrates’ remark here: Critias himself shows that unless he (or his young cousin Charmides) can admit ignorance and experience such wonder, then he is constitutionally not included in this common good.
The aim of this article is to present the hypothesis that a powerful earthquake, which resulted in, among others, the destruction and engulfment by water of the bay of two cities, Helike and Bura ...(373/72 BC) may have been one of two significant causes for which Plato drew attention to soil degradation and erosion processes in Attica and their potentially devastating effects. The second reason was the personally experienced anthropogenic transformation of the natural environment. The philological and historical commentary on the dialogue Critias also showed that Plato, in his analysis, used contemporary terminology in the field of natural sciences.
This paper takes issue with the thesis of Rashed and Auffret that the Critias that has come down to us is not a genuine dialogue of Plato. Authors do not consider the style of the Critias, which ...should be a factor in any complete study of authorship. It observes the widespread consensus that the style of the Timaeus and Critias are virtually inseparable. It surveys a wide range of stylistic studies that have tended to confirm this, before answering a possible objection that cites the similarity of style between the genuine Laws and Philip of Opus' Epinomis. Since the main argument used by Rashed and Auffret relies on an inconsistency between Timaeus and Critias consideration is given to the types of inconsistency found within Platonic dialogues and sequences of dialogues, particularly the hiatus-avoiding dialogues including Timaeus itself and Laws. Finally, alternative explanations of the alleged inconsistency are offered.
In The Textual Tradition of Plato's Timaeus and Critias, Gijsbert Jonkers presents a new examination of the medieval manuscripts of both Platonic dialogues, an overview of the ancient tradition and a ...vast collection of ancient testimonia.
Plato's Timaeus was his only cosmological dialogue and for almost thirteen hundred years it provided the basis in the West for educated people's general view of the natural world. The author provides ...a translation of this important work, together with the Critias - the source of the legendary tale of Atlantis. He has taken particular care to provide an accurate rendering of Plato's words and to avoid putting his own or any other interpretation on the works.
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