Abstract
Turkish foreign policy has dramatically transformed over the last two decades. In the first decade of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rule, the ‘logic of interdependence’ ...constituted the driving motive of Turkish foreign policy. In the second decade, however, the ‘logic of interdependence’ and the soft power-driven ‘mediator–integrator’ role were gradually replaced with a quest for ‘strategic autonomy’, accompanied by interventionism, unilateralism and coercive diplomacy. This article explores the causes of this dramatic shift. We argue that ‘strategic autonomy’, which goes beyond a moderate level of status-seeking compatible with Turkey's material power credentials, has a double connotation in the Turkish context. First, it constitutes a framework for the Turkish ruling elite to align with the non-western great powers and balance the US-led hierarchical order. Second, and more importantly, it serves as a legitimating foreign policy discourse for the government to mobilize its electoral base at home, fragment opposition and accrue popular support. We conclude that the search for autonomy from its western allies and the move towards the Russia–China axis has led to Turkey's isolation and permitted the emergence of new forms of dependence.
Prior to October 7, 2023, the defining feature of Israeli foreign policy was the drive to normalize ties with Arab states, thereby “shrinking” the Israeli–Pales-tinian conflict and assembling Iran’s ...rivals into a broad regional coalition. Despite the endurance of interests that made such a pursuit desirable, the most lucrative selling point of normalization—the ability to develop it into a diplomatic construct with which to contain Iran—had already expired prior to October 7, along with the essential contextual condition for such a deal: broad US support. Rather, the “Age of Normalizations,” a period in which diplomatic normalization could feasibly serve as the kernel of Israeli strategy, expired in late 2021 as a consequence of the Biden administration’s volte-face in the Middle East.
Abstract In 2022, Sweden retracted its feminist foreign policy (FFP). What are the consequences for Swedish foreign policy and for FFPs elsewhere? We published an extensive report on the Swedish FFP ...in 2023, based on a survey that went out to all Swedish diplomats, interviews with more than 30 key foreign policy officials, and hundreds of steering documents from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The article draws out new insights from the report. The retraction is likely to result in a deprioritization of gender equality in Swedish foreign policy. Sweden will likely lose its international leadership role on gender issues. However, FFPs may be more resilient than anticipated because of how foreign policy is governed. Governments that wish to retract FFPs are constrained by three key governance features: First, international agreements and soft law on women's rights place demands on policy content. Second, the decentralized nature of foreign policy implementation allows considerable autonomy on the ground, so that implementors may continue to work with gender equality. Third, longstanding international expectations for Sweden as a gender equality champion create a role-based constraint. These factors contribute to the ‘stickiness’ of FFPs, suggesting that a retraction is unlikely to result in a wholesale abandonment of gender equality activities. The article also examines the enduring legacy of the Swedish FFP beyond its formal retraction, highlighting adoption of FFPs by a growing number of states in different parts of the world.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan faces many internal and external challenges and remains a major point of reference in contemporary international security analysis. This article examines selected ...issues relating to Pakistan's foreign policy contextualized within the transformations in the security dynamics of South Asia. The specificity of the security environment in South Asia, the least politically and economically integrated region of the world, engaged in the protracted Kashmir conflict, serves as the starting point for the multi-dimensional study of the key objectives of Pakistan's foreign strategy towards its neighbouring states, such as India, China and Afghanistan. Methodological approach for this research is based on offensive realism, which seems to present the appropriate explanatory tool for studying the South Asian securityrelated specificity. The naya (new) Pakistan narrative, promoted by the Prime Minister Imran Khan seems hardly a game-changing chapter in the history of the state. Analysis of Pakistan's current policies, persistent domination of the army over the state's bureaucracy, increasing dependency on external loans and bailouts provokes rather opposite conclusions. Pakistan's strategic goals vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India exploit its own resources and strongly affect the regional security system whilst the country has no adequate means to achieve them. Consequently, there is a vital need of a paradigm shift in Pakistan's regional security calculus from ideologically motivated, unfeasible claims to a more cooperative posture, supplemented by campaigns for de-radicalization. This research study was conducted during seven trips to Pakistan during the last decade; the results and conclusions of this study were discussed and debated with academics and other South Asia experts both in Asia and in Europe.
An interview with David Shambaugh is presented. Among other things, Shambaugh discusses how he came up with the different labels to characterize the leadership style of Mao Ze Dong, Deng Xiaoping, ...Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping and why they best capture the style of these leaders, each leader's lasting legacy, and the leader that has the most astute understanding of foreign policy.
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