Rousseau acknowledges that citizenship renders individuals hostile to those outside their own state. In Emile he seems to minimize this problem, saying that the important thing is to be good to those ...with whom one lives. In the Social Contract, however, Rousseau designs a state that does not adopt this cavalier disposition toward the problem of nationalism. I argue that Rousseau addresses citizens' tendency toward nationalism by cultivating the sentiments in ways that generate a sense of compassion for those outside one's own state. Rousseau builds national institutions modeled after the sentiments of pity and self-preservation to promote a humane view of outsiders and to limit the uses of war.
In the field of international relations, Rousseau is generally considered an antiutopian and an exponent of the realist tradition. This view is based on his distrust of alliances and peace plans but ...also on the fact that he never offered any solution to how to lastingly ban war from the international scene. In this article, I argue instead that Rousseau's failure to propose any solutions in international politics lies rather in the utopian nature of his political philosophy. Rousseau intended to find remedies to the question of international law; if he never articulated them, it is, I submit, because the mere discussion of international relations would have undermined the lack of relationality which characterizes his model Republic. By envisioning the ideal state as self-sufficient and isolated (i.e. in the image of the unsociable man in the state of nature), Rousseau renders impractical the aspiration he had of resolving the question of sociability between states.
La correspondance de Mme de La Tour avec l'auteur de La Nouvelle Héloïse fut la grande affaire de sa vie, alors qu'elle n'a pas laissé son nom dans les Confessions, et que, malgré sa durée et une ...forme de grande intensité par moments, cet échange n'a été qu'un épiphénomène pour celui que Sainte-Beuve décrit comme « misanthrope et ours » (Sainte-Beuve 87). Ce concours prend pour le lecteur une dimension quelque peu ridicule : « vous êtes le plus sensible des hommes, écrit Marianne à Jean-Jacques ; moi, sans être peut-être la plus sensible des femmes, je suis plus sensible que vous : vous avez reçu mes hommages sans dédain ; je vous les ai offerts sans orgueil : c'est vous que vous aimez en moi ; moi je n'aime en vous que vous-même ; et nous avons raison tous deux » (Cor., 31 mars 1764, 217). (Cor., 23 mars 1769, 286) C'est sans doute faute de savoir définir leur relation, pour laquelle ils hésitent toujours, non sans une certaine mauvaise foi, entre « amour » et « amitié », comme Marianne dans ses lettres du 10 août 1762 et du 2 septembre 1770 (Cor. 132 et 302), que les deux épistoliers, en plein malentendu, transforment leur commerce en un trafic souvent agaçant, mais émouvant pour finir, car toute la vie de Mme de La Tour du Pin s'y est engloutie, dans une sorte de processus d'auto-alimentation, mais pas seulement, car on y découvre aussi un Jean-Jacques prêt à dire des « fadeurs » (Cor., 27 janvier 1763, 16217) pour nourrir l'échange, en laissant à Marianne cet os à ronger. Mary Kathleen McAlpin, Rhetoric, Genre and Gender in 18th-Century France : Marie- Jeanne Roland, Marie-Anne de La Tour and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1994 ; Gender, Authenticity and the Missive Letter in Eighteenthcentury France : Marie-Anne De La Tour, Rousseau's Real-life Julie (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2006).
I propose a theory of domination derived from republican political theory that is in contrast to the neo-republican theory of domination as arbitrary interference and domination as dependence. I ...suggest that, drawing on of the writings of Machiavelli and Rousseau, we can see two faces of domination that come together to inform social relations. One type of domination is extractive dominance where agents are able to derive surplus benefit from another individual, group, or collective resource, natural or human. Another is what I call constitutive domination where the norms, institutions, and values of the community shape the rationality of subjects to accept forms of power and social relations and collective goals as legitimate forms of authority. Each of these make up two faces of a broader theory of social domination that is more concrete and politically compelling than that put forth by contemporary neo-republican theory. I argue that this understanding of domination should be seen as a kind of ‘radical republicanism’ where the centrality of asymmetrical power relations are placed at the centre of all political concerns. I end by considering the relevance of the common interest as a central means by which to judge the existence of these kinds of domination as well as establish a convincing evaluative criteria for critical judgment.
Nikolai Marr is not a meteorite fallen to earth from a perverse and infernal universe. He finds his place in a school of thought which keeps cropping up in different time periods and places: a school ...which is in search of origins and "primitivism", fascinated by the notion of langage without langues, of the undivided sign, attempting to redefine semantics on the basis of etymologies derived from primordial archetypes. This school of thought, which gives the lie to the simplistic notion of a "national tradition" in linguistics, links Marr's texts to research conducted into the origin of language by philosophers from the seventeenth (Leibniz) and the eighteenth centuries (Vico, Condillac, Herder, Rousseau), as well as to all other logophiles, from Jean-Pierre Brisset to Stéphane Mallarmé, for whom the division of the sign is a source of suffering. Marr's oeuvre is incompatible with a positivist theory of knowledge; instead, it is a fantastical and fascinating object, a single-sided sign, a Möbius strip.
Este artículo plantea que, para poder debatir correctamente la propaganda, debemos centrarnos en cómo esta modifica las dinámicas del medio en el que está presente. Tras cotejar el análisis que hace ...Jason Stanley de la capacidad que tiene la propaganda para socavar el debate público, y la defensa que hace Jean-Jacques Rousseau de su uso para establecer comunidades políticas igualitarias, se afirma que la propaganda no tiene una naturaleza perversa. Esta conclusión se refuerza introduciendo una analogía entre la propaganda y el parasitismo que ilustra cómo la relación que se establece entre propaganda y mente pública no es mutua.
In this extraordinary work, Peter Alexander Meyers shows how the centerpiece of the Enlightenment-societyas the symbol of collective human life and as the fundamental domain of human practice-was ...primarily composed and animated by its most ambivalent figure: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Displaying this newsocietyas an evolving field of interdependence,Abandoned to Ourselvestraces the emergence and moral significance of dependence itself within Rousseau's encounters with a variety of discourses of order, including theology, natural philosophy, and music. Underpinning this whole scene we discover a modernizing conception of the human Will, one that runs far deeper than Rousseau's most famous trope, the "general Will." AsAbandoned to Ourselvesweaves together historical acuity with theoretical insight, readers will find here elements for a reconstructed sociology inclusive of things and persons and, as a consequence, a new foundation for contemporary political theory.
En este artículo se pretende mostrar dos obsesiones que atraviesan los principales escritos autobiográficos de Rousseau. En primer lugar, la aspiración a lo que se podría llamar su unidad externa, es ...decir, la coherencia entre lo que él cree ser y el juicio de los demás, una vez afirmada su ‘especial’ bondad natural. Para ello se analizarán textos fundamentalmente de las Confessions y los Dialogues. En segundo lugar, su tensión permanente hacia su unidad interna, plasmado en el sentimiento de su propia existencia, que se mostrará de forma destacada en las Rêveries.
According to Fichte's early science of knowledge, man is a free and independent being who becomes somebody not through the power of nature, by developing his innate skills and abilities, or through ...external influence, but by his own power. Since the essence of human beings is I-hood, the individual, having defeated the not-I or nature living in him, has to strive towards the absolute I, which is nothing else but the being created by himself. This process is Bildung, the details of which are elaborated in Fichte's philosophy of education, whereby he opposes his point of view to Rousseau. Although Fichte emphasizes the activity of the student, he sees the assistance of an educator as indispensable. The role of the educator can be apprehended from the foundations of the science of knowledge. Thus, in order to be able to posit ourselves as free beings we require another being who summons us. 'The summons to engage in free self-activity is what we call upbringing.'
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