Our study compares the efficiency of unemployment insurance programs in a state union. A centralized insurance will pool the cost of unemployment; this results in a collective bargaining in the ...member states, which leads to excessively high wages and inefficient insurance. Those high wages attract workers who reduce the outsourced economic cost of unemployment. Only with perfect mobility, this opposing migration effect completely outweighs the pooling effect, and the insurance is no longer inefficient when centralized. Furthermore, we conclude that a principle of efficient federal systems might be that fiscally linked economic policies and institutions should be governed on the same federative level.
In contemporary literature, bargaining is often construed as an instrument in the hands of the employer, a practice that is sustained by undermining worker solidarity and promoting interests of ...privileged unionized workers at the expense of other workers. This article challenges such narratives by foregrounding the idea of solidarity and highlighting the complex interplay of solidarity emanating from the multiple ways consciousness about worker identity plays out. Drawing on the literature on new social movements (NSM) and industrial relations (IR), the article shows that the relevance of bargaining is not merely confined to instrumental economic goals but extends to politically constitutive action. In the process of bargaining the political agency of workers and distinctive articulations of solidarity are identified. This article presents and classifies three kinds of solidarity that correspond to the three dimensions of political consciousness, namely critical solidarity, limited solidarity and absent solidarity across cases that are shaped by contextual realities of labour politics.
Abstract
A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. The choice of bargaining game influences participation levels, emission quotas and technology investment levels. I ...derive several predictions that are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement—including the transitioning from the former to the latter.
We show that suppliers’ risk taking is positively influenced by that of their major customers. This result is consistent with the notion that when major customers take more risk to enhance their ...bargaining power and rent extraction ability, suppliers may respond by also engaging in more risk taking to improve their bargaining positions. Further cross-sectional analysis shows that the transfer of risk taking along the supply chain becomes stronger when suppliers and customers have more comparable bargaining power and when the former have greater risk-taking capacities. Our findings are robust to a series of tests addressing endogeneity concerns.
This paper develops the theory of leverage in a Kaleckian growth model with collateralized borrowing by firms. When debts are secured by collateral, firms with higher leverage are able to borrow ...more. The paper focuses on what determines leverage and why it changes. Higher loan-to-collateral ratio allows higher leverage. Leverage affects the dynamics of effective demand and financial instability through the power relations between firms (borrowers) and financial capitalists (lenders). Firms and financial capitalists confront their respective claims regarding the target leverage. The model emphasizes the relative bargaining power between the two classes over the target leverage. As the firms' bargaining power varies, collateralized loans can generate cycles under some condition.
The Informal Politics of Legislation Reh, Christine; Héritier, Adrienne; Bressanelli, Edoardo ...
Comparative political studies,
09/2013, Volume:
46, Issue:
9
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of ...legislation as “early agreements.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargaining theory, and sociological institutionalism, this article explains under what conditions informal decision making is likely to occur. The authors test their hypotheses on an original data set of all 797 codecision files negotiated between mid-1999 and mid-2009. Their analysis suggests that fast-track legislation is systematically related to the number of participants, legislative workload, and complexity. These findings back a functionalist argument, emphasizing the transaction costs of intraorganizational coordination and information gathering. However, redistributive and salient acts are regularly decided informally, and the Council presidency’s priorities have no significant effect on fast-track legislation. Hence, the authors cannot confirm explanations based on issue properties or actors’ privileged institutional positions. Finally, they find a strong effect for the time fast-track legislation has been used, suggesting socialization into interorganizational norms of cooperation.
The share of paid‐for overtime hours within total paid‐for hours worked in Britain has declined from 5.4% to 2.0% between 1997 and 2020. We investigate this decline, focussing on its distribution ...across full‐time (f/t) and part‐time males and females and across 19 one‐digit industries. It is established that f/t males are dominant in the decline both of overtime working and overtime hours. We explore the implications of the decline on the share of overtime pay within total pay as well as on the gender pay gap. We test for economic, structural and cyclical influences on overtime working via a two‐part regression model that allows us to differentiate between the incidence of overtime working and weekly overtime hours of overtime employees. We examine how paid‐for overtime has varied with collective bargaining coverage, low pay, the 2008 financial crisis, the arrival of Covid‐19, job mobility and the public/private sector dichotomy. Combined marginal effects of changes in the incidence of overtime working and weekly overtime hours are also provided. The influence of the decline of collective bargaining in the last two decades on overtime working is highlighted using Blinder–Oaxaca decompositions.
Consensus analysis is required to ensure the quality of decision results. It means that some DMs’ opinions must be adjusted to reach a consensus. As a result, it harms DMs’ benefits because their ...opinions are not fully considered. Additionally, the consensus-reaching needs cooperation between DMs. Therefore, the consensus improvement can be seen as a cooperative game among DMs. Considering the benefit conflicts of DMs, this paper studies the adjustments of DMs in view of the Nash-bargaining game, which can ensure the global Pareto optimality and maximum fairness of the consensus adjustment scheme. Considering the inconsistency between the Pareto and individual optimal solutions, we first study the Nash-bargaining consensus adjustment solutions between individual DMs. For the situation where DMs form coalitions to reduce their adjustments, two cases for the coalitional Nash-bargaining consensus adjustment solutions of DMs are further studied. Meanwhile, interactive algorithms for the formation of DM coalitions are provided. The main characteristics of the Nash-bargaining consensus adjustment solution are the consideration of personal interest, the rationality of DMs, and the fairness of the allocation scheme. Moreover, this paper takes the choice of the cooperative partner of elderly care institutions as an example to show the concrete application of built models.
Cognitive small cell networks have been envisioned as a promising technique for meeting the exponentially increasing mobile traffic demand. Recently, many technological issues pertaining to cognitive ...small cell networks have been studied, including resource allocation and interference mitigation, but most studies assume non-cooperative schemes or perfect channel state information (CSI). Different from the existing works, we investigate the joint uplink subchannel and power allocation problem in cognitive small cells using cooperative Nash bargaining game theory, where the cross-tier interference mitigation, minimum outage probability requirement, imperfect CSI and fairness in terms of minimum rate requirement are considered. A unified analytical framework is proposed for the optimization problem, where the near optimal cooperative bargaining resource allocation strategy is derived based on Lagrangian dual decomposition by introducing time-sharing variables and recalling the Lambert-W function. The existence, uniqueness, and fairness of the solution to this game model are proved. A cooperative Nash bargaining resource allocation algorithm is developed, and is shown to converge to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium for the cooperative game. Simulation results are provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed cooperative game algorithm for efficient and fair resource allocation in cognitive small cell networks.
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