Entre 1999 e 2020, o Banco Central do Brasil--BCB contou com um regime de autonomia operacional, mas, diferentemente da regra geral dos demais bancos centrais, seus dirigentes não contaram com um ...mandato funcional estabelecido em lei. Como explicar o funcionamento desta autonomia sem a existência de uma garantia legal? O artigo procura responder a esta questão realizando um estudo de caso em profundidade em que analisa a governança e a atuação do BCB. Seus achados confirmam a hipótese de trabalho de que uma complementaridade institucional de três fatores desempenhou o papel de substituto funcional de um mandato estabelecido em lei, são eles: a organização weberiana do BCB, as suas coalizões externas de proteção e a capacidade regulatória adquirida pela autarquia. A organização weberiana garantiu coesão à burocracia e limitou o controle polÃtico exercido por meio das nomeações; as coalizões externas reforçaram os poderes do BCB dentro do Estado e a capacidade regulatória institucionalizou a atuação do BCB, o que reforçou um comportamento deferente das demais autoridades em relação à s suas polÃticas. Palavras-chave: Banco Central; Burocracia; Autonomia Operacional; Insulamento; Coalizões Externas; Capacidade Regulatória. Between 1999 and 2020, the Central Bank of Brazil - BCB rested on a regime of operational autonomy, but, unlike other central banks, its board of directors did not have a functional mandate established by law. How to explain the functioning of this autonomy without the existence of a legal guarantee? The article seeks to tackle this question by carrying out an in-depth case study examining the governance and performance of BCB. The findings confirm the hypothesis that an institutional complementarity of three factors played the role of a functional substitute for a mandate established by law: the Weberian organization of the BCB, its external coalitions, and the regulatory capacity. The Weberian organization guaranteed cohesion to the bureaucracy and limited political control exercised through appointments; external coalitions reinforced the BCB's powers within the State apparatus, and the regulatory capacity institutionalized the BCB's performance, reinforcing other authorities' deferential behavior. Keywords: Central Bank; Bureaucracy; Autonomy; Insulation; Coalitions; Regulatory Capacity.
In this paper we analyze whether central bank communication can facilitate the understanding of key economic concepts. Using survey data for consumers and professionals, we calculate how many of them ...have expectations consistent with the Fisher Equation, the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve and test, by accounting for three different communication channels, whether central banks can influence those. A substantial share of participants has expectations consistent with the Fisher equation, followed by the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve. We show that having theory-consistent expectations is beneficial, as it improves the forecast accuracy. Furthermore, consistency is time varying. Exploring this time variation, we provide evidence that central bank communication as well as news on monetary policy can facilitate the understanding of those concepts and thereby improve the efficacy of monetary policy.
This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970–2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a ...particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.
This article introduces the most comprehensive dataset on de jure central bank independence (CBI), including yearly data from 182 countries between 1970 and 2012. The dataset identifies statutory ...reforms affecting CBI, their direction, and the attributes necessary to build the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapty index. Previous datasets focused on developed countries, and included non-representative samples of developing countries. This dataset's substantially broader coverage has important implications. First, it challenges the conventional wisdom about central bank reforms in the world, revealing CBI increases and restrictions in decades and regions previously considered barely affected by reforms. Second, the inclusion of almost 100 countries usually overlooked in previous studies suggests that the sample selection may have substantially affected results. Simple analyses show that the associations between CBI and inflation, unemployment or growth are very sensitive to sample selection. Finally, the dataset identifies numerous CBI decreases (restrictions), whereas previous datasets mostly look at CBI increases. These data's coverage not only allows researchers to test competing explanations of the determinants and effects of CBI in a global sample, but it also provides a useful instrument for cross-national studies in diverse fields, such as liberalization, diffusion, political institutions, democratization, or responses to financial crises.
Blockchain technology can be the basis for future currencies. Numerous central banks are experimenting with this distributed ledger technology to map currencies on a blockchain basis in the future ...(central bank digital currencies, CBDCs). In this article, we explore motives for the introduction of CBDCs. The main motives are higher financial stability, higher security and efficiency of payment systems and a higher degree of automation of business processes. Furthermore, the risks of CBDCs are presented and the current state of development at the European Central Bank (ECB) is discussed. JEL Classification: E24, E44, G21 Zahlreiche Zentralbanken planen innerhalb der nachsten Jahre, eigene digitale Zentralbankwahrungen einzufuhren. Die Blockchain-Technologie kann dafur die technologische Basis darstellen. Zentralbanken experimentieren mit dieser Technologie, um Wahrungen perspektivisch auf Blockchain-Basis abzubilden. Mogliche Vorteile einer digitalen Zentralbankwahrung waren eine hohere finanzielle Stabilitat, eine hohere Sicherheit und Effizienz im Zahlungsverkehr und ein hoherer Automatisierungsgrad von Geschaftsprozessen. Risiken bestanden darin, dass es nach einer Einfuhrung zu einem digitalen Bank Run kommen konnte, dass Banken immens an Bedeutung verlieren konnten und letztlich die Datenschutzproblematik geklart werden muss.
The consensus that surrounded the granting of central bank independence in the pursuit of a price stability oriented monetary policy has been challenged in the aftermath of the global financial ...crisis, in the light of the rise of populism on the one hand and the expanded mandates of central banks on the other hand. After considering the economic case for independence and the three Ds (distributional, directional and duration effects), the paper examines three different dimensions in the debate of how the rise in populism - or simply general discontent with the status quo - affects central bank independence. Finally, the paper examines how to interpret the legality of central bank mandates, and whether or not central banks have exceeded their powers. This analysis leads us in turn to consider accountability and, in particular, the judicial review of central bank actions and decisions. It is important to have in place adequate mechanisms to ‘guard the guardians’ of monetary and financial stability.
We discuss the theoretical rationale for central bank communication about future policy rates, either as part of inflation targeting or in the form of forward guidance. We also summarize both actual ...central bank communication about future policy rates and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these types of communication. We argue that there is a disconnect between the theory and practice of forward guidance, as theory assumes commitment on the part of the central bank, while in practice central banks generally do not commit. Future theoretical research on forward guidance should therefore take the absence of commitment by central banks into account.
On 5 May 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) of Germany ruled that the European Central Bank had overstretched its mandate because its Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) lacked a ...transparent proportionality analysis. Our author argues that the FCC decision is mild, given the huge discrepancy between the foundations laid in the treaties and the actual monetary operations. JEL Classification: E58, K33, N44 Am 5. Mai 2020 verkundete das Bundesverfassungsgericht sein Urteil zur deutschen Beteiligung am Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) der Europaischen Zentralbank. Dieses Urteil ist vielfach kritisiert worden. Der Autor stellt dem eine alternative Deutung entgegen. So sieht er es als wichtige Aufgabe des Bundesverfassungsgerichts an, daruber zu wachen, ob die europaischen Organe die Grenzen ihrer Ermachtigung durch die Mitgliedstaaten achten. In praktischer Hinsicht erkennt er eine weit geoffnete Schere zwischen den Vertragsgrundlagen und den Ablaufen im Euroraum. Er halt das Urteil fur vorsichtig und schonend.
Despite increasing communication efforts, it may be difficult for central banks to engage the public, as their language is often too difficult to understand for most citizens. Focusing on the case of ...the European Central Bank (ECB), we hypothesise that greater communication clarity is conducive to stronger engagement. We rely on readability metrics to measure the clarity of ECB communications. We show that communication clarity is a significant and robust predictor of the media engagement generated by the ECB with its speeches, press conferences and tweets. Our findings are validated by a placebo test and have significant policy implications for central bank communication.
•Central bank communication has traditionally been very difficult to understand.•We hypothesise that clarity affects engagement with central bank communication.•Our analysis is based on ECB speeches, press conferences and tweets.•Readability metrics are used to measure the clarity of ECB communications.•Clarity is a robust predictor of the ECB’s traditional and social media engagement.
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