In the article, I contrast the contemporary legal dogma with the challenges underlying the political nature of law and judicial practice. Both the Continental jurisprudence and the judicial decisions ...issued by European courts are dominated by the dogmatic current – and treated as politically neutral acts. My intention is to carefully verify this quite common belief in this paper. Making use of H. Berman’s views, I assume that the present shape of jurisprudence and the judicial practice based thereon have been established as a result of political conflicts and that the legal dogma is capable of neutralising and solving modern-day political conflicts precisely because of the qualities of the said shape. It is therefore both a political and an apolitical activity. But this paradox is only apparent. In its strive to keep its paradigm alive, the dogma should be flexible in reacting to the challenges occurring in its political environment. It can – and should – modify the “buffer” of the theory upon which it is set in order to retain its core. In the article, I try to answer the question about the boundaries of the possible adaptation of jurisprudence and juridical practice with respect to claims raised by the domain of politics – claims currently articulated as the strongest by the so-called critical theories of adjudication. The final part of the paper is an attempt – based on the example of theses formulated in monograph by R. Mańko, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania – to outline the said boundaries.
In this essay, I argue that Kelsen’s and Troper’s concept of legal science, as well as Troper’s divide between legal dogmatics and legal science, are fundamentally flawed, for they fail to recognise ...the constitutive character of legal science’s epistemic coherence.
Pokrovčeva knjiga Slobodno stvaranje prava: Herman U. Kantorowicz i slobodnopravni pokret (2018) nameće pitanje izraženo naslovom ovog rada na koje rad odgovara u tri koraka: prvo, pretpostavkom da ...je pitanje odgovorivo samo idealnim tipovima pravnih disciplina / funkcija; drugo, upućivanjem na kontekst Kantorowiczevih gledišta, osobito na objavu presuda; treće, ocjenom da je Kantorowicz podijelio pravnu znanost u prepletene funkcije a ne u odvojene discipline. U tu svrhu rad nudi idealne tipove disciplina i funkcija pravne dogmatike, pravne historije, pravne teorije i, kao najsloženiji i najkorisniji skup funkcija, pravnopolitičku analizu. Pretpostavka je, koja se ne dokazuje, da ne postoji ni oštra granica izmeðu pravne znanosti i susjednih znanosti: sociologije, ekonomije, psihologije, filozofije.
Pokrovčeva knjiga Slobodno stvaranje prava: Herman U. Kantorowicz i slobodnopravni pokret (2018) nameće pitanje izraženo naslovom ovog rada na koje rad odgovara u tri koraka: prvo, pretpostavkom da ...je pitanje odgovorivo samo idealnim tipovima pravnih disciplina / funkcija; drugo, upućivanjem na kontekst Kantorowiczevih gledišta, osobito na objavu presuda; treće, ocjenom da je Kantorowicz podijelio pravnu znanost u prepletene funkcije a ne u odvojene discipline. U tu svrhu rad nudi idealne tipove disciplina i funkcija pravne dogmatike, pravne historije, pravne teorije i, kao najsloženiji i najkorisniji skup funkcija, pravnopolitičku analizu. Pretpostavka je, koja se ne dokazuje, da ne postoji ni oštra granica između pravne znanosti i susjednih znanosti: sociologije, ekonomije, psihologije, filozofije.
In the article, I contrast the contemporary legal dogma with the challenges underlying the political nature of law and judicial practice. Both the Continental jurisprudence and the judicial decisions ...issued by European courts are dominated by the dogmatic current – and treated as politically neutral acts. My intention is to carefully verify this quite common belief in this paper. Making use of H. Berman’s views, I assume that the present shape of jurisprudence and the judicial practice based thereon have been established as a result of political conflicts and that the legal dogma is capable of neutralising and solving modern-day political conflicts precisely because of the qualities of the said shape. It is therefore both a political and an apolitical activity. But this paradox is only apparent. In its strive to keep its paradigm alive, the dogma should be flexible in reacting to the challenges occurring in its political environment. It can – and should – modify the “buffer” of the theory upon which it is set in order to retain its core. In the article, I try to answer the question about the boundaries of the possible adaptation of jurisprudence and juridical practice with respect to claims raised by the domain of politics – claims currently articulated as the strongest by the so-called critical theories of adjudication. The final part of the paper is an attempt – based on the example of theses formulated in monograph by R. Mańko, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania – to outline the said boundaries.
This paper pursues three goals. First, some traditional concepts of ‘legal science’ will be analysed, and a definition of ‘legal science ampio sensu’, ‘legal science stricto sensu’ and ‘legal ...dogmatics’ will be proposed. Second, a reconstruction of five models of ‘legal science ampio sensu’ will be presented to show the different methodological alternatives available to legal scholars. Third, I claim that it is necessary (for conceptual reasons) to argue for moral reasons when choosing a legal method. Finally, I offer some arguments for supporting the five methodological alternatives of legal science ampio sensu.
Recently, there have been various developments within Dutch substantive criminal-law doctrine that in some important ways suggest a shift towards a common-law conception of judicial interpretation in ...different topics which are central to substantive criminal law. The developments suggest that criminal-law doctrine in the Netherlands is becoming sketchier and is losing some theoretical profundity. Building on Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms, Shapiro's planning theory of law, and Wittgenstein's considerations on rule-following, this article aims to contribute to a description of the independent function of doctrine in substantive criminal law, by addressing the question as to how, and in what sense, doctrine 'helps' the court in applying the statutory and non-statutory criminal-law norms. It is argued that the law constitutes a 'symbolic form' that is to some extent disassociated from the social life-world, and that is construed by way of sophisticated, shared forms of 'social planning'. These forms of social planning form parts of a 'practice' governed by a specific 'legal point of view'. It is further argued that criminal-law doctrine, in a radical sense, comprises a form of proceduralization, by means of which the adjudicating judge is 'directed' to a certain position within the criminal law's symbolically construed space. It is concluded that criminal-law doctrine fulfils an important function in 'situating' the judge, and in 'prompting' or 'compelling' the judge, from his subjective position, to apply a criminal-law norm in an objectively correct manner.
In 1986, in the pages of the journal Doxa, Roberto Vernengo and Manuel Atienza were involved in an enriching debate about whether it is possible to consider the studies conducted by legal dogmatics ...as a science or if, instead, they can only aspire to be re-garded as a technique. By exploring the main theses and arguments presented in this ex-change, it will be identified the presuppositions and conceptions of rationality involved in order to establish the relevant features that, concerning a better understanding of legal-dogmatics task, favor one option or the other.
En 1986, en las páginas de la Revista Doxa, Roberto Vernengo y Manuel Atienza protagonizaron un enriquecedor debate acerca de si es posible considerar a los estudios que lleva adelante la dogmática jurídica como una ciencia del derecho o si, en cambio, sólo pueden aspirar a ser considerados una técnica. A partir de la exploración de las principa-les tesis y argumentos expuestos en este intercambio, se identificarán los presupuestos y las nociones de racionalidad involucrados a fin de establecer las notas relevantes que, en materia de una mejor comprensión de la tarea dogmática, una u otra opción favorece.