Competition policy has been at the core of the European integration project from its very inception. The United Kingdom (UK) played a truly pivotal role in the development of European Union (EU) ...competition policy with the policy long presenting one of the best illustrations of Europeanisation. The public vote for Brexit in 2016 pushed the reset button for the UK's engagement with the EU and saw successive UK governments all pursuing a de-Europeanisation trajectory as part of their objective of 'taking back control'. State aid emerged as a contentious issue during the Brexit negotiations. The UK government hailed its new Subsidy Control Act (2023) as a clear departure from the EU state aid regime, but is this a case of de-Europeanisation or partial de-Europeanisation? This article argues that the UK has still not entirely broken free from EU's state aid regime and finds itself in a state of orbiting Europeanisation.
The article gives an idea about the volume of companies subsidizing in the EU. The characteristics of the last decade are revealed: stable growth, which led to a doubling of government aid spending, ...then a huge surge at the end of the period under review due to the COVID-19 crisis. The types of assistance are described, as well as the conditions under which it can be provided from state budgets according to the Temporary Anti-Crisis Program of the EU, put into effect in March 2022 in connection with Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine and allowing additional state subsidies. Significant differences between EU countries in the level of state support of the national economy are shown. It shows also the active use of state support as a tool for influencing the economy by large European countries: Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, as well as a noticeable increase in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Against this background, the forecast of further deepening of cross-country imbalances in the EU is given. The modern role of the European Commission in the control of state support is revealed: once the guardian of fair competition, which does not recognize state interference in market relations, and now the conductor of state subsidies to the economy, distorting the normal course of competition.
In the United States, researchers have documented persistent racial disparities in school funding for decades. Drawing on evidence from a recent policy change in Pennsylvania, this article ...contributes to research on the role of state governments in limiting or expanding racial disparities in K-12 education funding by examining differences in the racial composition of school districts positively and negatively impacted by a technical provision lawmakers inserted into a newly created formula for distributing state equalization aid. We find that negatively-impacted districts enroll a substantially higher number of Black and Latinx students, receive less state aid, have lower levels of state and local funding, and have lower spending levels than positively-impacted districts with otherwise similar financial needs. These findings suggest how state lawmakers can exacerbate racial inequities when pursuing reforms ostensibly focused on equity, and these results have implications for both policymakers and educational leaders focused on racial justice.
State aid poses a threat to undistorted competition in the common market and, therefore, is rigidly regulated. However, elected political leaders have an incentive to disobey European Union (EU) ...regulations and grant aid in order to boost their electoral support. The European Commission is responsible for monitoring and enforcing member states' compliance with EU state aid regulation. The present article analyses the effect of domestic politics on the Commission's willingness to open a formal investigation and thus risk conflict with national governments. Specifically, it argues that the Commission is more likely to investigate, where institutional trust is strong and where ruling parties follow an interventionist economic policy.
During economic recessions, state funding for higher education contracts (Delaney & Doyle,
2011
; Hovey,
1999
; SHEEO,
2022
). Despite this reality, public higher education officials need to offer ...insights and explanations to state legislators about the current status of their institutions and their needs when discussing their budget requests. We use a multiple case-study design, framed by the narrative policy framework, to examine how campus officials in California and Texas justify their budget requests to the state legislature during the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on 131 h of transcribed legislative budget meetings and 62 documents, our findings suggest that higher education leaders emphasize the economic functions of higher education and center their ability to successfully manage during these uncertain and difficult times by highlighting improved or stable accountability measures such as enrollment, persistence, graduation, and job placement rates. During these budget requests, there are commonalities between the states regarding the structure, justifications, and narrative strategies used. However, higher education leaders evoked different narrative objects depending on the perceived values, beliefs, and norms of their state legislators.
The purpose of this Insight is to illustrate how State aid law will work in this troubled time. First, it focuses on Art. 107, para. 3, let. b) and c), TFEU and the Temporary Framework adopted by the ...European Commission to support the economy in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. Furthermore, it clarifies the role that Art. 107, para. 2, let. b), TFEU may play. Finally, it takes into consideration the General Block Exemption Regulation, and the de minimis Regulations. It is argued that a new approach to State aid law will be needed in the coming years, based on a compensation mechanism and some other expedients to avoid competitive distortions.
Performance funding in higher education is intended to incentivize increased degree production at American colleges and universities by linking state funds directly to institutional outcomes. ...However, many critics suggest that such funding arrangements create systems of "winners and losers " by rewarding some institutions over others. Using a difference-in-difference methodology, this article explores the impact of performance funding on state appropriations and investigates the heterogeneous treatment effects across institution types. I find that performance funding consistently benefits high-resource institutions and imposes financial burdens on low-resource institutions. The theory of social construction and policy design illuminates the findings.
