Moralists and radical realists both seem to employ a division of intellectual labour to enable their theories to be action-guiding. Moralists typically distinguish between formulating normative principles and devising suitable means for implementing or approximating them. Radical realists, meanwhile, seem to distinguish between the findings of ideology critique and further political theorising informed by these findings. However, radical realist criticisms of the moralist division of labour may suggest a tu quoque objection to radical realism: if the moralist division of labour is defective, why does the same not also hold for the radical realist division of labour? My aim in this article is to answer this question. I identify two distinct radical realist objections to the moralist division of labour, which I refer to as the seminar room objection and the motivation objection respectively. I then argue that radical realists can deal effectively with these objections if they were to be turned against their version of the division of labour. Hence, radical realists can consistently criticise moralist versions of the division of labour while simultaneously employing their own version.