U ovom radu nudim interpretaciju Mercierove kritike modernog pristupa spoznajnom problemu. Interpretacija počiva uglavnom na razlikovanju između objekta i stvari i na razlikovanju između objektivnoga ...i transobjektivnoga. Ta dva razlikovanja prožimaju Mercierovu kritiku, premda ih on nigdje ne razrađuje. U ovom radu, razrađujem te dvije distinkcije, da bih im potom pustio da, tako razrađene, prožmu Mercierovu kritiku iznova, s konačnim rezultatom koji, u osnovi, pokazuje da Mercierova kritika počiva na načelima objektivizma i objektivnoga realizma, nasuprot transobjektivnome realizmu, i na motivu povratka svijeta umu koji ga je stvorio, nasuprot modernoj koncepciji stvarnosti odvojene od uma.
Balićev pristup Škarica, Dario
Crkva u svijetu,
03/2020, Letnik:
55, Številka:
1
Journal Article
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Glavni je cilj ovog članka ponuditi cjelovit prikaz Balićeva neoskolastičkog pristupa. Istraživanjem raznih iskaza, uglavnom međusobno izoliranih i rasutih po Balićevim radovima prema sredini XX. ...st., identificirane su sljedeće tri temeljne značajke Balićeva pristupa: prvo, historijsko-kritička metoda (izrijekom preferirana u odnosu na spekulativni pristup), drugo, privrženost rimokatoličkim dogmama kao jednoj od normi prema kojima vrednujemo filozofske sisteme i, treće, postojano zagovaranje načela intelektualne slobode i otvorenosti prema raznim skolastičkim sistemima kao i prema modernoj znanosti i filozofiji (u okviru dogme).
U ovom su članku razrađene sljedeće ideje i teze: (1) halucinator može pretraživati vlastite halucinacije, što često i čini, iz čega slijedi da
halucinacija, premda po naravi nefizička, ipak jest ...objekt, pretraživan
(ili barem pretraživ), (2) premda povlašten, halucinatorov pristup halucinaciji nije neutralan, nego selektivan, (3) premda kompetentan očevidac vlastite halucinacije, halucinator može u mnogom pogledu biti inkompetentan izvjestitelj o njezinu sadržaju, (4) izvještaj o halucinaciji (koliko god da je ona sama po svojoj naravi privatna) moguć
je zato što su javne kategorije pod koje ona biva u izvještaju podvedena, (5) izvještaji o halucinacijama mogu biti ciljani ili spontani, (6) glavna je svrha spontanih izvještaja o halucinaciji da izvijeste o situacijskom značenju halucinacije i o njezinu doživljaju, a
ne o njezinu pojavnom sadržaju, (7) naše razumijevanje spontanih izvještaja o halucinacijama omogućeno je, u prvom redu, kognitivnom empatijom, a ne imaginacijom.
In this paper, the following ideas and theses are elaborated: (1) hallucinations can be, and often are, scanned by the hallucinator, from which it follows that, although nonphysical by their nature, hallucinations nevertheless are objects being scanned (or at least being scannable). (2) Though privileged, the hallucinator’s access to his or her own hallucination is not neutral, but selective. (3) While being a competent ‘perceiver’ of his or her own hallucination, the hallucinator may in many respects be an incompetent reporter on its content. (4) What makes a report on a hallucination possible (despite the fact that the very hallucination is, by its nature, private) is the public nature of the categories under which it is subsumed within the report. (5) Reports on hallucinations may be directed or free. (6) The main object of free reports on hallucinations is to convey the situational meaning of the hallucination and the lived experience of it, rather than its phenomenal content. (7) It is primarily cognitive empathy (rather than imagination) that makes our understanding of free reports on hallucinations possible.
Članak razmatra problem pouzdanosti izvještaja o bonnetovskim halucinacijama. Cilj je identificirati pojedine faktore koji takve izvještaje čine pouzdanima. Identificirani su sljedeći faktori: ...izvjestiteljeva iskrenost i kompetencija (predmetna, jezična i memorijska), izvanjska potvrda izvještaja (fiziološka, ekspresivna i bihevioralna) i koherencija između izvještaja i evidencije kao i između raznih evidencijskih potvrda i unutar svih izvještaja (ako ih je više). K
tome, eksplicirano je i naše implicitno predrazumijevanje halucinacije (prema kojem ona nije tek pojava nego i halucinatorov doživljaj pojave, očit u njegovu facijalnom izrazu, ponašanju itd.).
The paper is focused on the problem of the reliability of reports on Bonnet's hallucinations. The aim is to identify particular factors that make such reports reliable. The factors identified are as follows: the reporter's sincerity and competence (the latter including his/her expert, language, and memory competences), the external (physiological, expressive, and behavioural) confirmation of the report, and the coherence between the report and evidence as well as between various kinds of evidence collected, and within all the reports given (when there are more than one of them). Additionally, our implicit preunderstanding of hallucination (as being not merely the appearance, but also the hallucinator’s lived experience of it, manifested in his/her facial expression, behaviour etc.) is brought to light.
Pojava, ideja, um Škarica, Dario
Služba Božja,
09/2020, Letnik:
60, Številka:
3
Journal Article, Paper
Recenzirano
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Jednim svojim dijelom članak je posvećen dvjema nesvjesnim presumpcijama
bitno vezanima uz naše (perceptivno i misaono) znanje: presumpciji stvarnosti i presumpciji bitne idealnosti stvari. ...Presumpcija stvarnosti
drži naše osjete primarno pojavom stvarnosti, zbilje (a ne tek pojavom u
našem umu). Pritom, u skladu sa samom idejom stvarnosti, da bi se uistinu potvrdila kao pojava nečeg stvarnog i zbiljskog, pojava mora u sadržajnom pogledu biti i javna i objektivno određena. U tom se smislu naše perceptivno znanje pokazuje bitno utemeljenim i na senzornoj informaciji i na ideji stvarnosti. Presumpcija bitne idealnosti stvari drži mogućnost, nemogućnost i nužnost pojedine stvari bitno ovisnom o njezinoj ideji, je li (ta ideja) u sebi protuslovna ili neprotuslovna, odnosno (kad je riječ o nužnome) je li njoj oprečna ideja u sebi protuslovna ili neprotuslovna. U tom smislu, naše se (misaono) znanje o mogućem, nemogućem i nužnom pokazuje utemeljenim na ideji protuslovlja. Drugim svojim dijelom članak je posvećen epistemološkim implikacijama dvaju međusobno suprotnih shvaćanja ideje što dominiraju zapadnom filozofskom tradicijom. Ako su, naime, ideje tek reprezentacije u našem umu, onda subjektivizam u pogledu našeg znanja (bilo perceptivnog, bilo misaonog) čini se da je neizbježan. Ali, ako su ideje sama bit stvari, onda je naše znanje (bilo perceptivno, utemeljeno na ideji stvarnosti, bilo misaono, utemeljeno na ideji protuslovlja) objektivno određeno. Pokazuje se, dakle, da u pozadini tih dvaju međusobno suprotnih shvaćanja ideje leži suprotnost između subjektivističke i objektivističke koncepcije našeg uma i znanja. U završnom odsječku članka ukratko je razmotren problem opravdanja tih dviju koncepcija uma,
u okviru kako neutralnog (kartezijanskog), tako i zdravorazumskog (reidovskog) pristupa spoznajnom opravdanju, s polučenim zaključkom da se unutar neutralnog pristupa ni jedna koncepcija ne čini opravdanom, dok se unutar zdravorazumskog pristupa objektivistička koncepcija pokazuje u potpunosti opravdanom.
One main topic of this paper concerns two unconscious presumptions inevitably tied to our (perceptual and intellectual) knowledge: the presumption of reality and the presumption of the essential ideality of things. The presumption of reality holds that our sensations are primarily appearances of actual reality (and not just appearances in our
mind). Here, in accordance with the very idea of reality, an appearance
has to be, with respect to its content, both public and objectively determined, in order to confirm itself as truly an appearance of something actual and real. In that sense, our perceptual knowledge turns
out to be essentially founded both on sensory information and on the idea of reality. The presumption of the essential ideality of things holds the possibility, impossibility and necessity of a thing essentially dependent on its idea, i. e. on whether the idea is internally consistent or inconsistent and (when it comes to the necessary) on whether its contradictory idea is internally consistent or
inconsistent. In that sense, our (intellectual) knowledge of the possible, impossible and necessary turns out to be founded on the idea of contradiction. Another main topic of this paper, closely connected to
the first one, concerns the epistemological implications of the two opposite conceptions of idea that dominate the Western tradition of philosophy. Namely, if ideas are but representations in our mind, then subjectivism with respect to our knowledge (whether perceptual or intellectual) seems to be unavoidable. However, if ideas are the very essences of things, then our knowledge (whether perceptual, founded on the idea of reality, or intellectual, founded on the idea of contradiction) is objectively determined. Thus, what lies behind the two
opposite conceptions of idea turns out to be the opposition between the
subjectivist and objectivist conception of our mind and knowledge. In the closing section of the paper, the issue of the justification of the two conceptions of our mind is briefly addressed, within the frame of both neutral (Cartesian) and common sense (Reidian) approach to epistemic justification. The conclusion is reached that within the neutral approach neither conception seems justified, while within the common sense approach the objectivist conception proves fully justified.
Glavna
je tema rada Tomin pojam istine, posebno njegova distinkcija između istine uma
(
veritas intellectus
) i istine stvari
(
veritas rerum
). Pritom je
veritas intellectus
(logička istina)
...istražena u punom njenu značenju, tj. ne samo kao podudaranje sudova s njihovim
objektima nego i kao svrha kojoj sudovi prirodno teže, kao i unutar njezine
vlastite svrhe (znanja). Unutar ove rasprave izložene su i neke misli o naravi
suda, znatno prožete Tominom distinkcijom između praktičnog i spekulativnog
znanja. Nadalje, pokazano je da Tomin termin
veritas
rerum
obuhvaća dva veoma
različita pojma istine: prvo, pojam objektivne istine, koji se tiče stvari kao
objekata naših sudova i normi njihove istinitosti, i drugo, pojam ontološke
istine, koji se tiče stvari u mjeri u kojoj one reflektiraju Božje ideje kao
svoje egzemplarne uzroke i norme svoje stvarnosti. Konačno, utvrđeno je da
Mercier i Zimmermann sekulariziraju Tomin pojam istine, ali sekularizacijom
bitno provizornog karaktera.
The main topic of this paper is Thomas Aquinas's concept of truth, particularly his distinction between the truth of intellect (
veritas intellectus
) and the truth of things (
veritas rerum
). Here,
veritas intellectus
(logical truth) is considered in its full sense, i. e., not only as mere correspondence of judgements to their objects, but also as the natural aim of judgements and within its own natural aim, which is knowledge. Within this discussion, some thoughts are presented concerning the nature of judgement, which are considerably permeated with Thomas's distinction between practical and speculative knowledge. Next, Thomas's term
veritas rerum
is proven to encompass two rather different notions of truth, the first being the notion of objective truth, referring to things as objects of our judgements and norms of their truth, and the second being the notion of ontological truth, referring to things insofar as they reflect divine ideas as their exemplar causes and norms of their reality. Finally, Mercier's and Zimmermann's secularization of Thomas's concept of truth is identified and shown to be essentially provisional in character.
The Croatian philosophical heritage is an ongoing research task. There are not many who have dedicated themselves to this task. One of those who recognized the importance of the topic was Fr. Vicko ...Kapitanović, a Franciscan and historian. The importance of his research work in this area is expressed in the fact that he thoroughly researched, listed, described and brought to light numerous Latin philosophical manuscripts from the 18th and 19th centuries that are kept in the monasteries of the Franciscan Province of the Most Holy Redeemer in Makarska, Šibenik, Visovac, Živogošće, Split, Sinj, Omiš, Zaostrog, Sumartin and Karin. In addition, in presenting individual philosophical manuscripts, Kapitanović regularly describes the history of the monastic philosophical schools in question, stating in detail, as far as possible, the data on the Franciscan philosophers who taught at these colleges. This paper presents Kapitanović’s valuable contribution to the research of the history of Croatian philosophy.
The Croatian philosophical heritage is an ongoing research task. There are not many who have dedicated themselves to this task. One of those who recognized the importance of the topic was Fr. Vicko ...Kapitanović, a Franciscan and historian. The importance of his research work in this area is expressed in the fact that he thoroughly researched, listed, described and brought to light numerous Latin philosophical manuscripts from the 18th and 19th centuries that are kept in the monasteries of the Franciscan Province of the Most Holy Redeemer in Makarska, Šibenik, Visovac, Živogošće, Split, Sinj, Omiš, Zaostrog, Sumartin and Karin. In addition, in presenting individual philosophical manuscripts, Kapitanović regularly describes the history of the monastic philosophical schools in question, stating in detail, as far as possible, the data on the Franciscan philosophers who taught at these colleges. This paper presents Kapitanović’s valuable contribution to the research of the history of Croatian philosophy.
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