Social cognition in humans is distinguished by psychological processes that allow us to make inferences about what is going on inside other people-their intentions, feelings, and thoughts. Some of ...these processes likely account for aspects of human social behavior that are unique, such as our culture and civilization. Most schemes divide social information processing into those processes that are relatively automatic and driven by the stimuli, versus those that are more deliberative and controlled, and sensitive to context and strategy. These distinctions are reflected in the neural structures that underlie social cognition, where there is a recent wealth of data primarily from functional neuroimaging. Here I provide a broad survey of the key abilities, processes, and ways in which to relate these to data from cognitive neuroscience.
The amygdala has received intense recent attention from neuroscientists investigating its function at the molecular, cellular, systems, cognitive, and clinical level. It clearly contributes to ...processing emotionally and socially relevant information, yet a unifying description and computational account have been lacking. The difficulty of tying together the various studies stems in part from the sheer diversity of approaches and species studied, in part from the amygdala's inherent heterogeneity in terms of its component nuclei, and in part because different investigators have simply been interested in different topics. Yet, a synthesis now seems close at hand in combining new results from social neuroscience with data from neuroeconomics and reward learning. The amygdala processes a psychological stimulus dimension related to saliency or relevance; mechanisms have been identified to link it to processing unpredictability; and insights from reward learning have situated it within a network of structures that include the prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum in processing the current value of stimuli. These aspects help to clarify the amygdala's contributions to recognizing emotion from faces, to social behavior toward conspecifics, and to reward learning and instrumental behavior.
In this debate with Lisa Feldman Barrett, I defend a view of emotions as biological functional states. Affective neuroscience studies emotions in this sense, but it also studies the conscious ...experience of emotion ('feelings'), our ability to attribute emotions to others and to animals ('attribution', 'anthropomorphizing'), our ability to think and talk about emotion ('concepts of emotion', 'semantic knowledge of emotion') and the behaviors caused by an emotion ('expression of emotions', 'emotional reactions'). I think that the most pressing challenge facing affective neuroscience is the need to carefully distinguish between these distinct aspects of 'emotion'. I view emotion states as evolved functional states that regulate complex behavior, in both people and animals, in response to challenges that instantiate recurrent environmental themes. These functional states, in turn, can also cause conscious experiences (feelings), and their effects and our memories for those effects also contribute to our semantic knowledge of emotions (concepts). Cross-species studies, dissociations in neurological and psychiatric patients, and more ecologically valid neuroimaging designs should be used to partly separate these different phenomena.
To date, fMRI research has been concerned primarily with evincing generic principles of brain function through averaging data from multiple subjects. Given rapid developments in both hardware and ...analysis tools, the field is now poised to study fMRI-derived measures in individual subjects, and to relate these to psychological traits or genetic variations. We discuss issues of validity, reliability and statistical assessment that arise when the focus shifts to individual subjects and that are applicable also to other imaging modalities. We emphasize that individual assessment of neural function with fMRI presents specific challenges and necessitates careful consideration of anatomical and vascular between-subject variability as well as sources of within-subject variability.
Historically, research on emotion perception has focused on facial expressions, and findings from this modality have come to dominate our thinking about other modalities. Here we examine emotion ...perception through a wider lens by comparing facial with vocal and tactile processing. We review stimulus characteristics and ensuing behavioral and brain responses and show that audition and touch do not simply duplicate visual mechanisms. Each modality provides a distinct input channel and engages partly nonoverlapping neuroanatomical systems with different processing specializations (e.g., specific emotions versus affect). Moreover, processing of signals across the different modalities converges, first into multi- and later into amodal representations that enable holistic emotion judgments.
A subcortical pathway through the superior colliculus and pulvinar to the amygdala is commonly assumed to mediate the non-conscious processing of affective visual stimuli. We review anatomical and ...physiological data that argue against the notion that such a pathway plays a prominent part in processing affective visual stimuli in humans. Instead, we propose that the primary role of the amygdala in visual processing, like that of the pulvinar, is to coordinate the function of cortical networks during evaluation of the biological significance of affective visual stimuli. Under this revised framework, the cortex has a more important role in emotion processing than is traditionally assumed.
Since the 19th century, there has been disagreement over the fundamental question of whether “emotions” are cause or consequence of their associated behaviors. This question of causation is most ...directly addressable in genetically tractable model organisms, including invertebrates such as Drosophila. Yet there is ongoing debate about whether such species even have “emotions,” as emotions are typically defined with reference to human behavior and neuroanatomy. Here, we argue that emotional behaviors are a class of behaviors that express internal emotion states. These emotion states exhibit certain general functional and adaptive properties that apply across any specific human emotions like fear or anger, as well as across phylogeny. These general properties, which can be thought of as “emotion primitives,” can be modeled and studied in evolutionarily distant model organisms, allowing functional dissection of their mechanistic bases and tests of their causal relationships to behavior. More generally, our approach not only aims at better integration of such studies in model organisms with studies of emotion in humans, but also suggests a revision of how emotion should be operationalized within psychology and psychiatry.
Psychiatric and neurological disorders have historically provided key insights into the structure-function relationships that subserve human social cognition and behavior, informing the concept of ...the ‘social brain’. In this review, we take stock of the current status of this concept, retaining a focus on disorders that impact social behavior. We discuss how the social brain, social cognition, and social behavior are interdependent, and emphasize the important role of development and compensation. We suggest that the social brain, and its dysfunction and recovery, must be understood not in terms of specific structures, but rather in terms of their interaction in large-scale networks.
Our preferences are influenced by what other people like, but depend critically on how we feel about those people, a classical psychological effect called “cognitive balance.” Here, we manipulated ...preferences for goods by telling participants the preferences of strongly liked or disliked groups of other people. Participants’ preferences converged to those of the liked group, but diverged from the disliked group. Activation of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) tracked the discrepancy between one’s own preference and its social ideal and was associated with subsequent preference change (toward the liked and away from the disliked group), even several months later. A follow-up study found overlapping activation in this same region of dmPFC with negative monetary outcomes, but no overlap with nearby activations induced by response conflict. A single social encounter can thus result in long-lasting preference change, a mechanism that recruits dmPFC and that may reflect the aversive nature of cognitive imbalance.
•Likes and dislikes of goods were influenced by other people’s preferences•According to balance theory, liked and disliked people elicit opposite influence•Dorsomedial PFC tracked cognitive imbalance and predicted preference change•Both behavioral and neural effects were still seen 4 months later
Our preferences are influenced by those of other people, and also by how we feel about those people. Izuma et al. link this effect to the medial prefrontal cortex, extending this region’s role from reward processing to mediating social influence.
Abstract
People readily (but often inaccurately) attribute traits to others based on faces. While the details of attributions depend on the language available to describe social traits, psychological ...theories argue that two or three dimensions (such as valence and dominance) summarize social trait attributions from faces. However, prior work has used only a small number of trait words (12 to 18), limiting conclusions to date. In two large-scale, preregistered studies we ask participants to rate 100 faces (obtained from existing face stimuli sets), using a list of 100 English trait words that we derived using deep neural network analysis of words that have been used by other participants in prior studies to describe faces. In study 1 we find that these attributions are best described by four psychological dimensions, which we interpret as “warmth”, “competence”, “femininity”, and “youth”. In study 2 we partially reproduce these four dimensions using the same stimuli among additional participant raters from multiple regions around the world, in both aggregated and individual-level data. These results provide a comprehensive characterization of trait attributions from faces, although we note our conclusions are limited by the scope of our study (in particular we note only white faces and English trait words were included).
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