Following the Suez Campaign the British government found itself facing Moscow and its bid for power in the Middle East. The Soviets, for their part, exploited London's weakness to extend and ...consolidate their influence in the Arab world. By taking advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, by maintaining an (un)reasonably high level of regional tension, Moscow sought to make the Arabs totally dependent on its support. It began supplying the Arabs with weapons and providing them with diplomatic support, acquiring in the process a regional status equal to that enjoyed by the West. This in turn meant that any attempt by Britain to come to some kind of an understanding, such as limiting arms sales to the Middle East, had virtually no chance of success. Having mobilized what little remained of its power to try and check the Soviet advance, Britain was finally forced admit that it was no longer up to the task.
The 1967 Six-Day War did not result from a single factor but rather a chain of factors, and it is difficult to determine which was pivotal. This study adds another dimension, that of retaliatory ...raids, an element overlooked by the other studies. Retaliatory raids in their scope and intensity constituted a factor that accelerated the process that led to the Six-Day War in June 1967.
From the establishment of the Iraqi polity under King Faisal I in 1921 the Jews were anxious to integrate into Muslim Arab society and become an integral part of it. However, with the end of the ...British Mandate in 1932 the Jews' relations with Arab society took a turn for the worst, reaching its climax in the 1941 pogrom. The struggle to determine the fate of Palestine and later the establishment of the state of Israel created an unbearable situation, which ultimately pushed the Jews out of Iraq, during the early 1950s. This study analyzes Jewish-Arab relations during that period, focused mainly on the circumstances which led to this change - from an attempt to integrate to Arab policy of controlled oppression.
This article discusses the change in British policy towards Israel following Israel's victory in the 1967 War. It examines how prior to the Six Day war Britain and Israel enjoyed a friendly ...relationship characterized by the former's absolute commitment to maintaining stability in the Middle East. Britain supplied Israel with arms and gave political support in the United Nations as well as in the international forums. The article studies how following the war, Harold Wilson's government sought ways to minimize the damage Israel's victory had wrought to Britain's economic interests. This policy change was manifested in support of the Arab position regarding the territories captured by Israel in the course of the war. Adapted from the source document.
Previous historical analysis that characterized President Nassers political strategies prior to the Six Day War as an attempt to secure a political victory for Egyptian leadership of the Middle East, ...are argued to underestimate the leaders goal of using a predetermined & deliberate strategy to close the Arab account with the Zionist state. The decision to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, & the destabilizing impact of the Israeli taking of water from the Jordan River are related to Nassers elemental goal of defeating Israel that are reflected in his leadership at the Cairo summit, his actions in the face of the Israel-Syrian conflict, & the reintroduction of military troops into Sinai. Nassers desire to revert the Middle East to a pre-1956 state of affairs, his belief that the West had abandoned Israel, & his confidence in the Arab states ability to demolish Israel on the battlefield is argued to have been the real trigger of the 1967 war. J. Harwell
Gat asserts that the water dispute between Israel and its neighbors which erupted in early 1964 provided the USSR with a golden opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. He examines Soviet ...and Western policies in the region in the time leading up to and during the dispute, and how they affected the conflict.
The closure of the straits on 23 May 1927 placed the Johnson administration in an impossible position. Publicly committed to maintaining the freedom of passage through the straits, its own freedom of ...action was limited the congress, who insisted that it act only with some form of an international framework. It was obvious that unless something were to be done to open the straits and secure free passage for the Israeli ships, war was inevitable. In the first week, after the closure of the straits, the American administration made efforts to find ways to resolve the crisis, and especially in establishing a naval task force to breach the blockade. At the end of May it realized that there was no practical plan to end the blockade. Accordingly, it reconciled to the prospect of an independent Israeli action to open the straits.
From the End of the Suez campaign until the outbreak of the Six Day War, on 5 June 1967, Israel and Britain enjoyed a warm and friendly relationship characterised by Britain's absolute commitment to ...Israel's survival. To this end it not only supplied Israel with arms, but also endorsed the Israeli position on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the United Nations as well as in the international forums.
Unless otherwise stated all references are to documents held at the Public Record Office, Kew, London.
After the war of June 1967, which ended in a stunning Israeli victory, Britain sought ways to limit the damage Israel's victory had wrought on its interests. British Foreign Secretary, George Brown, believed that Britain had to take positive action to establish as soon as possible a good relationship with the Arab states. This British policy found expression in Brown's speech to the United Nations' Assembly on 21 June. Brown demanded Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, warned Israel not to annex East Jerusalem, and demanded a solution on the Palestinian refugee problem as a whole. From Israel's point of view, Brown's speech amounting to nothing but a betrayal, marked a change for the worse in Britain's policy towards Israel. Indeed, Brown's speech signaled the onset of the rising Anglo-Israeli tension, with Israel and Britain finding themselves on opposite sides of the debate on practically every issue on the Middle East agenda.
After the Suez Campaign, Britain sought to preserve a measure of stability in the Middle East. Britain believed that only if the Middle East enjoyed a modicum of stability could it safeguard its own ...political & economic interests in the Arab world, as well as block any further Soviet penetration of the region. But in May 1967, following Nasser's decision to close the Straits to Israeli shipping, Britain recognized that unless something was done soon about the Straits, a war could erupt with catastrophic effects on British interests. To this end, it made strenuous efforts to promote the idea of an international naval task force, which, by lifting the blockade, would end the crisis. Unfortunately, Britain, hamstrung by its fear of undermining its interests in the Arab world, was unwilling to assume the lead in establishing the task force. It certainly did not want to risk the possibility of finding itself in a headlong military confrontation with the Arab states. The British venture came to nothing & despite its best efforts, Britain failed to forestall the Six Day War with its disastrous effects on Britain's interests in the Middle East. Adapted from the source document.
