The ceasefire of August 1970 proved the United States' ability to set the wheels of the peace process in motion. The USSR did not partner with it en route to the ceasefire, and, in fact, was against ...it. The ceasefire between Israel and Egypt may be viewed as a turning point in Egyptian-American relations. It was Nasser who had led the United States to intervene in the peace process, without the help of the Soviets, creating an opportunity for the return of US clout in Egypt, after it had reached an unprecedented low during and after the Six Day War. In fact, after the ceasefire the United States was slowly becoming a major axis in the pollical process. For Egypt, the United States was the only power that would help in returning the occupied lands.
American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who controlled the American foreign policy, thought that it was possible to reach a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but only in ...stages. This policy is known as a policy of step by step. The first step was the Agreements of Disengagement, which were essentially a military disengagement, between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and between Israel and Syria in May of that Year. Kissinger focused on Egypt, the largest Arab Country. He sought an agreement which he assumed would continue to maintain the expansion of US influence in Egypt and in moderate Arab Countries, and would keep the Soviets out from the political process. He believed that in order to reach a settlement, which was of utmost importance to American interests, the US must put hard pressure, and forced the Israelis accept the proposed settlement, known as Sinai 2 agreement.
The transition from life under Ottoman rule to life under the Iraqi Kingdom established in 1921 marked a positive shift in the fortunes of the country's Jewish community. During the British mandate ...for Iraq (1921-32), the Jews enjoyed equal rights and were economically and socially integrated into Muslim society. However, with the end of the mandate and the acceptance of Iraq's independence, a process of restricting the Jews and physically harming them began, culminating in the pogrom (known as the Farhud) of June 1941. During the decade attending the Farhud, the Iraqi government linked the fate of the Jewish community to that of the Palestinian Arabs. The state pursued a policy of oppression and discrimination, which eventually led to the displacement of the country's Jewish community from a place it had called home for thousands of years.
Abstract
The life of the Jewish community in Iraq may be divided into three periods serving as a framework for its identity and the modernization processes it has undergone: The precolonial period, ...during which Jews lived under the Ottoman Empire's Muslim rule; the colonial period, or Mandatory Iraq under British rule, which lasted a mere ten years between 1922 and 1932; and the period during which Iraq became an independent state from 1932 onwards—a period which led to the liquidation of the Jewish community, most members of which had immigrated to Israel between 1951 and 1952. The present article aims to examine the issues of the community’s national religious identity considering the modernization processes. Was this distinctiveness put to the test over the various periods of time? Did Jews consider divorcing from their religious heritage or identity? Did they experience “slavery within liberty,” to use the phrase coined by Ahad Ha’am? A further question is that of their identity upon immigrating to Israel in the early 1950s.
Since entering office, William Rogers had undertaken to advance the peace process between Israel and the Arab states, particularly Egypt. He believed an agreement would serve the American interests ...at a time when extremism was spreading in the Arab world, and Soviet influence had grown. However, his actions on the political front went unsupported by President Nixon. Moreover, the National Security Advisor had embraced a different policy vis à vis Israel and the Arab world. Rogers' failure to secure an interim agreement and his previous failure to persuade Israel and Egypt to accept his plan, led the entire region back to stagnation, from which it emerged only after the October 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Following the Suez Campaign in October 1956, Great Britain began to step away from the Middle East. Its policy aimed at a gradual withdrawal from the region while protecting its interests, ensuring ...the uninterrupted supply of oil, and curbing Soviet expansion. Hence the policy of the United Kingdom (UK) was to maintain stability as another war between Israel and its Arab neighbors would be detrimental to its economy and provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to deepen its incursion into the region. Britain therefore adopted a low-profile policy, designed to avoid taking sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In practice, it was burying its head in the sand. The Arabs viewed the absence of clear support for them, particularly in the issue of water, as implicit support for Israel, especially since Britain was secretly supplying the latter with weapons. London's low-profile policy did not stand the test of regional developments. The tension between Israel and Egypt that emerged in mid-May 1967, intensified over the closing of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt, led the UK to take steps to ensure free passage through them.
Most historians blame Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir for the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, having allegedly rejected all peace proposals made by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In fact, ...Sadat was adamantly opposed to Meir's demand for direct negotiations, envisaging political settlement as an American dictate on Israel. The Yom Kippur War shook both sides of their intransigence and brought them closer to each other's position.
Between 1969 and 1971 US diplomat Joseph Sisco was the driving force behind all initial steps to resolve the Israeli‒Egyptian conflict. But despite his tremendous efforts, his ability was limited as ...President Nixon did not throw his weight behind these efforts. Three main initiatives were taken during the discussed period: the Rogers Plan, the Rogers Initiative, and Sadat's initiative for an interim agreement. Most of Sisco's efforts concentrated on the latter initiative. His failure to reach an interim agreement, coupled with his inability to persuade Israel and Egypt to accept the Rogers Plan, led the region to political stagnation, from which the two parties only emerged in the aftermath of 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Rabin differed considerably from the average ambassador - a representative receiving and issuing reports. He viewed himself not only as a diplomat, but as capable of shaping policy with respect to ...both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship with the United States. During his term as ambassador to Washington he displayed sober realism with regard to the political, and to some extent the military, reality - the very realism that was absent from the government that sent him.
Between 1967 and 1973, Israeli governments took no initiative to set a peace process in motion. Instead, they simply responded to proposals that were raised from time to time, and, for the most part, ...rejected all of them - the Rogers Plan, Sadat's willingness to sign a peace agreement and his initiative for an interim settlement - with the sole exception being the ceasefire agreement reached in August 1970. While Israeli policy lacked initiative on the political front, it dedicated much effort to convincing the United States that the greater Israel's military power, the better its deterrence capabilities would be, which in turn would increase the likelihood of achieving peace. Hence, Israeli leaders' repeated requests to be supplied with advanced aircraft.
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