Does the internet facilitate selective exposure to politically congenial content? To answer this question, I introduce and validate large-N behavioral data on Americans' online media consumption in ...both 2015 and 2016. I then construct a simple measure of media diet slant and use machine classification to identify individual articles related to news about politics. I find that most people across the political spectrum have relatively moderate media diets, about a quarter of which consist of mainstream news websites and portals. Quantifying the similarity of Democrats' and Republicans' media diets, I find nearly 65% overlap in the two groups' distributions in 2015 and roughly 50% in 2016. An exception to this picture is a small group of partisans who drive a disproportionate amount of traffic to ideologically slanted websites. If online "echo chambers" exist, they are a reality for relatively few people who may nonetheless exert disproportionate influence and visibility.
Widespread belief in misinformation circulating online is a critical challenge for modern societies. While research to date has focused on psychological and political antecedents to this phenomenon, ...few studies have explored the role of digital media literacy shortfalls. Using data from preregistered survey experiments conducted around recent elections in the United States and India, we assess the effectiveness of an intervention modeled closely on the world’s largest media literacy campaign, which provided “tips” on how to spot false news to people in 14 countries. Our results indicate that exposure to this intervention reduced the perceived accuracy of both mainstream and false news headlines, but effects on the latter were significantly larger. As a result, the intervention improved discernment between mainstream and false news headlines among both a nationally representative sample in the United States (by 26.5%) and a highly educated online sample in India (by 17.5%). This increase in discernment remained measurable several weeks later in the United States (but not in India). However, we find no effects among a representative sample of respondents in a largely rural area of northern India, where rates of social media use are far lower.
Although commentators frequently warn about echo chambers, little is known about the volume or slant of political misinformation that people consume online, the effects of social media and fact ...checking on exposure, or the effects of political misinformation on behaviour. Here, we evaluate these questions for websites that publish factually dubious content, which is often described as fake news. Survey and web-traffic data from the 2016 US presidential campaign show that supporters of Donald Trump were most likely to visit these websites, which often spread through Facebook. However, these websites made up a small share of people's information diets on average and were largely consumed by a subset of Americans with strong preferences for pro-attitudinal information. These results suggest that the widespread speculation about the prevalence of exposure to untrustworthy websites has been overstated.
To assess the quantity and type of vaccine-related information Americans consume online and its relationship to social media use and attitudes toward vaccines.
Analysis of individual-level web ...browsing data linked with survey responses from representative samples of Americans collected between October 2016 and February 2019.
We estimate that approximately 84% of Americans visit a vaccine-related webpage each year. Encounters with vaccine-skeptical content are less frequent; they make up only 7.5% of vaccine-related pageviews and are encountered by only 18.5% of people annually. However, these pages are more likely to be published by untrustworthy sources. Moreover, skeptical content exposure is more common among people with less favorable vaccine attitudes. Finally, usage of online intermediaries is frequently linked to vaccine-related information exposure. Google use is differentially associated with subsequent exposure to non-skeptical content, whereas exposure to vaccine-skeptical webpages is associated with usage of webmail and, to a lesser extent, Facebook.
Online exposure to vaccine-skeptical content is relatively rare, but vigilance is required given the potential for exposure among vulnerable audiences.
The consequences of online partisan media Guess, Andrew M; Barberá, Pablo; Munzert, Simon ...
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS,
04/2021, Letnik:
118, Številka:
14
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
What role do ideologically extreme media play in the polarization of society? Here we report results from a randomized longitudinal field experiment embedded in a nationally representative online ...panel survey (N = 1,037) in which participants were incentivized to change their browser default settings and social media following patterns, boosting the likelihood of encountering news with either a left-leaning (HuffPost) or right-leaning (Fox News) slant during the 2018 US midterm election campaign. Data on ≈ 19 million web visits by respondents indicate that resulting changes in news consumption persisted for at least 8 wk. Greater exposure to partisan news can cause immediate but short-lived increases in website visits and knowledge of recent events. After adjusting for multiple comparisons, however, we find little evidence of a direct impact on opinions or affect. Still, results from later survey waves suggest that both treatments produce a lasting and meaningful decrease in trust in the mainstream media up to 1 y later. Consistent with the minimal-effects tradition, direct consequences of online partisan media are limited, although our findings raise questions about the possibility of subtle, cumulative dynamics. The combination of experimentation and computational social science techniques illustrates a powerful approach for studying the long-term consequences of exposure to partisan news.
The precise mechanisms by which the information ecosystem polarizes society remain elusive. Focusing on political sorting in networks, we develop a computational model that examines how social ...network structure changes when individuals participate in information cascades, evaluate their behavior, and potentially rewire their connections to others as a result. Individuals follow proattitudinal information sources but are more likely to first hear and react to news shared by their social ties and only later evaluate these reactions by direct reference to the coverage of their preferred source. Reactions to news spread through the network via a complex contagion. Following a cascade, individuals who determine that their participation was driven by a subjectively "unimportant" story adjust their social ties to avoid being misled in the future. In our model, this dynamic leads social networks to politically sort when news outlets differentially report on the same topic, even when individuals do not know others' political identities. Observational follow network data collected on Twitter support this prediction: We find that individuals in more polarized information ecosystems lose cross-ideology social ties at a rate that is higher than predicted by chance. Importantly, our model reveals that these emergent polarized networks are less efficient at diffusing information: Individuals avoid what they believe to be "unimportant" news at the expense of missing out on subjectively "important" news far more frequently. This suggests that "echo chambers"-to the extent that they exist-may not echo so much as silence.
Significance
Although Americans believe the confusion caused by false news is extensive, relatively few indicate having seen or shared it—a discrepancy suggesting that members of the public may not ...only have a hard time identifying false news but fail to recognize their own deficiencies at doing so. If people incorrectly see themselves as highly skilled at identifying false news, they may unwittingly participate in its circulation. In this large-scale study, we show that not only is overconfidence extensive, but it is also linked to both self-reported and behavioral measures of false news website visits, engagement, and belief. Our results suggest that overconfidence may be a crucial factor for explaining how false and low-quality information spreads via social media.
We examine the role of overconfidence in news judgment using two large nationally representative survey samples. First, we show that three in four Americans overestimate their relative ability to distinguish between legitimate and false news headlines; respondents place themselves 22 percentiles higher than warranted on average. This overconfidence is, in turn, correlated with consequential differences in real-world beliefs and behavior. We show that overconfident individuals are more likely to visit untrustworthy websites in behavioral data; to fail to successfully distinguish between true and false claims about current events in survey questions; and to report greater willingness to like or share false content on social media, especially when it is politically congenial. In all, these results paint a worrying picture: The individuals who are least equipped to identify false news content are also the least aware of their own limitations and, therefore, more susceptible to believing it and spreading it further.
We studied the effects of exposure to reshared content on Facebook during the 2020 US election by assigning a random set of consenting, US-based users to feeds that did not contain any reshares over ...a 3-month period. We find that removing reshared content substantially decreases the amount of political news, including content from untrustworthy sources, to which users are exposed; decreases overall clicks and reactions; and reduces partisan news clicks. Further, we observe that removing reshared content produces clear decreases in news knowledge within the sample, although there is some uncertainty about how this would generalize to all users. Contrary to expectations, the treatment does not significantly affect political polarization or any measure of individual-level political attitudes.
Self-reported measures of media exposure are plagued with error and questions about validity. Since they are essential to studying media effects, a substantial literature has explored the ...shortcomings of these measures, tested proxies, and proposed refinements. But lacking an objective baseline, such investigations can only make relative comparisons. By focusing specifically on recent Internet activity stored by Web browsers, this article's methodology captures individuals' actual consumption of political media. Using experiments embedded within an online survey, I test three different measures of media exposure and compare them to the actual exposure. I find that open-ended survey prompts reduce overreporting and generate an accurate picture of the overall audience for online news. I also show that they predict news recall at least as well as general knowledge. Together, these results demonstrate that some ways of asking questions about media use are better than others. I conclude with a discussion of survey-based exposure measures for online political information and the applicability of this article's direct method of exposure measurement for future studies.
How well does public policy represent mass preferences in U.S. states? Current approaches provide an incomplete account of statehouse democracy because they fail to compare preferences and policies ...on meaningful scales. Here, we overcome this problem by generating estimates of Americans' preferences on the minimum wage and compare them to observed policies both within and across states. Because we measure both preferences and policies on the same scale (U.S. dollars), we can quantify both the association of policy outcomes with preferences across states (responsiveness) and their deviation within states (bias). We demonstrate that while minimum wages respond to corresponding preferences across states, policy outcomes are more conservative than preferences in each state, with the average policy bias amounting to about two dollars. We also show that policy bias is substantially smaller in states with access to direct democratic institutions.