How to theorize about hope Kwong, Jack M. C.
European journal of philosophy,
December 2022, 2022-12-00, 20221201, Letnik:
30, Številka:
4
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In order to better understand the topic of hope, this article argues that two separate theories are needed: One for hoping, and the other for hopefulness. This bifurcated approach is warranted by the ...observation that the word “hope” is polysemous: It is sometimes used to refer to hoping and sometimes to feeling or being hopeful. Moreover, these two senses of “hope” are distinct, as a person can hope for some outcome yet not simultaneously feel hopeful about it. I argue that this distinction between hoping and hopefulness is not always observed or fully appreciated in the literature and has consequently caused much confusion. This article then sketches what theorizing about hope looks like in light of this clarification and discusses some of its implications.
Abstract
This conceptual paper explores the role that wisdom plays in social work. In the literature, this topic is primarily discussed in terms of ‘Practice Wisdom’, a kind of implicit and ...intuitive-based body of knowledge that is acquired through practice experience. After reviewing some formulations of it, we argue that practice wisdom faces a number of difficulties and is a misguided approach. To replace it, we propose a novel framework called ‘Practitioner Wisdom’, which emphasises that the proper subject of wisdom is not some sub-personal construct like a body of knowledge or a set of skills but the social work practitioner. Drawing from virtue theory in philosophy, we theorise that being a wise practitioner is a matter of acquiring and cultivating a character that is constituted by the relevant social work virtues and values. We conclude by discussing some benefits of practitioner wisdom, including how it can be taught to social work students and entrants, and suggest some future areas of research.
This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of ...the intellectual tasks as required by open-mindedness
by herself;
that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking about open-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways for an individual to be open-minded, but can also help offset some recent criticisms raised against open-mindedness and its status as an intellectual virtue.
What is hope? Kwong, Jack M. C.
European journal of philosophy,
March 2019, Letnik:
27, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
According to the standard account, to hope for an outcome is to desire it and to believe that its realization is possible, though not inevitable. This account, however, faces certain difficulties: It ...cannot explain how people can display differing strengths in hope; it cannot distinguish hope from despair; and it cannot explain substantial hopes. This paper proposes an account of hope that can meet these deficiencies. Briefly, it argues that in addition to possessing the relevant belief–desire structure as allowed in the standard account, a hopeful person must also be able to see a way in which the desired outcome can come about and to see such a way to the outcome as a genuine possibility.
Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-mindedness's truth-conduciveness is highly ...contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to defend open-mindedness against these challenges. In particular, I show that the challenges are ill-founded because they misconstrue the nature of open-mindedness and fail to consider the requisite conditions of its application. With a proper understanding of open-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear that recourse to it is indeed truthconducive.
Shame and moral autonomy Kwong, Jack M. C.
Ratio (Oxford),
March 2021, 2021-03-00, 20210301, Letnik:
34, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its ...being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this paper will propose a way in which we can reconcile shame with moral autonomy. Specifically, I will argue that a mature moral agent is vulnerable to shame because she cares a great deal about morality, and possesses certain character traits that dispose her to take others’ moral criticisms seriously. Occurrences of shame therefore are not always a threat to a moral agent's autonomous moral judgment.
Gatekeeping the mind Kwong, Jack M. C.
Inquiry (Oslo),
01/2023, Letnik:
ahead-of-print, Številka:
ahead-of-print
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This paper proposes that we should think of epistemic agents as having, as one of their intellectual activities, a gatekeeping task: To decide in light of various criteria which ideas they should ...consider and which not to consider. When this task is performed with excellence, it is conducive to the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth and knowledge, and the reduction of falsehoods. Accordingly, it is a worthy contender for being an intellectual virtue. Although gatekeeping may strike one simply as the virtue of open-mindedness, I argue that it is not; gatekeeping does not favor a characteristic disposition to be willing to consider novel or opposing ideas. In fact, being told that an agent is excellent at gatekeeping reveals nothing about how frequently she considers or refuses to consider ideas. This paper will introduce and motivate the notion of gatekeeping, and offer some preliminary arguments in support of its candidacy as an intellectual virtue.
Open-Mindedness as Engagement Kwong, Jack M. C.
The Southern journal of philosophy,
03/2016, Letnik:
54, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Open‐mindedness is an under‐explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of ...intellectual activities are central to it? Can one be open‐minded about one's firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be open‐minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construes open‐mindedness as engagement, that is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one's cognitive space and to accord them serious consideration.
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