This work explores some of the many interesting philosophical issues that arise in the conduct of generative linguistics. There are three basic themes that are woven throughout the work. The first ...theme is that generative linguistics at its best is concerned with understanding and explanation, and not just with observation and data gathering. Generative linguistics is interested in underlying mechanisms that give rise to language related phenomena, and this interest will often trump the goal of accumulating more data. The second theme is the Ψ-language hypothesis. It is the hypothesis that the underlying mechanisms posited by generative linguists are fundamentally psychological mechanisms and that generative linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology, but that it doesn't follow that cognitive psychology must therefore be interested in psychological states individuated narrowly. It is consistent with the Ψ-language hypothesis that psychological states are individuated in part by the embedding environment. The third theme is the principle of methodological minimalism. It is the thesis that best theory criteria like simplicity and formal rigor all really come down to one thing: seek methods that help linguists to do their jobs effectively and with the minimal of cognitive labor.
ABSTRACT Tensism is the view that tense is not merely a property of language and the mind (narrowly individuated), but of the world itself. Perspectivalism extends this idea to all perspectival ...properties be they person (e.g. first person vs. second) or locational (e.g. here vs there). One challenge that perspectivalism faces is the problem of expressing the contents of the beliefs and utterances of persons that are in other perspectival positions. One proposed solution to this problem is to allow for semantic theories that "realign" the expression of contents so that the contents expressed by persons in other perspectival positions can be re-expressed from one's own perspectival position. In this paper I argue that a similar semantic realignment strategy could be deployed in helping perspectivalists generally (and presentists in particular) come to grips with a puzzle raised by the Special Theory of Relativity. In short, the strategy is to realign the expression of contents in another inertial frame so that they are expressed from within your inertial frame. As we will see, the strategy is not puzzle free.
Kenneth Taylor's book, Referring to the World: An Opinionated Introduction to the Theory of Reference, is an exploration of the cognitive resources required to refer to things in the external world. ...According to Taylor, there is a lot going on. One needs the appropriate internal syntactic objects (which are, on Taylor's view, the product of discursive activity), plus the appropriate internal conceptions, plus of course, the things in the external world that are causally related to our sense organs. His project then is to direct this symphony of moving parts.
Abstract In accounts of indexicals, we encounter two problems: the problem of cognitive significance and the problem of cognitive dynamics. The problem of cognitive significance leads us to posit ...finer-grained sense content to account for the explanation of our actions and emotions. Meanwhile the problem of cognitive dynamics calls us to show how two episodes of thought can have the same fine-grained sense content even though they are expressed in different ways in different times and places. Bojislav Bozickovic offers a solution to the problem of cognitive dynamics by using objects to tie together different ways in which a sense content might be expressed, and arguing that the sense expressions might become untied if we come to wonder if we are talking about the same object. I argue that this strategy raises a number of questions, and may lead to destabilization of our thought contents based on past and future concerns about object identity.
David Chalmers argues that virtual objects exist in the form of data structures that have causal powers. I argue that there is a large class of virtual objects that are social objects and that do not ...depend upon data structures for their existence. I also argue that data structures are themselves fundamentally social objects. Thus, virtual objects are fundamentally social objects.
How a virtual journalist in the virtual world of online gaming landed on the real-world front page of the New York Times and how his virtual newspaper chronicled the emergence of the next generation ...of the World Wide Web.
Part of what makes working with modals such a tricky business is that apparent modal forms are deployed in all sorts of ways in language. In this paper I explore an interesting example of an apparent ...modal—the Blofeld case—which was introduced by Gilles and von Fintel as part of their argument against context of assessment accounts of epistemic modals. I argue that the example is subtle, and that the apparent modal may not be an epistemic modal at all—it could be a scalar modifier that merges or “incorporates” with the matrix verb, weakening the meaning of the matrix verb. If apparent modals are used as scalar modifiers and are subject to movement and incorporation, then the surface language of modality may be throwing us some crafty head fakes. Caution is advised.
'Knowledge' doesn't correctly describe our relation to linguistic rules. It is too thick a notion (for example, we don't believe linguistic rules). On the other hand, 'cognize', without further ...elaboration, is too thin a notion, which is to say that it is too thin to play a role in a competence theory. One advantage of the term 'knowledge'-and presumably Chomsky's original motivation for using it-is that knowledge would play the right kind of role in a competence theory: Our competence would consist in a body of knowledge which we have and which we may or may not act upon-our performance need not conform to the linguistic rules that we know. Is there a way out of the dilemma? I'm going to make the case that the best way to talk about grammatical rules is simply to say that we have them. That doesn't sound very deep, I know, but saying that we have individual rules leaves room for individual norm guidance in a way that 'cognize' does not. Saying we have a rule like subjacency is also thicker than merely saying we cognize it. Saying I have such a rule invites the interpretation that it is a rule for me-that I am normatively guided by it. The competence theory thus becomes a theory of the rules that we have. Whether we follow those rules is another matter entirely.
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