In the wake of healthcare disasters, such as the appalling failures of care uncovered in Mid Staffordshire, inquiries and investigations often point to a litany of early warnings and weak signals ...that were missed, misunderstood or discounted by the professionals and organisations charged with monitoring the safety and quality of care. Some of the most urgent challenges facing those responsible for improving and regulating patient safety are therefore how to identify, interpret, integrate and act on the early warnings and weak signals of emerging risks-before those risks contribute to a disastrous failure of care. These challenges are fundamentally organisational and cultural: they relate to what information is routinely noticed, communicated and attended to within and between healthcare organisations-and, most critically, what is assumed and ignored. Analysing these organisational and cultural challenges suggests three practical ways that healthcare organisations and their regulators can improve safety and address emerging risks. First, engage in practices that actively produce and amplify fleeting signs of ignorance. Second, work to continually define and update a set of specific fears of failure. And third, routinely uncover and publicly circulate knowledge on the sources of systemic risks to patient safety and the improvements required to address them.
Understanding the resilience of healthcare is critically important. A resilient healthcare system might be expected to consistently deliver high quality care, withstand disruptive events and ...continually adapt, learn and improve. However, there are many different theories, models and definitions of resilience and most are contested and debated in the literature. Clear and unambiguous conceptual definitions are important for both theoretical and practical considerations of any phenomenon, and resilience is no exception. A large international research programme on Resilience in Healthcare (RiH) is seeking to address these issues in a 5-year study across Norway, England, the Netherlands, Australia, Japan, and Switzerland (2018-2023). The aims of this debate paper are: 1) to identify and select core operational concepts of resilience from the literature in order to consider their contributions, implications, and boundaries for researching resilience in healthcare; and 2) to propose a working definition of healthcare resilience that underpins the international RiH research programme.
To fulfil these aims, first an overview of three core perspectives or metaphors that underpin theories of resilience are introduced from ecology, engineering and psychology. Second, we present a brief overview of key definitions and approaches to resilience applicable in healthcare. We position our research program with collaborative learning and user involvement as vital prerequisite pillars in our conceptualisation and operationalisation of resilience for maintaining quality of healthcare services. Third, our analysis addresses four core questions that studies of resilience in healthcare need to consider when defining and operationalising resilience. These are: resilience 'for what', 'to what', 'of what', and 'through what'? Finally, we present our operational definition of resilience.
The RiH research program is exploring resilience as a multi-level phenomenon and considers adaptive capacity to change as a foundation for high quality care. We, therefore, define healthcare resilience as: the capacity to adapt to challenges and changes at different system levels, to maintain high quality care. This working definition of resilience is intended to be comprehensible and applicable regardless of the level of analysis or type of system component under investigation.
Efforts to develop autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS) have exploded across a range of settings in recent years, from self‐driving cars to medical diagnostic chatbots. These have the potential ...to bring enormous benefits to society but also have the potential to introduce new—or amplify existing—risks. As these emerging technologies become more widespread, one of the most critical risk management challenges is to ensure that failures of AIS can be rigorously analyzed and understood so that the safety of these systems can be effectively governed and improved. AIS are necessarily developed and deployed within complex human, social, and organizational systems, but to date there has been little systematic examination of the sociotechnical sources of risk and failure in AIS. Accordingly, this article develops a conceptual framework that characterizes key sociotechnical sources of risk in AIS by reanalyzing one of the most publicly reported failures to date: the 2018 fatal crash of Uber's self‐driving car. Publicly available investigative reports were systematically analyzed using constant comparative analysis to identify key sources and patterns of sociotechnical risk. Five fundamental domains of sociotechnical risk were conceptualized—structural, organizational, technological, epistemic, and cultural—each indicated by particular patterns of sociotechnical failure. The resulting SOTEC framework of sociotechnical risk in AIS extends existing theories of risk in complex systems and highlights important practical and theoretical implications for managing risk and developing infrastructures of learning in AIS.
Every safety-critical industry devotes considerable time and resource to investigating and analysing accidents, incidents and near misses. The systematic analysis of incidents has greatly expanded ...our understanding of both the causes and prevention of harm. These methods have been widely employed in healthcare over the last 20 years but are now subject to critique and reassessment. In this paper, we reconsider the purpose and value of incident analysis and methods appropriate to the healthcare of today.
The primary need for a revised vision of incident analysis is that healthcare itself is changing dramatically. People are living longer, often with multiple co-morbidities which are managed over very long timescales. Our vision of safety analysis needs to expand concomitantly to embrace much longer timescales. Rather than think only in terms of the prevention of specific incidents, we need to consider the balance of benefit, harm and risks over long time periods encompassing the social and psychological impact of healthcare as well as physical effects. We argued for major changes in our approach to the analysis of safety events: assume that patients and families will be partners in investigation and where possible engage them fully from the beginning, examine much longer time periods and assess contributory factors at different time points in the patient journey, be more proportionate and strategic in analysing safety issues, seek to understand success and recovery as well as failure, consider the workability of clinical processes as well as deviations from them and develop a much more structured and wide-ranging approach to recommendations.
Previous methods of incident analysis were simply adopted and disseminated with little research into the concepts, methods, reliability and outcomes of such analyses. There is a need for significant research and investment in the development of new methods. These changes are profound and will require major adjustments in both practical and cultural terms and research to explore and evaluate the most effective approaches.
Abstract
Background
Healthcare leaders play an important and complex role in managing and handling the dual responsibility of both Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) for workers and quality and ...patient safety (QPS). There is a need for better understanding of how healthcare leaders and decision makers organize and create support structures to handle these combined responsibilities in practice. The aim of this study was to explore how healthcare leaders and elected politicians organize, control, and follow up the work of HSE and QPS in a Norwegian nursing home context. Moreover, we explore how they interpret, negotiate, and manage the dual responsibility and possible tensions between employee health and safety, and patient safety and quality of service delivery.
Methods
The study was conducted in 2022 as a case study exploring the experience of healthcare leaders and elected politicians in five municipalities responsible for providing nursing homes services in Norway. Elected politicians (18) and healthcare leaders (11) participated in focus group interviews (5) and individual interviews (11). Data were analyzed using inductive thematic analysis.
Results
The analysis identified five main themes explaining how the healthcare leaders and elected politicians organize, control, and follow up the work of HSE and QPS:
1. Establish frameworks and room for maneuver in the work with HSE and QPS.
2. Create good routines and channels for communication and collaboration.
3. Build a culture for a health-promoting work environment and patient safety.
4. Create systems to handle the possible tensions in the dual responsibility between caring for employees and quality and safety in service delivery.
5. Define clear boundaries in responsibility between politics and administration.
Conclusions
The study showed that healthcare leaders and elected politicians who are responsible for ensuring sound systems for quality and safety for both patients and staff, do experience tensions in handling this dual responsibility. They acknowledge the need to create systems and awareness for the responsibility and argue that there is a need to better separate the roles and boundaries between elected politicians and the healthcare administration in the execution of HSE and QPS.
Despite an emerging consensus on the importance of resilience as a framework for understanding the healthcare system, the operationalization of resilience in healthcare has become an area of ...continuous discussion, and especially so when seeking operationalization across different healthcare contexts and healthcare levels. Different indicators for resilience in healthcare have been proposed by different researchers, where some indicators are coincident, some complementary, and some diverging. The overall aim of this article is to contribute to this discussion by synthesizing knowledge and experiences from studies in different healthcare contexts and levels to provide holistic understanding of capacities for resilience in healthcare.
This study is a part of the first exploratory phase of the Resilience in Healthcare programme. The exploratory phase has focused on screening, synthesising, and validating results from existing empirical projects covering a variety of healthcare settings. We selected the sample from several former and ongoing research projects across different contexts and levels, involving researchers from SHARE, the Centre for Resilience in Healthcare in Norway. From the included projects, 16 researchers participated in semi-structured interviews. The dataset was analysed in accordance with grounded theory.
Ten different capacities for resilience in healthcare emerged from the dataset, presented here according to those with the most identified instances to those with the least: Structure, Learning, Alignment, Coordination, Leadership, Risk awareness, Involvement, Competence, Facilitators and Communication. All resilience capacities are interdependent, so effort should not be directed at achieving success according to improving just a single capacity but rather at being equally aware of the importance and interrelatedness of all the resilience in healthcare capacities.
A conceptual framework where the 10 different resilience capacities are presented in terms of contextualisation and collaboration was developed. The framework provides the understanding that all resilience capacities are associated with contextualization, or collaboration, or both, and thereby contributes to theorization and guidance for tailoring, making operationalization efforts for the identified resilience capacities in knowledge translation. This study therefore contributes with key insight for intervention development which is currently lacking in the literature.
Autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS) are being developed and deployed across a wide range of sectors and encompass a variety of technologies designed to engage in different forms of independent ...reasoning and self-directed behavior. These technologies may bring considerable benefits to society but also pose a range of risk management challenges, particularly when deployed in safety-critical sectors where complex interactions between human, social, and technical processes underpin safety and resilience. Healthcare is one safety-critical sector at the forefront of efforts to develop and deploy intelligent technologies, such as through artificial intelligence (AI) systems intended to automate key aspects of healthcare tasks such as reading medical images to identify signs of pathology. This article develops a qualitative analysis of the sociotechnical sources of risk and resilience associated with the development, deployment, and use of AI in healthcare, drawing on 40 in-depth interviews with participants involved in the development, management, and regulation of AI. Qualitative template analysis is used to examine sociotechnical sources of risk and resilience, drawing on and elaborating Macrae's (2022, Risk Analysis, 42(9), 1999-2025) SOTEC framework that integrates structural, organizational, technological, epistemic, and cultural sources of risk in AIS. This analysis explores an array of sociotechnical sources of risk associated with the development, deployment, and use of AI in healthcare and identifies an array of sociotechnical patterns of resilience that may counter those risks. In doing so, the SOTEC framework is elaborated and translated to define key sources of both risk and resilience in AIS.
Abstract
Background
Adaptation and innovation are both described as instrumental for resilience in healthcare. However, the relatedness between these dimensions of resilience in healthcare has not ...yet been studied. This study seeks to develop a conceptual understanding of adaptation and innovation as a basis for resilience in healthcare. The overall aim of this study is therefore to explore how adaptation and innovation can be described and understood across different healthcare settings. To this end, the overall aim will be investigated by identifying what constitutes adaptation and innovation in healthcare, the mechanisms involved, and what type of responses adaptation and innovation are associated with.
Methods
The method used to develop understanding across a variety of healthcare contexts, was to first conduct a narrative inquiry of a comprehensive dataset from various empirical settings (e.g., maternity, transitional care, telecare), that were later analysed in accordance with grounded theory. Narrative inquiry provided a contextually informed synthesis of the phenomenon, while the use of grounded theory methodology allowed for cross-contextual comparison of adaptation and innovation in terms of resilience in healthcare.
Results
The results identified an imbalance between adaptation and innovation. If short-term adaptations are used too extensively, they may mask system deficiencies and furthermore leave the organization vulnerable, by relying too much on the efforts of a few individuals. Hence, short-term adaptations may end up a barrier for resilience in healthcare. Long-term adaptations and innovation of products, processes and practices proved to be of a lower priority, but had the potential of addressing the flaws of the system by proactively re-organizing and re-designing routines and practices.
Conclusions
This study develops a new conceptual account of adaptation and innovation as a basis for resilience in healthcare. Findings emerging from this study indicate that a balance between adaptation and innovation should be sought when seeking resilience in healthcare. Adaptations can furthermore be divided into short-term and long-term adaptations, creating the need to balance between these different types of adaptations. Short-term adaptations that adopt the pattern of firefighting can risk generating complex and unintended outcomes, but where no significant changes are made to organization of the system. Long-term adaptations, on the other hand, introduce re-organization of the system based on feedback, and therefore can provide a proactive response to system deficiencies. We propose a pattern of adaptation in resilience in healthcare: from short-term adjustments, to long-term reorganizations, to innovations.
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