Tema članka je Katolička crkva na sjednicama Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske i njegova Predsjedništva u razdoblju od 1979. do 1988. U tom je vremenu o Katoličkoj crkvi raspravljano na ...više od četrdeset raznih sjednica, plenuma i sastanaka. O tim raspravama javnost nije informirana zbog ustaljene prakse da Savez komunista ne vodi javni dijalog sa svojim protivnicima. Za »dijalog«, odnosno službeni odnos bile su zadužene partijske transmisije, državne u vidu komisija za odnose s vjerskim zajednicama, te političke u vidu odbora za društvena pitanja religije Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Hrvatske. Cilj članka je dvojak, dati prilog proučavanju načina na koji je stvarno funkcionirao politički sustav u samoupravnom socijalizmu na primjeru odnosa prema najvećoj vjerskoj zajednici u Republici i najvećem ideološkom protivniku, Katoličkoj crkvi. Druga pobuda je bila istražiti u kojoj se mjeri Predsjedništvo CK SKH, kao najvažniji centar politički moći i središnje tijelo vlasti u Socijalističkoj Republici Hrvatskoj, bavilo Katoličkom crkvom od 1979. do 1988. godine.
The topic of the article is debates about the Catholic Church at the meetings (sessions) of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and its Presidency in the period from 1979 to 1988. During that time, the Catholic Church was discussed at more than 40 different sessions, plenums, and meetings. The public was not informed about these discussions, due to the established practice that the League of Communists did not hold a public dialogue with its opponents. However, the "dialogue", i.e. the official relationship was maintained through state or political (party) committees such as the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities or the Committee for Social Issues of Religion of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Croatia. Therefore, the goal of this article is twofold: firstly, to contribute to the study of the political system in self-governing socialism and its actual functioning, which was examined on the example of the relationship towards the largest religious community in the Republic, and at the same time the biggest ideological opponent, i.e., the Catholic Church. The second motive was to investigate to what extent the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, as the most important center of political power and the central authority in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, dealt with the Catholic Church from 1979 to 1988.
Tema rada je tretman političkoga tjednika Danas Predsjedništva Centralnoga komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske u prvoj godini njegova izlaženja, tijekom 1982. i 1983. Danas je počeo izlaziti u drugoj ...polovini veljače 1982., a već pola godine poslije postao je krupan politički problem. Tjednik se pojavio u razdoblju opće krize, s kritičkim, na trenutke i provokativnim pristupom izazvao je okoštalu i ostarjelu partijsku elitu odlučnu da brani svoj nedodirljivi položaj. U vrlo kratkom vremenu ustalio se na nakladi od oko 120.000 prodanih primjeraka, što svjedoči o njegovoj privlačnosti širokoj čitalačkoj populaciji, a s druge strane i utjecaju, što je zapravo zabrinjavalo partijski vrh. Pojavom Danasa počelo je nastajati kritičko javno mnijenje u socijalističkoj Hrvatskoj, što je dotad u većoj mjeri bila značajka Slovenije i Srbije. U obračun s tjednikom partijski vrh krenuo je u ljeto 1982. i privremeno ga je primirio početkom sljedeće godine. To je učinjeno smjenom glavnoga i odgovornoga urednika te dovođenjem novoga s mlađim pomoćnicima koji su bili na službenoj partijskoj liniji. Rezultat promjena bio je i drastičan pad naklade, što je tjednik doslovno svelo na životarenje i marginalan utjecaj.
The subject of this paper is the way the weekly Danas was treated by the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia in the first year of its publication, during 1982 and 1983. Danas started being published in the second half of February 1982 and half a year later the periodical turned into a huge political issue. The newspaper appeared at a time of a general crisis; with its critical approach, at times even provocative, it frustrated the hardened and obsolete party elite which was determined to defend its hitherto inviolable position. Within a short period of time, the weekly attained a circulation of 120,000 copies, which testifies to its wide appeal as well as to its influence, which in fact distressed the party leadership. With the appearance of Danas, a critical public opinion started to come into being. The party leadership started to deal with the weekly in the summer of 1982 and temporarily discontinued it at the beginning of the following year. This was done by the replacement of the editor-in-chief with a new one, along with young associates who were willing to toe the party line. The result of the changes was a drop in circulation, which literally reduced the weekly to eking out an existence and having only marginal influence. The penalization of Danas was in fact an example of shutting down any public opinion unacceptable to the party leadership, through the principle of democratic centralism and its concrete implementation in practice. It was actually a conflict within the party in which lower-ranking communists lost out.
Na Badnju noć 1984. godine u Splitu manja skupina uglavnom alkoholiziranih maloljetnika napravila je izgred koji su službe unutarnjeg reda u svom izvješću samo spomenule. Bez ikakvog realnog ...utemeljenja, Jugoslavenska narodna armija je izgred proglasila napadom na sebe i pretvorila ga u slučaj koji je imao odjek u cijeloj Jugoslaviji. O izgredu je nekoliko puta raspravljao i politički vrh Saveza komunista Hrvatske koji je prihvatio armijsku interpretaciju izgreda i smijenio rukovodeću strukturu službi unutarnjeg reda u Splitu.
The conception of total people’s defence and social self-protection, as the Yugoslav defence-protection system was called, began to be implemented after the Warsaw Pact countries’ invasion of ...Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Yugoslav communists believed that this sudden and successful aggression could be effectively opposed only through the organised engagement of all available societal potentials, based on its revolutionary experience and reflections on Marxist classics regarding arming the populace. This was the beginning of a conception of defence that visibly burdened the society, increased the already large military budget, and prompted the militarisation of society. Although the security of society, called social self-protection, was discussed at the same time as defence, the true impetus for its theoretical and practical formation was the infiltration of the paramilitary cell Feniks (Phoenix) into Yugoslavia in summer 1972. In contrast to total people’s defence, whose implementation was considered successful, the implementation of social self-protection ran into numerous problems because security was from 1945 to 1966 exclusively the responsibility of the security service, and therefore difficult to accept in other social structures. For this reason, on several occasions the League of Communists initiated its acceptance on all levels of organisation in party and social-political structures. A relatively efficient fusion of these two protective complexes was achieved only in 1979, after the founding of committees for total people’s defence and social self-protection, which were supposed to secure the leading role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the defence-security system.
Koncepcija općenarodne obrane i društvene samozaštite, kako se od sredine 1970-ih zvao jugoslavenski obrambeno-zaštitni sustav, počela se provoditi nakon invazije zemalja Varšavskoga ugovora na ...Čehoslovačku u kolovozu 1968. Jugoslavenski komunisti smatrali su da se takvoj, iznenadnoj i uspješnoj agresiji mogu učinkovito suprotstaviti samo organiziranim angažmanom svih raspoloživih potencijala društva na temelju svojega revolucionarnog iskustva i promišljanja klasika marksizma o naoružanome narodu. Tako je počela nastajati obrambena koncepcija koja je osjetno opteretila društvo, povećala ionako velike financijske izdatke za vojsku i potaknula militarizaciju društva. Premda
je istovremeno s obrambenom funkcijom problematizirana i funkcija sigurnosti društva pod imenom društvena samozaštita, pravi poticaj za njezino teorijsko i praktično uobličavanje dao je upad naoružane skupine
Feniks u Jugoslaviju u ljeto 1972. No do koliko-toliko učinkovite fuzije tih dvaju zaštitnih kompleksa doći će tek 1979. osnivanjem komiteta za općenarodnu obranu i društvenu samozaštitu, koji su u obrambeno-zaštitnom sustavu trebali osigurati rukovodeću ulogu Saveza komunista Jugoslavije.
The conception of total people’s defence and social self-protection, as the Yugoslav defence-protection system was called, began to be implemented after the Warsaw Pact countries’ invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Yugoslav communists believed that this sudden and successful aggression could be effectively opposed only through the organised engagement of all available societal potentials, based on its revolutionary experience and reflections on Marxist classics regarding arming the populace. This was the beginning of a conception of defence that visibly burdened the society, increased the already large military budget, and prompted the militarisation of society. Although the security of society, called social self-protection, was discussed at the
same time as defence, the true impetus for its theoretical and practical formation was the infiltration of the paramilitary cell Feniks
(Phoenix) into Yugoslavia in summer 1972. In contrast to total people’s
defence, whose implementation was considered successful, the implementation of social self-protection ran into numerous problems because security was from 1945 to 1966 exclusively the responsibility of
the security service, and therefore difficult to accept in other social
structures. For this reason, on several occasions the League of Communists initiated its acceptance on all levels of organisation in party and social-political structures. A relatively efficient fusion of these two protective complexes was achieved only in 1979, after the founding of committees for total people’s defence and social self-protection, which were supposed to secure the leading role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the defence-security system.
The conception of total people's defence and social self-protection, as the Yugoslav defence-protection system was called, began to be implemented after the Warsaw Pact countries' invasion of ...Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Yugoslav communists believed that this sudden and successful aggression could be effectively opposed only through the organised engagement of all available societal potentials, based on its revolutionary experience and reflections on Marxist classics regarding arming the populace. This was the beginning of a conception of defence that visibly burdened the society, increased the already large military budget, and prompted the militarisation of society. Although the security of society, called social self-protection, was discussed at the same time as defence, the true impetus for its theoretical and practical formation was the infiltration of the paramilitary cell Feniks (Phoenix) into Yugoslavia in summer 1972. In contrast to total people's defence, whose implementation was considered successful, the implementation of social self-protection ran into numerous problems because security was from 1945 to 1966 exclusively the responsibility of the security service, and therefore difficult to accept in other social structures. For this reason, on several occasions the League of Communists initiated its acceptance on all levels of organisation in party and social-political structures. A relatively efficient fusion of these two protective complexes was achieved only in 1979, after the founding of committees for total people's defence and social self-protection, which were supposed to secure the leading role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the defence-security system.
U Časopisu za suvremenu povijest (2020, br. 3) odgovorio sam na „prikaz” moje knjige Rat Hrvata i Muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1992. do 1994. godine koji je napravio Mesud Šadinlija. Odgovor ...sam naslovio „Politika povijesti ili politika laži – povodom jednog prikaza u Preporodovu Journalu”, a odgovorio sam na tekst koji je objavljen u Preporodovu Journalu, dvomjesečniku Kulturnoga društva Bošnjaka Hrvatske. Smisleno je pitanje treba li uopće odgovarati na „prikaze” znanstvene knjige u neznanstvenim publikacijama, posebno onima koje bi se trebale baviti očuvanjem i razvojem kulture jedne manjinske zajednice, u ovom slučaju one bošnjačko-muslimanske u Hrvatskoj. Mislim da treba, baš zato što će u suprotnom čitatelji te publikacije, odnosno pripadnici te nacionalne manjine steći potpuno pogrešnu sliku o nekim važnim povijesnim događajima koji u mnogočemu određuju njihove odnose s hrvatskim narodom, kako u Hrvatskoj tako i u BiH. Naime, Šadinlija svoj „prikaz” temelji na metodi prešućivanja i vađenja iz konteksta. Usto mi je pripisao riječi koje nisam rekao niti ih ima u mojoj knjizi. Riječi iz jednoga dokumenta HVO-a pripisao je meni kao moja osobna stajališta, „prigovorio” mi je na ignoriranju izvora na koje sam se referirao, ustvrdio je da
sam prešutio nešto što nisam, a da ne govorim o spominjanju „validnih argumenata” na bitnim dionicama na kojima nije mogao argumentirano osporiti
moju interpretaciju. Šadinlija ne postupa kao profesionalni povjesničar, koji želi dodatno provjeriti činjenice i propitati eventualno dvojbene interpretacije. Na temelju takva pristupa posve sam utemeljeno zaključio da me doživljava kao neprijatelja s kojim se treba obračunati, a tada su laž, konstrukcije i podmetanja potpuno validni i legitimni.
U tekstu, odgovoru na reagiranje politologinje Mirjane Kasapović („Povijest, povijesni revizionizam i politike povijesti”), razmatra se besmislenost uporabe pojmova revizija i revizionizam u ...historiografiji jer su suprotni biti znanosti. Dovodi se u pitanje i nekritička primjena „gotovih rješenja” iz inozemstva kao putokaza za suočavanje s tamnim stranama naše prošlosti. Na tom se primjeru upozorava na kompleksnost selektivnoga suočavanja s prošlošću u ideološki podijeljenoj zemlji u kojoj se izvorište traumatičnih problema vidi samo u onima koji drugačije interpretiraju prošlost, pri čemu ih se ocjenjuje sa suprotstavljenih idejnih i političkih pozicija. Razmatra se i pitanje nedosljednosti u pokušajima primjene politikā povijesti i nemogućnost suočavanja i odbacivanja svih oblika totalitarizma te utjecaj totalitarne svijesti na hrvatsko društvo.
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