Being able to abstract relations of similarity is considered one of the hallmarks of human cognition. While previous research has shown that other animals (e.g. primates) can attend to relational ...similarity, they struggle to focus on object similarity. This is in contrast with humans. And it is precisely the ability to attend to objects that it is argued to make relational reasoning uniquely human. What about invertebrates? Despite earlier studies indicating that bees are capable of learning abstract relationships (e.g. ‘same’ and ‘different’), no research has investigated whether bees can spontaneously attend to relational similarity and whether they can do so when relational matches compete with object matches. To test this, a spatial matching task (with and without competing object matches) previously used with children and great apes was adapted for use with wild-caught bumblebees. When object matches were not present, bumblebees spontaneously used relational similarity. Importantly, when competing object matches were present, bumblebees still focused on relations over objects. These findings indicate that the absence of object bias is also present in invertebrates and suggest that the relational gap between humans and other animals is due to their preference for relations over objects.
Episodic memory is the ability to consciously recollect personal past events. This type of memory has been tested in non-human animals by using depletion paradigms that assess whether they can ...remember the "what," "where," and "when" (i.e., how long ago) of a past event. An important limitation of these behavioral paradigms is that they do not clearly identify the cognitive mechanisms (e.g., episodic memory, semantic memory) that underlie task success. Testing adult humans in a depletion paradigm will help to shed light on this issue. In two experiments, we presented university undergraduates with a depletion paradigm which involved choosing one of two food snacks-a preferred but perishable food and a less preferred but non-perishable food-either after a short or a long interval. Whereas, in Experiment 1, participants were asked to
the time between hiding the food items and choosing one of them; in Experiment 2 participants
the time elapsed between hiding the food items and choosing one of them. In addition, in Experiment 2 participants were presented with 2 trials which allowed us to investigate the role of previous experience in depletion paradigms. Results across both experiments showed that participants chose the preferred and perishable food (popsicle) after the short interval but did not choose the less preferred and non-perishable food (raisins) after the long interval. Crucially, in Experiment 2 experiencing the melted popsicle in Trial l improved participants' performance in Trial 2. We discuss our results in the context of how previous experience affects performance in depletion tasks. We also argue that variations in performance on "episodic-like memory" tasks may be due to different definitions and assessment criteria of the "when" component.
Sequential tool use in great apes Martin-Ordas, Gema; Schumacher, Lena; Call, Josep
PloS one,
12/2012, Letnik:
7, Številka:
12
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Sequential tool use is defined as using a tool to obtain another non-food object which subsequently itself will serve as a tool to act upon a further (sub)goal. Previous studies have shown that birds ...and great apes succeed in such tasks. However, the inclusion of a training phase for each of the sequential steps and the low cost associated with retrieving the longest tools limits the scope of the conclusions. The goal of the experiments presented here was, first to replicate a previous study on sequential tool use conducted on New Caledonian crows and, second, extend this work by increasing the cost of retrieving a tool in order to test tool selectivity of apes. In Experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans and bonobos with an out-of-reach reward, two tools that were available but too short to reach the food and four out-of-reach tools differing in functionality. Similar to crows, apes spontaneously used up to 3 tools in sequence to get the reward and also showed a strong preference for the longest out-of reach tool independently of the distance of the food. In Experiment 2, we increased the cost of reaching for the longest out-of reach tool. Now apes used up to 5 tools in sequence to get the reward and became more selective in their choice of the longest tool as the costs of its retrieval increased. The findings of the studies presented here contribute to the growing body of comparative research on tool use.
Following encoding, memory remains temporarily vulnerable to disruption. Consolidation refers to offline time-dependent processes that continue after encoding and stabilize, transform or enhance the ...memory trace. Memory consolidation resulting from sleep has been reported for declarative and non-declarative memories in humans. We first investigated the temporal course of memory retrieval in chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans. We found that the amount of retrieved information was time dependent: apes' performance degraded after 1 and 2 h, stabilized after 4 h, started to increase after 8 and 12 h and fully recovered after 24 h. Second, we show that although memories during wakefulness were highly vulnerable to interference from events similar to those witnessed during the original encoding event, an intervening period of sleep not only stabilized apes' memories into more permanent ones but also protected them against interference.
•One-step “spoon tests” do not directly assess the ability to reason about the future.•Preschoolers were tested in a two-step “spoon test” that required temporal reasoning.•Only 5-year-olds included ...temporal reasoning in their planning responses.•It is crucial to incorporate a temporal component to investigate future thinking.•Alone item-choice measures of planning might not involve foresight.
Previous methodologies used to investigate future thinking (i.e., one-step “spoon test”) do not directly assess temporal reasoning. Consequently, the extent to which foresight is required to solve these tasks has been questioned. In the current study, 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds were presented with a two-step “spoon test”: to secure a future need (e.g., play with a marble run game), children first had to obtain a key that allowed them next to access the marbles. By the age of 4 children selected the key; however, it is only by the age of 5 that children reasoned about the temporal sequence of future events and selected the key. Temporal reasoning, memory for the past events and age significantly contributed to predict children’s ability to select the correct item. These findings suggest that temporal reasoning is crucial to assess future thinking and that item-choice measures alone might not involve foresight.
One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cognition. We critically examine key underlying assumptions in the debate, which is mainly preoccupied ...with certain dichotomous positions, the most prevalent being whether or not ‘real’ future orientation is uniquely human. We argue that future orientation is a theoretical construct threatening to lead research astray. Cognitive operations occur in the present moment and can be influenced only by prior causation and the environment, at the same time that most appear directed towards future outcomes. Regarding the current debate, future orientation becomes a question of where on various continua cognition becomes ‘truly’ future-oriented. We question both the assumption that episodic cognition is the most important process in future-oriented cognition and the assumption that future-oriented cognition is uniquely human. We review the studies on future-oriented cognition in the great apes to find little doubt that our closest relatives possess such ability. We conclude by urging that future-oriented cognition not be viewed as expression of some select set of skills. Instead, research into future-oriented cognition should be approached more like research into social and physical cognition.
Episodic memory, as defined by Tulving, can be described in terms of behavioural elements (what, where and when information) but it is also accompained by an awareness of one’s past (
chronesthesia
) ...and a subjective conscious experience (
autonoetic
awareness). Recent experiments have shown that corvids and rodents recall the where, what and when of an event. This capability has been called episodic-like memory because it only fulfils the behavioural criteria for episodic memory. We tested seven chimpanzees, three orangutans and two bonobos of various ages by adapting two paradigms, originally developed by Clayton and colleagues to test scrub jays. In Experiment 1, subjects were fed preferred but perishable food (frozen juice) and less preferred but non-perishable food (grape). After the food items were hidden, subjects could choose one of them either after 5 min or 1 h. The frozen juice was still available after 5 min but melted after 1 h and became unobtainable. Apes chose the frozen juice significantly more after 5 min and the grape after 1 h. In Experiment 2, subjects faced two baiting events happening at different times, yet they formed an integrated memory for the location and time of the baiting event for particular food items. We also included a memory task that required no temporal encoding. Our results showed that apes remember in an integrated fashion what, where and when (i.e., how long ago) an event happened; that is, apes distinguished between different events in which the same food items were hidden in different places at different times. The temporal control of their choices was not dependent on the familiarity of the platforms where the food was hidden. Chimpanzees’ and bonobos’ performance in the temporal encoding task was age-dependent, following an inverted U-shaped distribution. The age had no effect on the performance of the subjects in the task that required no temporal encoding.
One of the most contested areas in the field of animal cognition is non-human future-oriented cognition. We critically examine key underlying assumptions in the debate, which is mainly preoccupied ...with certain dichotomous positions, the most prevalent being whether or not 'real' future orientation is uniquely human. We argue that future orientation is a theoretical construct threatening to lead research astray. Cognitive operations occur in the present moment and can be influenced only by prior causation and the environment, at the same time that most appear directed towards future outcomes. Regarding the current debate, future orientation becomes a question of where on various continua cognition becomes 'truly' future-oriented. We question both the assumption that episodic cognition is the most important process in future-oriented cognition and the assumption that future-oriented cognition is uniquely human. We review the studies on future-oriented cognition in the great apes to find little doubt that our closest relatives possess such ability. We conclude by urging that future-oriented cognition not be viewed as expression of some select set of skills. Instead, research into future-oriented cognition should be approached more like research into social and physical cognition.
Previous studies on tool using have shown that presenting subjects with certain modifications in the experimental setup can substantially improve their performance. However, procedural modifications ...(e.g. trap table task) may not only remove task constraints but also simplify the problem conceptually. The goal of this study was to design a variation of the trap-table that was functionally equivalent to the trap-tube task. In this new task, the subjects had to decide where to insert the tool and in which direction the reward should be pushed. We also administered a trap-tube task that allowed animals to push or rake the reward with the tool to compare the subjects’ performance on both tasks. We used a larger sample of subjects than in previous studies and from all the four species of great apes
(Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, and Pongo pygmaeus)
. The results showed that apes performed better in the trap-platform task than in the trap-tube task. Subjects solved the tube task faster than in previous studies and they also preferred to rake in rather than to push the reward out. There was no correlation in the level of performance between both tasks, and no indication of interspecies differences. These data are consistent with the idea that apes may possess some specific causal knowledge of traps but may lack the ability to establish analogical relations between functional equivalent tasks.
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