In this paper, the authors analyze the relation of the international community (the European Community) to the minority legislation of Republic of Croatia in 1991-1992. Namely, establishing beyond ...any doubt and evaluating the reasons why the Yugoslavia Peace Conference or the special institution, which the European Community formed in order to find a peaceful solution of the conflict, pressed Zagreb so strongly to make profound changes to the minority legislation. Special attention is given to the Conference’s fixation on the special status or regional political autonomy for the territories of Republic of Croatia with Serbian majority.
Učitelj i politika Miškulin, Ivica
Scrinia Slavonica,
11/2022, Letnik:
22, Številka:
1
Journal Article, Paper
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
U radu autor ocjenjuje političko djelovanje učitelja Ivana Trdića u razdoblju Kraljevine Jugoslavije i početkom Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1929. – 1941.). Čitatelj se posebno upućuje na analizu ...Trdićeva rada u temeljnim političkim i parapolitičkim organizacijama šestosiječanjskog režima u gradu te kotaru Slavonska Požega, poput Jugoslovenskog učiteljskog udruženja, Jugoslovenske radikalno seljačke demokratije, Jugoslovenske nacionalne stranke, Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice i Sokola Kraljevine Jugoslavije. U promatranom razdoblju Trdić službuje u školi Vanjska Požega te je jedan od najvažnijih lokalnih pristaša ideologije i politike beskompromisnog jugoslavenstva. Njezino pak rastakanje u drugoj polovici 1930-ih donosi propast Trdićevih ideala. Osvetoljubive ustaše ubile su ga u prvim danima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske.
The abundance and diversity of the preserved archival materials allow a comprehensive analysis of the political activities of the teacher Ivan Trdić during the time of the Yugoslav states (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) between the two wars and in the first days of the Independent State of Croatia. In the first part of the parliamentary period (1919-1926) Trdić came to the fore as the first local teacher to voice the ideology of Yugoslav unitarism, which soon put him - chiefly because of his aggressive pushing of exclusive and violent Yugoslavism - in an untenable position in the Croatian rural communities in which he worked (Nova Kapela). The predictable outcome of everything was a deep disapproval of Yugoslav symbolism by the majority of Croats who started to justifiably treat the aggressive and violent unitaristic minority as national renegades and traitors. Immediately after his promotion in his career (occupying the position of head teacher through political protectionism by the Association of Yugoslav Teachers) Trdić had to undergo a fall. The first Yugoslav circle of sincere Yugoslav teachers ended in the victory of national (i.e. separate Croatian and Serbian) policies and led Trdić to the lee of anonymity in back-of-beyond Stražeman.The Yugoslav nationalists were undeservedly given a new opportunity in the early 1930s. Hence, the 6 January coup of Aleksander Karađorđević must be considered as a new attempt to impose a Yugoslav synthesis. The ideology of the uncompromising Yugoslav regime of the dictatorship reiterated a number of the previous features (a-historicism, exclusiveness, hidden Serbianization) but also brought in some novelties such as state protection, a more apparent monarchism, the predominance of the assimilation version of Yugoslavism and the disappearance of a vocal opposition. As expected, Trdić happened to be at the forefront of distinguished stakeholders of the new conditions in Slavonska Požega (where he lived and where the primary school of which he was head was located); he was enthusiastically active through the two basic media. He occupied a distinguished position in the new regime formation meant for the ideological indoctrination of society, particularly of children (centralized Association of Yugoslav Teachers) and was also a part of the administration of regime parties. Also, the increase of problems concerning the ambivalence of the dictatorial regime would hardly have led to a new collapse of Yugoslav nationalism without the violent death of its idol King Alexander. Without the king, the supporters of “provincial” (that is to say national) identities in Sava Banovina were in the majority (as indicated by the parliamentary elections in May 1935) and in the case of Slavonska Požega this in the first place indicated the return of the HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) led Croatian national movement to the scene. Hence, Trdić experienced in Slavonska Požega (as well as in the second half of 1920 in Nova Kapela) the collapse of Yugoslav nationalism which is naturally the frequent fate of unnatural ideological projects that have no very serious support and are based on imposition and repression.Trdić managed to keep his position on the surface for only a short period of time: without the support of the regime or of a strong political party the Croatian, Yugo-nationalists were brought down to the status of a distinct minority, hence, the imperative of continuing to exist inevitably led them in the direction of Milan Stojadinović which again brings to light their dependence on the Serbian base. However, the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia (denied in the early 1930s) indicated the final victory of Croatian nationalism, that is to say the final defeat of Yugoslav nationalism and the new regime showed not much consideration for Yugoslav teachers who were the servants of a violent and anti-Croatian dictatorship. Trdić was therefore expelled from the Association of Croatian Teachers and to the Yugoslav Radical Union he was more an obstacle to the prospects of the party than a useful lure for Croats. However, Trdić’s second Yugoslav round did not end peacefully. The regime of the Banovina of Croatia forced him into retirement but the uncompromising Croatian nationalists governing the Independent State of Croatia decided to execute him.
The abundance and diversity of the preserved archival materials allow a comprehensive analysis of the political activities of the teacher Ivan Trdić during the time of the Yugoslav states (Kingdom of ...Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) between the two wars and in the first days of the Independent State of Croatia. In the first part of the parliamentary period (1919-1926) Trdić came to the fore as the first local teacher to voice the ideology of Yugoslav unitarism, which soon put him - chiefly because of his aggressive pushing of exclusive and violent Yugoslavism - in an untenable position in the Croatian rural communities in which he worked (Nova Kapela). The predictable outcome of everything was a deep disapproval of Yugoslav symbolism by the majority of Croats who started to justifiably treat the aggressive and violent unitaristic minority as national renegades and traitors. Immediately after his promotion in his career (occupying the position of head teacher through political protectionism by the Association of Yugoslav Teachers) Trdić had to undergo a fall. The first Yugoslav circle of sincere Yugoslav teachers ended in the victory of national (i.e. separate Croatian and Serbian) policies and led Trdić to the lee of anonymity in back-of-beyond Stražeman. The Yugoslav nationalists were undeservedly given a new opportunity in the early 1930s. Hence, the 6 January coup of Aleksander Karađorđević must be considered as a new attempt to impose a Yugoslav synthesis. The ideology of the uncompromising Yugoslav regime of the dictatorship reiterated a number of the previous features (a-historicism, exclusiveness, hidden Serbianization) but also brought in some novelties such as state protection, a more apparent monarchism, the predominance of the assimilation version of Yugoslavism and the disappearance of a vocal opposition. As expected, Trdić happened to be at the forefront of distinguished stakeholders of the new conditions in Slavonska Požega (where he lived and where the primary school of which he was head was located); he was enthusiastically active through the two basic media. He occupied a distinguished position in the new regime formation meant for the ideological indoctrination of society, particularly of children (centralized Association of Yugoslav Teachers) and was also a part of the administration of regime parties. Also, the increase of problems concerning the ambivalence of the dictatorial regime would hardly have led to a new collapse of Yugoslav nationalism without the violent death of its idol King Alexander. Without the king, the supporters of “provincial” (that is to say national) identities in Sava Banovina were in the majority (as indicated by the parliamentary elections in May 1935) and in the case of Slavonska Požega this in the first place indicated the return of the HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) led Croatian national movement to the scene. Hence, Trdić experienced in Slavonska Požega (as well as in the second half of 1920 in Nova Kapela) the collapse of Yugoslav nationalism which is naturally the frequent fate of unnatural ideological projects that have no very serious support and are based on imposition and repression. Trdić managed to keep his position on the surface for only a short period of time: without the support of the regime or of a strong political party the Croatian, Yugo-nationalists were brought down to the status of a distinct minority, hence, the imperative of continuing to exist inevitably led them in the direction of Milan Stojadinović which again brings to light their dependence on the Serbian base. However, the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia (denied in the early 1930s) indicated the final victory of Croatian nationalism, that is to say the final defeat of Yugoslav nationalism and the new regime showed not much consideration for Yugoslav teachers who were the servants of a violent and anti-Croatian dictatorship. Trdić was therefore expelled from the Association of Croatian Teachers and to the Yugoslav Radical Union he was more an obstacle to the prospects of the party than a useful lure for Croats. However, Trdić’s second Yugoslav round did not end peacefully. The regime of the Banovina of Croatia forced him into retirement but the uncompromising Croatian nationalists governing the Independent State of Croatia decided to execute him.
Učitelj i politika Miškulin, Ivica
Scrinia Slavonica,
12/2021, Letnik:
21, Številka:
1
Journal Article, Paper
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
U radu autor ocjenjuje političko djelovanje učitelja i člana Demokratske te
Samostalne demokratske stranke Ivana Trdića u Novoj Kapeli (kotar Nova
Gradiška) i Stražemanu (kotar Požega). Čitatelj se ...posebno upućuje na analizu
stalnih političkih sukoba koje je ovaj deklarirani pristaša unitarnog
jugoslavenstva, centralizirane države i Svetozara Pribićevića imao s pristašama
hrvatske seljačke republike Stjepana Radića u seoskim sredinama u kojima je
službovao. Također, rad pokazuje karakteristične probleme s kojima su se
pripadnici radikalne ideologije jugoslavenskog nacionalizma morali nositi u
hrvatskim seoskim sredinama, kao i neke posljedice opće politizacije
prosvjetnog sustava koje je djelovanje demokrata i samostalnih demokrata proizvelo
u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji.
The descriptive analysis and analytical assessment show that Ivan Trdić’s crucial basic idea was the political ideology of the Yugoslav unitarism. Embodied by its belonging first to the Democratic and later the Independent Democratic Party as well as by the loyalty to Svetozar Pribičević, it was also characterized by the assimilationism, the denial
of ethnic and other realities, ahistoricism, favouritism towards Serbia
and the Serbs as well as by exclusiveness and violence. In view of the fact that Croatian rural communities (particularly Nova Kapela) reacted equally sharply to the intrusive and repressive Yugoslavism, by identifying exclusively with Croatian political parties and at times using violence, Trdić’s position in these parties was from the beginning
rather delicate. After the first electoral defeats had put the democrats in the position of an isolated minority identified with violent Serbianisation and regime violence, they responded with still more vehement reliance on the machinery of government, which naturally produced an even deeper hostility among the local Croatian peasantry. Once the circuit of radical exclusiveness was closed, it fed upon itself, and Trdić’s role in its establishment in a Croatian rural community in the western Slavonian area was an excellent illustration of
processes that also unfolded in other regions. The political weaknesses
of the democrats and independent democrats prevented Trdić from going beyond the local scope; however, the characteristic inclination of both Trdić and his associates to administrative violence to a large extent affected the educational system. Firstly, he used Pribičević’s political
influence to expel real and imaginary enemies from the majority of primary schools in the Nova Gradiška district and to enrol supporters and members of the Democratic party; subsequently he was appointed school principal in Nova Kapela. Trdić enjoyed his heyday only for a short time: in line with the fall of Pribičević, he was transferred from
Nova Kapela and for several years he was relatively passive in Stražeman; certain issues, typical of his employment in Nova Kapela, arose during that period. At the beginning of 1929 Aleksandar Karađorđević’s dictatorship provided new opportunities for Yugoslav nationalists, among others also for Trdić; more on this subsequently.
The descriptive analysis and analytical assessment show that Ivan Trdić’s crucial basic idea was the political ideology of the Yugoslav unitarism. Embodied by its belonging first to the Democratic ...and later the Independent Democratic Party as well as by the loyalty to Svetozar Pribičević, it was also characterized by the assimilationism, the denial of ethnic and other realities, ahistoricism, favouritism towards Serbia and the Serbs as well as by exclusiveness and violence. In view of the fact that Croatian rural communities (particularly Nova Kapela) reacted equally sharply to the intrusive and repressive Yugoslavism, by identifying exclusively with Croatian political parties and at times using violence, Trdić’s position in these parties was from the beginning rather delicate. After the first electoral defeats had put the democrats in the position of an isolated minority identified with violent Serbianisation and regime violence, they responded with still more vehement reliance on the machinery of government, which naturally produced an even deeper hostility among the local Croatian peasantry. Once the circuit of radical exclusiveness was closed, it fed upon itself, and Trdić’s role in its establishment in a Croatian rural community in the western Slavonian area was an excellent illustration of processes that also unfolded in other regions. The political weaknesses of the democrats and independent democrats prevented Trdić from going beyond the local scope; however, the characteristic inclination of both Trdić and his associates to administrative violence to a large extent affected the educational system. Firstly, he used Pribičević’s political influence to expel real and imaginary enemies from the majority of primary schools in the Nova Gradiška district and to enrol supporters and members of the Democratic party; subsequently he was appointed school principal in Nova Kapela. Trdić enjoyed his heyday only for a short time: in line with the fall of Pribičević, he was transferred from Nova Kapela and for several years he was relatively passive in Stražeman; certain issues, typical of his employment in Nova Kapela, arose during that period. At the beginning of 1929 Aleksandar Karađorđević’s dictatorship provided new opportunities for Yugoslav nationalists, among others also for Trdić; more on this subsequently.
The case of the political prisoner and émigré Janjko Sarajlić should be treated as a contribution to the knowledge of the variations of the political opposition to the Yugoslav communist regime in ...the last decade of its existence. Living in poverty, Sarajlić found a way of making a living for himself and his numerous family in West Germany. However, in this state he also experienced a space of freedom, i.e. became acquainted with a different image of the situation in Yugoslavia and accordingly developed a strongly critical attitude toward communism. Subsequently, due to an alleged minor breach of the regulations – bringing prohibited literature into the state - he was accused of having committed a political crime. After the trial he was de facto declared an enemy of the state and was sent to some of the most notorious prisons of communist Croatia (the penal and correctional institutions of Stara Gradiška and Lepoglava). Long-term imprisonment, along with various types of repression, additionally strengthened his hostile attitude toward the regime. Sarajlić’s oppositional activities – possession of prohibited literature, hunger strikes, refusal of work, the writing of petitions and submissions, work for international human rights organizations, membership in Croatian emigrant organizations and his writing efforts – should be evaluated non-violent forms of resistance. In this respect Sarajlić can be defined as an enemy of the state or as a political opponent of the Yugoslav communist regime, who tried to bring about a change in the situation, primarily the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the establishment of an independent Croatian state, through peaceful means.
Autori donose
prijepis programskog teksta istaknutog pripadnika Demokratske stranke
slavonsko-srijemskog prostora, odvjetnika i (kako se tada govorilo) kraljevskog
javnog bilježnika u Slatini Zdravka ...Kovačevića. U njemu se iznose razmišljanja
o ključnom unutarnjem političkom problemu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca,
nezadovoljstvu Hrvata novonastalim stanjem, s posebnim naglaskom na ideologiju
jugoslavenskog unitarizma. Protkana su (zbog slabe očuvanosti stranačkog i
drugog arhivskog gradiva) vrijednim (i u historiografiji uglavnom zanemarenim)
osobnim iskustvima koja je Kovačević imao u prvim godinama političkog
djelovanja u novoj državi. Dokument je popraćen temeljnim podatcima o samom
Kovačeviću i kraćom analizom teksta, kao i motivima kojima je potaknut te
reakcijama na nj.
The authors have provided a copy of the party programme of the lawyer and, as he was referred to at the time, royal notary Zdravko Kovačević in Slatina, a distinguished member of the Democratic Party in the Slavonian-Syrmian area. The text provides reflections on the crucial inner political issue of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the discontent of the Croats with the new conditions, with special emphasis on the ideology of Yugoslav unitarism. They are (due to the poor state of preservation of party political and other archival records) interwoven with Kovačević’s valuable (but mostly disregarded in historiography) personal experience during the first years of his political activities in the new state. The document also provides basic information about Kovačević as well as a brief analysis of the text, his
motives and the reactions to it.
The authors have provided a copy of the party programme of the lawyer and, as he was referred to at the time, royal notary Zdravko Kovačević in Slatina, a distinguished member of the Democratic Party ...in the Slavonian-Syrmian area. The text provides reflections on the crucial inner political issue of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the discontent of the Croats with the new conditions, with special emphasis on the ideology of Yugoslav unitarism. They are (due to the poor state of preservation of party political and other archival records) interwoven with Kovačević’s valuable (but mostly disregarded in historiography) personal experience during the first years of his political activities in the new state. The document also provides basic information about Kovačević as well as a brief analysis of the text, his motives and the reactions to it.
In this paper the author analyses occurrences connected with the oilfields of western
Syrmia (with special emphasis on the oilfield in Đeletovci) based on archival material, the periodicals of the ...time and relevant literature in the context of the implementation of the three peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Croatia (UNPROFOR, UNCRO and UNTAES). Bearing the decisive strategic importance of oilfields of western Syrmia in mind, the author has come to the conclusion that the peacekeeping forces, even within the limitations of traditional peacekeeping operations (UNPROFOR and UNCRO) failed to prevent oil theft by an active approach. By doing so they encouraged the Krajina Serbs in their policy of obstructing the peacekeeping operations. However, a more active role of the peacekeeping forces, albeit in altered circumstances, occurred at the beginning of the UNTAES operation, which was the moment when the later success of the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube River Basin was set out.
If, as had been done by the rare authors who analyzed the issue of the Status of Forces Agreement’s conclusion between the UN and the states of former Yugoslavia, one views SOFA solely as an ...indicator of the degree of cooperation, then Croatia can be characterized as one of the least cooperative participants. Zagreb primarily used the Agreement as a political tool which was supposed to ensure the return of the Croatian authorities in the occupied territories. It was not the most important political asset: infighting about legal status of the peacekeepers was, of course, in the shadow of official and unofficial initiatives and limited military operations, all of which was aimed to redefine the ineffective mandate of the peacekeeping forces of the UN. The financial aspect or the profit, which Zagreb had earned by using the presence of more than twenty thousand foreigners on its territory, can still be rated as a motif of secondary importance: on one hand, it resulted from a failure of political instrumentalisation of the Agreement during 1992, as well as retaliation arising from the infirmity to transform the UNPROFOR into a more efficient type of peacekeeping forces. Zagreb’s tactics on the Status of Forces Agreement had probably brought itself an unnecessary diplomatic damage. Nevertheless, it was the tactics that Zagreb could afford. In an atmosphere with a lack of cooperation of other parties in the conflict (mostly of the Krajina Serbs), the attempt was illegal, but not illegitimate. In any case, the maneuverability of Zagreb would be largely reduced if in March of 1992 the UN approved the proposal of the Agreement for which it had been ready from the second half of 1993. Or, that the UN had accepted the Croatian proposal to define the terms of territory and power, which would have been in accordance with Croatian international legal position at that time. This indicates that the UN position was largely legal, but essentially it was based on its own interpretation of the term. So, probably the beginning of 1992 was therefore the most suitable moment to conclude the Agreement with Croatia. Later, the growing discontent of Zagreb by the UNPROFOR’s effect in the implementation of the mandated tasks was probably an insurmountable obstacle. However, the UN cannot be fully acquitted of the tactics related to the Agreement: from the fact that the insistence on the type model agreement ignores the particularities of the country with which the contract is concluded, the questionable morality of some legal procedures by the UN peacekeepers, the inability to establish an effective system of coordination with individual contingents of peacekeeping forces to the preference of protection of the UN financial interests at the expense of the Croatian legislation.
PDF
