In the literature there are at least two models for probabilistic belief revision: Bayesian updating and imaging Lewis, D. K. (1973),
Counterfactuals
, Blackwell, Oxford; Gärdenfors, P. (1988), ...Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. In this paper we focus on imaging rules that can be described by the following procedure: (1) Identify every state with some real valued vector of characteristics, and accordingly identify every probabilistic belief with an expected vector of characteristics; (2) For every initial belief and every piece of information, choose the revised belief which is compatible with this information and for which the expected vector of characteristics has minimal Euclidean distance to the expected vector of characteristics of the initial belief. This class of rules thus satisfies an intuitive notion of minimal belief revision. The main result in this paper is to provide an axiomatic characterization of this class of imaging rules.
Selecting livestock genetics adapted to arid environments, such as Criollo cattle, is one of several strategies recommended for decreasing the vulnerability to climate change of ranching in the ...southwestern USA. Our objective was to determine whether desirable foraging traits of Criollo cattle previously documented in the Chihuahuan Desert, held true in two of the most climate-vulnerable ecosystems of the Southwest. We conducted a study at Rancho Corta Madera (RCM) in southern California and Dugout Ranch (DR) in southeast Utah. Twenty mature cows, 10 Raramuri Criollo and 10 Red or Black Angus, were monitored with GPS collars during multiple seasons between 2018 and 2021. Geolocation data were used to compute daily distance traveled (km*d−1), movement velocity (m*min−1), path sinuosity (SI), time spent grazing, resting, or traveling (h*d−1), and area of the pasture explored (ha*d−1) as well as to calculate selection of vegetation cover types (E, Ivlev's Electivity Index) by cows of each breed. The effects of breed, season, year, and pasture on each of these metrics were modeled with repeated measures analyses of variance. At both ranches, statistically detectable differences (P ≤ 0.05) between breeds were observed for most behavior metrics during the dormant season. Conversely, few breed differences were observed during the growing season. Criollo cattle exhibited greater relative preference for a number of shrub dominated vegetation types at both ranches, and similar relative selection of grassland dominated sites compared to Angus counterparts. At both ranches, Criollo cattle exhibited similar or less relative preference for riparian areas vs. Angus counterparts. Breed divergence vs. convergence of foraging behaviors during the dormant vs. growing seasons, previously observed in the Chihuahuan Desert, was documented at both sites. Positive system outcomes associated with foraging traits of Criollo cattle could be expected to occur more broadly across the Southwest.
The Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game is reconsidered under the assumption that each player is loss averse and the associated reference point is equal to the highest turned down offer of ...the opponent in the past. This makes the payoffs and therefore potential equilibrium strategies dependent on the history of play. A subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed, in which the strategies depend on the history of play through the current reference points. It is shown that this equilibrium is unique under some assumptions that it shares with the equilibrium in the classical model: immediate acceptance of equilibrium offers, indifference between acceptance and rejection of such offers, and strategies depending only on the current reference points. It is also shown that in this equilibrium loss aversion is a disadvantage. Moreover, a relation with asymmetric Nash bargaining is established, where a player’s bargaining power is negatively related to own loss aversion and positively to the opponent’s loss aversion.
► Incorporation of loss aversion in the alternating offers bargaining game. ► Reference outcome is equal to the highest turned down offer. ► In subgame perfect equilibrium own loss aversion hurts. ► In subgame perfect equilibrium the opponent’s loss aversion benefits. ► Nash bargaining in the limit, power inversely related to loss aversion.
Strategic disclosure of random variables Flesch, János; Perea, Andrés
European journal of operational research,
02/2011, Letnik:
209, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
We consider a game
G
n
played by two players. There are
n independent random variables
Z
1,
…
,
Z
n
, each of which is uniformly distributed on 0,1. Both players know
n, the independence and the ...distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations
z
≔
(
z
1,
…
,
z
n
) of them. Player 1 begins by choosing an order
z
k
1
,
…
,
z
k
n
of the realizations. Player 2, who does not know the realizations, faces a stopping problem. At period 1, player 2 learns
z
k
1
. If player 2 accepts, then player 1 pays
z
k
1
euros to player 2 and play ends. Otherwise, if player 2 rejects, play continues similarly at period 2 with player 1 offering
z
k
2
euros to player 2. Play continues until player 2 accepts an offer. If player 2 has rejected
n
−
1 times, player 2 has to accept the last offer at period
n. This model extends
Moser’s (1956) problem, which assumes a non-strategic player 1.
We examine different types of strategies for the players and determine their guarantee-levels. Although we do not find the exact max–min and min–max values of the game
G
n
in general, we provide an interval
I
n
=
a
n
,
b
n
containing these such that the length of
I
n
is at most 0.07 and converges to 0 as
n tends to infinity. We also point out strategies, with a relatively simple structure, which guarantee that player 1 has to pay at most
b
n
and player 2 receives at least
a
n
. In addition, we completely solve the special case
G
2 where there are only two random variables. We mention a number of intriguing open questions and conjectures, which may initiate further research on this subject.
Psychological games enable us to study diverse motivations like anger, guilt, and intention-based reciprocity using models of rational strategic choice based on common belief in rationality (aka ...correlated rationalizability). This is achieved by letting utility depend not only on outcomes and beliefs about others’ behavior but also on higher-order beliefs. It is an open question whether such belief-dependent utilities can be made consistent with common belief in rationality in all empirically relevant cases. In this paper, we use a novel existence condition to show that common belief in rationality is possible for any empirically relevant case of belief-dependent utility. In addition, we present a recursive elimination procedure that characterizes common belief in rationality under minimal assumptions on belief-dependent utility functions.
In this paper we study environments in which agents can transfer influence to others by supporting them. When planning whom to support, they should take into account the future effect of this, since ...the receiving agent might use this influence to support others in the future. We show that in the presence of a finite horizon there is an essentially unique optimal support behavior which can be characterized in terms of associated marginal value functions. The analysis of these marginal value functions allows us to derive qualitative properties of optimal support strategies under different specific environments and to explicitly compute the optimal support behavior in some numerical examples. We also investigate the case of an infinite horizon. Examples show that multiple equilibria may appear in this setting, some of which sustaining a degree of cooperation that would not be possible under a finite horizon.
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