Violations of labour law in Chile Kanbur, Ravi; Ronconi, Lucas; Wedenoja, Leigh
Revue internationale du travail,
12/2013, Letnik:
152, Številka:
3-4
Journal Article
// ABSTRACT IN FRENCH : Les auteurs quantifient les violations du droit du travail au Chili en matière de salaire minimum, de limitation du temps de travail, de contrat écrit et de cotisations au ...régime de retraite. Un tiers des travailleurs a vu bafouer au moins l'un de ces droits, avec d'importantes variations des violations selon la période, la disposition législative et les caractéristiques des travailleurs et des entreprises. On observe un moindre respect des droits des femmes, des travailleurs d'origine étrangère, de la population indigène et des travailleurs les moins instruits, ainsi que dans les petites entreprises et les ré ;gions agricoles. Les auteurs en appellent à des recherches complémentaires pour renforcer l'application du droit.
Résumé.
Les auteurs quantifient les violations du droit du travail au Chili en matière de salaire minimum, de limitation du temps de travail, de contrat écrit et de cotisations au régime de retraite. ...Un tiers des travailleurs a vu bafouer au moins l'un de ces droits, avec d'importantes variations des violations selon la période, la disposition législative et les caractéristiques des travailleurs et des entreprises. On observe un moindre respect des droits des femmes, des travailleurs d'origine étrangère, de la population indigène et des travailleurs les moins instruits, ainsi que dans les petites entreprises et les régions agricoles. Les auteurs en appellent à des recherches complémentaires pour renforcer l'application du droit.
In a context of increasing teachers' militancy in Argentina, this article provides the first empirical analysis of teachers' strikes in all twenty-four Argentine provinces during the 1990s. Using a ...cross-provincial statistical analysis, it explains the wide variation across provinces and across time of Argentine teachers' strikes. It demonstrates that political alignments between provincial governors and teachers' unions explain these patterns better than organizational and institutional variables, which strongly shape public-sector labor relations in other countries. We emphasize the discretion of provincial governors, for both the application of labor regulations and budgetary appropriations in the politicization of labor relations in the education sector. Our findings confirm the politicization of provincial public-sector labor relations in Argentina, especially after the decentralization of education resulted in the provincialization of teachers' protests. Publication Abstract
The first chapter of my dissertation empirically assesses the effect of government enforcement of labor regulations on compliance, employment and wages using a panel across Argentine provinces ...between 1995 and 2002. I find that enforcement increases compliance and has no significant effect on employment and average wages. The second chapter studies the emergence and growth of organizations of poor, unemployed and previously unorganized people that occurred in Argentina since 1996. I argue that the emergence and growth of the movement was triggered and fueled by the implementation of temporary public works programs in the early nineties and the clientelistic manner in which the programs were administered by the government. Workfare fostered networking among aggrieved individuals and provided selective incentives and external resources allowing these incipient organizations to become the most active social actor in the country. The third chapter re-evaluates targeting and income effects of temporary public works programs using alternative samples of participants. Contrary to previous research, I find more misallocation of funds and smaller income effects.
In 1996 the Argentine government, with financial and technical assistance from the World Bank, implemented a temporary public works program known as Programa Trabajar. The program was targeted toward ...poor and unemployed people, and a main objective was to increase the current income of recipients. Program participants received a maximum benefit of 200 pesos per month (equal to the legal minimum wage) in exchange for working in community projects. In this paper, the author uses alterative samples of workfare participants in Argentina to reassess targeting and income effects between 1997 and 2002. The next section explores poverty targeting using four samples of workfare participants collected by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC). The paper then computes average income effects during treatment using longitudinal data between October 2000 and May 2002, controlling for pretreatment income and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.