The author analyzes the effect of government enforcement on compliance with labor regulations in Argentina, a country where only half of the workforce receives all the benefits to which they are ...legally entitled. Constructing panel data for the period 1995-2002 across provinces and using the number of labor inspectors per capita as a proxy for enforcement, he estimates the effect of enforcement on compliance with six employment and social security regulations: minimum wage, maximum hours, paid vacation time, annual extra monthly wage, workers compensation insurance, and health insurance. Because of potential simultaneity between enforcement and compliance, the author explores instrumenting enforcement by electoral years. Twostage least squares estimates suggest enforcement increases compliance.
This paper provides new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations in eighteen Latin American countries between 1985 and 2009, and explores how it is affected by external and domestic ...factors. The results suggest that governments react to the competitive pressures produced by trade opening by turning a blind eye to noncompliance, but increase enforcement in response to higher FDI. Governments also react to the demands of their constituent base to keep their support and reinforce partisan affinities, and workers are more effective in more democratic systems.
The distinction between de jure and de facto regulation is well understood in theory, but has rarely been applied to cross‐country empirical work on the impact of labour regulation on labour market ...outcomes for lack of data. Policy debate has been based on measures of stringency of law, suggesting a negative correlation between labour regulation and labour market outcomes. This article provides new cross‐country measures of labour law enforcement and evidence of a negative correlation between stringency and intensity of enforcement. Previous results concerning the consequences of labour regulation and the legal origins theory no longer hold when a measure of effective labour regulation is used.
This paper argues that political brokers pay particular attention to household size, and the age distribution of its members, when allocating scarce indivisible social benefits. Because people ...usually share their income with other household members, allocating a social benefit to an individual member of a household with
n
voters is likely to bring more political support than allocating the same benefit to an individual member of a household with
n-1
voters. Based on the main Argentine household survey and on personal interviews with 120 brokers, this paper shows that brokers effectively collect information on family size and age composition and allocate scarce temporary public works programs to families with more voters, unintentionally discriminating against families with children not old enough to vote.
The paper provides difference‐in‐differences estimates suggesting that Latin American countries that signed a free trade agreement with the United States experienced an increase in the number of ...labor inspectors and inspections. We also find large heterogeneity across signers and no evidence that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had a positive impact on Mexico. We conclude by suggesting that the stringency of content of the accord and the resources devoted by the U.S. government to increase enforcement make a difference.
This paper empirically explores the incidence of labor inspections across registered firms in 72 developing countries. Results show that larger firms are more likely to be inspected than smaller ...firms. Interestingly, inspections are less likely to occur among firms with a larger share of low‐skilled workers, and that operate in industries with more tax evasion. We explore the heterogeneity of these findings across income and geographic groups, and conclude by briefly discussing the consistency of the stylized facts with competing theories of inspection agencies’ behavior.
Empirical evidence on the impact of stringent land use regulations on the price of land and housing in urban areas is growing, yet most research has been carried out in countries where ordinances are ...enforced. If enforcement is lax, the ultimate impact of strict rules on land and housing prices is unclear. Lower levels of compliance with rules can result in negative externalities and thereby exert downward pressure on the price of formal land. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between land use regulations, compliance and land prices in the three major metropolitan areas of Argentina, the country with the most stringent land use and urban development regulations in Latin America, using an original dataset gathered from parcel- and municipal-level surveys. Results show that municipalities with higher levels of regulation have lower rates of compliance with property laws, and lots selling legally in these municipalities have lower land prices.
Résumé
Selon l'approche «insiders‐outsiders», qui domine le discours sur le droit du travail, la législation protectrice de l'emploi favorise les travailleurs dotés d'un emploi stable, les insiders, ...au détriment des outsiders, moins bien lotis. Les outsiders devraient de ce fait être favorables à la déréglementation. Les auteurs observent pourtant que, dans les pays en développement, ceux‐ci sont au contraire très majoritairement attachés à la protection de l'emploi. Ils plaident donc pour une remise en question de l'opposition traditionnelle entre insiders et outsiders et pour une meilleure prise en compte d'aspects comme la mutualisation des gains, les transitions professionnelles, l'équité ou le pouvoir de l'employeur.
Resumen
La perspectiva insider‐outsider, dominante en el discurso sobre la regulación laboral, sostiene que las disposiciones protectoras se mantienen vigentes en interés de sus beneficiarios ...(insiders), aunque perjudican a otros trabajadores menos acomodados (outsiders). Si la contraposición entre ambas categorías fuera tal como se formula en el modelo, los outsiders se opondrían rotundamente a la regulación. Sin embargo, nuestras evidencias de que los outsiders en los países en desarrollo están mayoritariamente a favor de las medidas regulatorias obligan a replantear la tajante dicotomía insider‐outsider. Sugerimos distintas líneas de investigación, como los procesos redistributivos, las transiciones, la equidad y el poder del empleador en los mercados de trabajo.
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