This article presents and critically assesses the latest anthropological and archaeological research on the chronology, lethality, and frequency of violence and war in human history. Stepping back ...from the rhetorically polarized dispute between ‘Hobbesians’ and ‘Rousseauans’, the article examines the methods and findings of the latest research in a conceptually novel way, i.e. by dropping the existing and widely used polarized terms that have inevitably framed the literature so far. The article demonstrates that multiple sources of evidence point more in the direction of the modal human prehistoric social organization, i.e. nomadic hunter-gatherers, likely having warfare only in a minority of cases, or war even being virtually non-existent (with interpersonal violence being more common). The dispute over this claim so far is found to stem, at least in part, from the varying definitions of war and the grouping together of nomadic with complex foragers. More significantly, the disagreement is due to different sampling and sourcing techniques of different researchers, the biggest divide being between self-selection/systematic sampling and first-best/second-best sources. Important potential warlike exceptions are also noted and discussed in the article from multiple angles (Jebel Sahaba, Nataruk, Aboriginal Australia, etc.), as are the discovered precursors and enabling conditions of war, such as the complexification of (nomadic) hunter-gatherer societies with the transition to settled life.
The notion that the world has been witnessing a profound neoliberal transformation since around the 1980s onward is widely accepted in many parts of social science and the humanities. Moreover, the ...overarching impression is that this transformation has mostly been regrettable in economic, political, and other social terms. At the same time, careful interdisciplinary research recently uncovered that neoliberalism has been notoriously hard to define. Based on that research, this article first clarifies the conceptual confusion surrounding neoliberalism and presents a broad, synthetic institutions-based working definition of it that captures its typical contemporary usages. The article then asks if a systematic empirical assessment of neoliberalism’s social impact over the past decades across the world is even possible. It suggests it is by empirically operationalizing neoliberalism in three distinct, yet potentially overlapping, ways that appear in the literature: first, as a broad set of economic institutions measured by economic freedom indexes; second, as the process of international trade liberalization (itself proxied by import shocks); and third, as shock-therapy type institutional reforms in (parts of) post-communist Europe. Synthesizing the findings of the existing vast research literature, the main conclusion of the article is that neoliberalism’s social impact has been more nuanced than suggested by prevailing discourse.
The notion of ‘rationality’ has always been one of the more controversial social-scientific ideas. Today there exist many conceptual varieties of rationality which are often less than clearly ...distinguished and the precise intellectual import of which likewise tends to be opaque. In this article I draw on classical and contemporary examples from sociology, political science and economics in the effort to clarify the many meanings of the notion and to demonstrate that it is more useful as well as more legitimate for explanatory purposes than some canonical critiques suggest. As the behavioral economics revolution has made clear, many varieties of rationality are both empirically and theoretically limited or outright falsified. However, although it is now certain that rationality cannot be the singular basis of a universal, general theory of social behavior, I argue it can and should form one important part of a larger conceptual toolbox upon which a social theorist can draw when devising tractable theoretical explanations of social phenomena.
Peter T. Leeson and Tobias Wolbring agree with me that rationality, properly clarified, should continue to assume an important theoretical role in modern social science. We disagree, however, about ...the precise extent of its role. In my reply to the debate I focus on two related issues that have emerged. First, can and should the concepts of rationality, or rational choice theory (RCT) more generally, be employed as something more than just one tool among many? Second, can all cases of norm-following be satisfactorily subsumed by rationality and RCT analysis?
The paper examines two ubiquitous concepts of power: the “classical sociological” concept which draws on Max Weber’s definition of power, and the “Foucauldian” concept which stems from Michel ...Foucault’s genealogical works. Three main theses are argued for. First, the two concepts are not, in most respects, as radically different as it is usually claimed. It is demonstrated that both can make room for different sources of power, for understanding power in a non-reified way, for the fact that power is rarely completely centralised, etc. Second, in those respects in which the two concepts actually differ, the classical view of power is more convincing and useful than the Foucauldian one. It is demonstrated that the Foucauldian view is implicitly positivist in the normative domain and thus unable to differentiate between power and domination, and that it succumbs to errors of methodological holism (i.e. undertheorising agency). Third, it is argued that the classical sociological view allows to analytically distinguish between power, domination and exploitation. These three categories are shown not to be synonymous and to carry with them importantly different sociological implications. It is demonstrated that exploitation cannot merely refer to any process of unpaid appropriation of surplus as obvious false positives are generated from this definition. Nonetheless, such appropriation is the fundamental characteristic which differentiates exploitation from domination (but not power itself), and this reveals an important sociological implication for the dynamics of struggle of the exploited against exploitation in contrast to the struggle of the dominated against the dominators.
Abstract How have broad patterns of violence and war changed from the dawn of humanity up to present time? In answering this question, researchers have typically framed their arguments and evidence ...in terms of the polarized debate between Hobbes (or hawks) and Rousseau (or doves). This article moves beyond the stalemated debate and integrates the most robust existing theoretical developments and empirical findings that have emerged from various disciplines over the past 20 years – primarily sociology, political science, anthropology, and archaeology – to answer the question. Drawing on carefully curated violent lethality data for pre historically appropriate hunter-gatherers, as well as historical pre-state and state societies, it shows that simple narratives of violence and war decreasing through history from ostensibly high levels in the human state of nature, on the one hand, and the obverse insistence that the once mostly peaceful communities became highly belligerent with the transition to modernity, on the other, are both wrong. Instead, multiple lines of existing evidence and theoretical perspectives suggest a complex, non-linear, Kuznets-style relationship between violence and the passage of history.
The communist elite of Yugoslavia established Yugoslavia anew during World War II. A federal communist arrangement was put in place, with the period shifting from an almost totalitarian regime ...towards an operationally consociational one. In this paper, we question the issue of the homogeneity and very existence of the Yugoslav ruling communist elite in the period 1943–1991. We focus on decision-making, discussions and purges by considering newly available archival sources. The article finds that while the elite was successful in taking power it was not long before the elite started to be ethnically segmented. The origins of this segmentation related to how resolution of the national question of the nations at issue was understood, in turn further driving the segmentation process. Overall, we argue that individual national elites were already established by 1972.
What can sociology learn about the logic of social behaviour from the field of cultural evolution? How can sociology enrich cultural evolutionary theory? In this article, I present and examine ...cultural evolutionary theory by specifying its various proposed mechanisms, such as cultural drift, biased transmission and cultural selection (including cultural group selection), and by investigating concrete examples of social phenomena to which the theory has been applied. My findings are three‐fold. First, cultural evolutionary mechanisms should not be dismissed by sociologists but instead, given their strong explanatory power in certain cases, incorporated into their basic theoretical toolkit. Second, one mechanism, i.e. cultural selection, can even underpin a more nuanced and micro‐founded sociological functionalism that avoids some of the errors of structural functionalism. This, however, should not be celebrated too soon as the applicability of cultural selection is more limited than cultural evolutionists acknowledge. Third, drawing on historical sociology and comparative politics I also uncover further important sociological limitations of the cultural evolutionary approach that should be heeded by the latter. I focus on two: (1) its inapplicability to cases of intentional decision‐making and strategizing, and (2) its inability to subsume the phenomenon of social power.
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