This article explores the largely overlooked triangular relations among the United States, Iran and Israel during the 1960s, and unveils the gradual entanglement of the three regimes. With its focus ...on the smaller states, it reveals that Iran and Israel actively sought to influence the development of their relations to the United States, as well as their situation in the Middle East. Starting around 1963, Iran and Israel developed a set of shared foreign policy strategies: a coordination of their efforts to sway US policy in their favor, and to protect their regimes from their common threat-the spread of radical Arab nationalism. US officials were skeptical onlookers to the evolving Israeli-Iranian ties and activities, yet their lack of effective response both allowed and reinforced them. Ultimately, these efforts contributed to the Arab loss in the Arab-Israeli June 1967 War, and the subsequent Arab breach of relations with the United States, which again moved Israel and Iran further into the US orbit.
During the spring of 1976, the Syrian army unexpectedly intervened in the Lebanese civil war. Syria's President Hafez al-Assad had shifted his allegiances, abandoning his Muslim-Palestinian partners ...and joining the conflict in order to prevent the Christians from losing. Assad feared that if the PLO managed to tip the balance of power in Lebanon in its favour, an Israeli response would be inevitable. Following his move to prevent this, Israel did nothing. This uncharacteristic prudence from Israel when faced with Syrian forces entering Lebanon has been attributed by many analysts to a 'red line agreement' which asserted a de facto partitioning of Lebanon into Israeli and Syrian spheres of influence, negotiated in secret by the powerful US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Drawing upon American and Israeli archival sources, this article argues that the 'red line agreement' was in fact no agreement at all but rather a short-lived Syrian-Israeli marriage of convenience within which the Americans acted as mediators. The Syrians and Israelis danced 'a careful minuet' in southern Lebanon, constantly probing each other's strategic thresholds while seeking US assurances that neither would attack the other.
Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians? This article draws the line all the way back to the very first Arab-Israeli negotiations. In 1949, on the Island of Rhodes, UN mediator ...Ralph Bunche negotiated an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. The outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war constituted the immediate context for the negotiations and was important for the final outcome. Israel had won; the Arab states had lost the war. A large number of Palestinians had fled and had lost their homeland. After the war, Israel was in a much stronger military position than Egypt, and could resume the war if necessary. New empirical evidence shows that this imbalance of power on the ground was strengthened by strong support in Israel's favor from the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, as well as from the US administration. Such support served to limit the UN mediator's room for maneuver and ultimately contributed to a biased agreement. An analysis of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt at Rhodes sheds light on and widens our understanding of the approach and power relations which marked the 1949 negotiations. The armistice negotiations represent the first example of a process and an agreement based largely on Israeli premises. Such an agreement could not provide the basis for peace in the Middle East.
After the Arab states' devastating defeat in the 1948 war with Israel, Syria refused to give in without a fight. Syria held on to several bridgeheads inside the former Palestine. Proving as skillful ...as their Israeli opponents at the game of contradictory arguments, the Syrians steadfastly
refused to concede to Israel's demands. The negotiations in 1949 eventually resulted in a demilitarized zone on the Syrian-Israeli border, and with it a state of belligerency was cemented.
Da Israel invaderte Libanon sommeren 1982, hadde haukene i Israel stor innflytelse på Reagan-administrasjonens politikk. Den amerikanske politikken var støttende og passiv overfor den israelske ...regjeringens invasjon. Samtidig var den likegyldig overfor skjebnen til den palestinske befolkningen i Libanon.
En underdanig supermakt Ferdinand Nordanger; Hilde Henriksen Waage
Babylon (Oslo. Online),
12/2022, Letnik:
20, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Da Israel invaderte Libanon sommeren 1982, hadde haukene i Israel stor innflytelse på Reagan-administrasjonens politikk. Den amerikanske politikken var støttende og passiv overfor den israelske ...regjeringens invasjon. Samtidig var den likegyldig overfor skjebnen til den palestinske befolkningen i Libanon.
Å gjøre opp regning uten vert? Emma Skovro Thoresen; Hilde Henriksen Waage
Babylon (Oslo. Online),
04/2023, Letnik:
21, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Da amerikanerne i september 1978 inviterte Egypt og Israel til Camp David for å forhandle om fred i Midtøsten, ble verken palestinerne, Jordan eller Syria invitert. Amerikanerne skulle raskt få ...erfare at uten deres støtte og hjelp skulle det bli svært vanskelig, om ikke umulig, å gjennomføre resultatene av fredsforhandlingene.
Våre menn er gode til å skyte Silje Gill Andby Solvang; Hilde Henriksen Waage
Babylon (Oslo. Online),
04/2023, Letnik:
21, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
I mars 1978 krysset israelske soldater grensen til Libanon. Operasjon Litani var en reaksjon på et terrorangrep som hadde funnet sted i Israel få dager tidligere. Invasjonen ble til hodebry for USAs ...president Jimmy Carter, som var i full sving med å få i gang fredssamtaler mellom Israel og Egypt. Hvilken betydning fikk invasjonen for Carters fredsinitiativ?
Hvorfor bidro Norge med militære styrker til United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) i 1978? Hvorfor trakk ikke Norge sine styrker ut da det viste seg at nordmennene ikke hadde noen mulighet ...til å oppfylle FNs mandat, og da situasjonen på bakken gikk fra vondt til verre og var direkte farlig for norsk militært personell? Litteraturen rundt årsakene til at norske soldater ble sendt på FN-oppdrag, har vært sentrert rundt to motiver: sikkerhetspolitiske egeninteresser og altruisme. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan disse to motivene kom til uttrykk vedrørende den norske deltakelsen i UNIFIL. Samtidig var det klart for norske myndigheter at de hadde et svært begrenset handlingsrom i Libanon. Norges deltakelse skyldtes i utgangspunktet FNs særstilling i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Avgjørelsen om å delta ble tatt på autopilot, men da soldatene først var i Libanon, oppfattet norske myndigheter at bordet fanget. FN-styrken ble en fast brikke ingen turte flytte på. De politiske omkostningene ved å trekke seg ut ble vurdert som for store, selv om situasjonen ble radikalt endret som en følge av den israelske invasjonen i 1982. Samtidig anså norske militære ledere oppdraget som meningsløst.
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