A formal model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of leadership turnover is analyzed where (1) successive leaders of the same state may differ in their resolve, (2) their resolve is private ...information, and (3) the probability of leadership turnover depends on bargaining behavior and conflict outcomes. The model provides novel answers to a number of questions about the relationship between an incumbent's time in office, the prospects of losing office, the anticipated behavior of future leaders, and the current probability of conflict. Taken together, these results add further weight to recent claims that leaders, not states, should be considered the fundamental units of analysis in international relations.
I analyze a model of coalition war termination in which continued fighting prevents power from shifting in an enemy’s favor but causes power to shift between partners. War ends in equilibrium when ...both across- and within-side distributions of power are sufficiently stable, but coalition politics can shorten or lengthen the war. When within-side power is shifting but the rising partner’s stakes in the war are low, the war ends “early,” before fighting can solve the underlying bargaining problem. When continued fighting strengthens the rising partner sufficiently, its declining partner acquiesces in continued fighting when intramural discord is costly or coalition exit is unattractive, causing the war to end “late,” well after the enemy’s power has been stabilized. I use the model to account for the early end of World War I and the late end of the Paraguayan War and then discuss implications for research design, war outbreak, and balancing coalitions.
Great Power Intervention and War Wolford, Scott
International studies quarterly,
12/2022, Letnik:
67, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Abstract
Great powers often extract concessions whether they intervene during or after other states’ wars. I analyze crisis bargaining between two primary disputants and a great power that may ...intervene to extract concessions from the victor. When disputants face commitment problems, the threat of intervention discourages declining states from attacking and enables rising states to make otherwise-incredible commitments to avoid war. When disputants face information problems, uninformed states find risking war less attractive, and informed states accept less favorable proposals, regardless of their private information. The mechanism by which the threat of intervention discourages war depends on great powers’ military reach and the side(s) against which they intervene. The model shows how (i) changing great power capabilities can lead to the outbreak of war between other states, (ii) these effects are mediated by hierarchical relationships, and (iii) great powers can create international order not with principle but with selfishness.
I introduce this issue's symposium on the Russo-Ukrainian War by giving a brief overview of the bargaining framework, which asks why states sometimes use war to resolve disputes despite common ...knowledge that fighting is wasteful. I describe two types of mechanism—costly war and costly peace—and briefly discuss each symposium contribution in relation to its proposed mechanism(s). I also discuss the advantages of the bargaining framework for identifying and ruling out potential causal mechanisms in historical cases and close with some suggestions for continued work in the modeling dialogue between theory and evidence in the study of war.
Historically, anecdotal observations support the likelihood of human-assisted invasive insect dispersal to new environments. No previous studies have investigated the ability of insects to remain ...attached to moving vehicles; however, such information is critical for prioritizing research, mitigation activities and understanding anthropogenic effects on biotic communities. Lycorma delicatula (White), spotted lanternfly (SLF), an invasive insect whose range is currently expanding throughout the United States, is commonly observed in urban settings and near transportation hubs. We developed a novel method to test SLF’s ability to remain on vehicle surfaces including bonnet, nose wing, windscreen, wipers and scuttle panel using laminar wind flow from 0 to 100 ± 5 km h −1 . We found all mobile life stages (nymphs and adults) could remain on the vehicle up to 100 km h −1 . First instar nymphs and early season adults remained attached at significantly higher wind speeds than other stages. A brief acclimatization period prior to wind delivery increased attachment duration for all life stages except later season adults. The importance of outliers in the success of invasive species is well established. Given these results, any hitchhiking SLF could potentially establish incipient populations. This methodology will be beneficial for exploring human-assisted dispersal of other invasive arthropods.
I analyze a three-actor model of crisis bargaining with two key features. First, diplomatic opposition raises the costs of war, but an informed state can avoid it by conveying restraint to a ...supporter. Second, the means of conveying restraint may fail to convince an enemy tempted to risk war of the informed state’s willingness to fight. I derive three results. First, war is more likely when third parties believe the informed state to be generally restrained. Second, the threat of opposition that modestly affects the costs of war discourages risky bluffing. Third, the threat of opposition that substantially raises the costs of war can lead states to mask a true willingness to fight, securing diplomatic support at the price of an elevated risk of war despite the availability of a credible signal. Building diplomatic coalitions to prevent balancing can simultaneously make credible communication that averts war both easy and unattractive.
How do coalition partners affect the dynamics of crisis bargaining? I analyze a model in which a potential coalition leader faces a trade-off between signaling resolve to a target and retaining a ...partner's support by limiting the costs of war. The strength of the target conditions the partner's effect. When the target is strong, the need to ensure military cooperation reduces the probability of war by discouraging bluffing, though resolute types can signal resolve by foregoing coalitional support. When the target is weaker, a resolute coalition leader moderates threats to preserve military cooperation, foregoing the chance to signal resolve and increasing the chances of war, even as the partner successfully moderates the leader's bargaining posture. Thus, coalitions may face higher probabilities of war against weaker targets than stronger ones, coalitions are more likely against weak than strong targets, and partners can increase or decrease the probability of war.
The Problem of Shared Victory Wolford, Scott
The Journal of politics,
04/2017, Letnik:
79, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
War-winning coalitions face a unique problem of ensuring multilaterally credible commitments to the distribution and defense of a new postwar status quo. Some sustain cooperation for years or ...decades, yet others collapse into intramural violence. Why do some victorious coalitions collapse into war, while others do not? I analyze data on war-winning coalitions from 1816 to 2007, using an event history framework to model the duration of postwar peace between their members. Increasing coalition size is associated with less durable postwar peace, while more extensive prewar alliance commitments are associated with less durable peace and great power participation is associated with more durable peace. These results have implications for the survival of postwar settlements, for the role of alliances and great powers in preserving world order, and for assessing the implications of modern theories of war.
I analyze a model of war expansion in the shadow of international law, where neutrality regimes emerge as equilibria in which only aggressive states are expected to violate the law. By sorting ...belligerents according to their ambitions (restrained or aggressive), neutrality regimes can help resolve third-party uncertainty over the desirability of balancing. Punishment for violations of the law emerges in equilibrium from self-interested power calculations absent any principled legal commitment. The model shows that (a) neutrality regimes can be effective not despite but because of inconsistent compliance; (b) strong third parties are uniquely prone to failures to balance under neutrality regimes; and (c) ratification of neutrality regimes can be facilitated by mutual and severe mistrust. Neutrality regimes need not be epiphenomenal to power politics; rather, they can support balance-of-power systems.
Abstract
Twelve of twenty-six war-winning coalitions since 1815 have seen at least two members go to war against one another after victory. What separates durable and fragile war-winning coalitions? ...To answer this question, we analyze a game-theoretic model of shifting intra-coalition power and collective deterrence. We show that (1) shifting power within war-winning coalitions can undermine commitments to the postwar settlement, but (2) revisionist threats from a powerful defeated side can enhance the credibility of commitments within the winning coalition, securing peace when intra-coalition war would otherwise be inevitable. We also recover these patterns in empirical models of the outbreak of war between former coalition partners: shifting power within a coalition is associated with increased probabilities of intra-coalition war, but only when the defeated side is not too powerful. A common enemy can thus preserve peace between former partners who would otherwise go to war over the terms of shared victory.
