I claim that objective consequentialism (OC) faces a problem stemming from the existence in some situations of a plurality of chances relevant to the outcomes of an agent’s acts. I suggest that this ...phenomenon bears structural resemblance to the well-known Reference Class problem. I outline a few ways in which one could attempt to deal with the issue, suggesting that it is the higher-level chance that should be employed by OC.
We investigate a model of becoming—classical sequential growth (CSG)—that has been proposed within the framework of causal sets (causets), with the latter defined as order types of certain partial ...orderings. To investigate how causets grow, we introduce special sequences of causets, which we call “csg-paths”. We prove a number of results concerning relations between csg-paths and causets. These results paint a highly non-trivial picture of csg-paths. There are uncountably many csg-paths, all of them sharing the same beginning, after which they branch. Every infinite csg-path achieves in the limit an infinite causet, and vice versa, every infinite causet is achieved in the limit by an infinite csg-path. However, coalescing csg-paths, i.e., ones that achieve the same causet even after forking off at some point, are ubiquitous.
What chance-credence norms should be Wroński, Leszek; Gyenis, Zalán; Cocchiaro, Mariangela Zoe
Synthese (Dordrecht),
12/2022, Letnik:
200, Številka:
6
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
We show a somewhat surprising result concerning the relationship between the Principal Principle and its allegedly generalized form. Then, we formulate a few desiderata concerning chance-credence ...norms and argue that none of the norms widely discussed in the literature satisfies all of them. We suggest that the New Principle comes out as the best contender.
On a conjecture by San Pedro Wroński, Leszek
European journal for philosophy of science,
10/2014, Letnik:
4, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Odprti dostop
In a recent paper in this Journal Iñaki San Pedro put forward a conjecture regarding the relationship between no-conspiracy and parameter independence in EPR scenarios; namely, that violation of the ...former implies violation of the latter. He also offered an argument supporting the conjecture. In this short note I present a method of constructing counterexamples to the conjecture and point to a mistake in the argument.
We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces (Hofer-Szabó et al. 1999; Gyenis and Rédei 2004). We prove that (i) any ...classical probability space has a causally closed extension; (ii) any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and (iii) any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style 'explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality.
PDF
